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CHAPTER1
Introduction
1.1 Production for ages
In economics the traditional production factors are natural resources, labor and capi-
tal [105]. The first additional most important production factor to combine these factors
in a profitable way into produced goods is certainly entrepreneurship. If one owns enough
land for growing crops and labor and tools like hoes and scythes are abundant for planting
the seeds and harvest the crops, this needs to be done in the right seasons so value is added
to the seeds and profit can be made on selling the crops. In this traditional setting, more
profit can be made if one owns more land, or cheaper laborers or more sustainable tools.
But, entrepreneurship involves taking risks. When seeds are planted, the farmer does
not knowwhether there will be enough rain and sunshine for growing the seeds. Of course,
the farmer can aid the growing process by adding more capital to the growing process, for
instance a watering can, combined with more resources, water or even soluble fertilizers,
but this will cut back the eventual profit because of the costs of the water and watering
can. Doing so, the farmer mitigates the risk of dead or not fully grown plants that probably
have little or no value. Another risk of the farmer is illness of employees, if on harvest
day all employees are in bed with influenza, the unharvested crops might rot on the land.
And when the handle of the hoe breaks due to intensive usage new capital needs to be
attracted for replacing the broken handle.
Then the question arises, how many days of illness strikes a regular employee during
the harvest season on average? And what is the chance that a handle breaks and needs
to be replaced? Which brand of fertilizer influences the growth of the crop significantly?
And at what point is the number of plants too large to harvest with the current number of
employees?
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1.2 Quantifying Risk Appetites
Usually, these operational and strategic questions are tackled with historic data. A smart
entrepreneur keeps track of yearly turnovers, production rates, replaced tools, etc. If one
is new in a region of market and no proprietary data is available, the neighbor can be
inquired about last year’s raining days, thus obtaining benchmark figures. Modern day
Internet even provides a lot of weather and demographic information directly on-line.
Having historical data in your hands, risks can be calculated and the drivers of the
risk can be identified and the risk mitigated. The calculated risk is then taken by the
entrepreneur, avoiding sudden jack-in-the-boxes. Identifying risks is a good first step in
cautious entrepreneurship, but calculating the chance that a risk materializes is an impor-
tant second.
An obvious example where risks were not properly quantified is the recent financial
crisis. Suddenly unstable portfolios of securities backed with subprime mortgages lost
their values. Many banks around the world had to amortize parts of their equities, resulting
in an unstable global financial market. Nowadays banks do realize that they were not fully
aware of the risks of certain securities that resulted in the financial crisis.
1.3 Research Rationale
For the last decades software has become an important production factor as well. Many
production processes depend on different software systems. Systems that support deci-
sions or even make decisions and produce without human intervention. Software often
helps in reducing the workload of humans; ranging from placing a box on a certain shelf
in a large warehouse to searching for the file of a certain patient in a doctor’s database. In
software engineering the same questions emerge as in agriculture. Projects involving the
production of software systems are often announced with a flourish of trumpets detailing
the improvements the project will result as soon as the project is finished. Promising faster
travel from A to B due to improved train schedules or fewer lost suitcases because of a
more efficient luggage control system on the airport. Too often these projects are later
encountered on newspaper front pages because the projects are costing too much, taking
too long and not delivering the desired functionality. Getting a grip on these important
key performance indicators (KPIs) will at least help in understanding where and when
a project derailed from its tracks. But what common methods and metrics can be used
for project portfolios with considerable IT components? At what point can a project be
marked as never ending or derailed? What are the industry benchmarks for projects of
a certain size? Why do certain projects cost more than estimated? Which metrics need
to be included if an IT dashboard is set up in a company or governmental organization?
How can an IT portfolio manager take calculated risks? All important questions needing
answers.
As in other research areas, measuring is key to take control over a project portfo-
lio. For proper analysis mathematical hurdles need to be covered. And if no data set is
available and historical data is urgently necessary, industry benchmarks are necessary.
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1.4 Exemplary IT projects
Projects that did not meet their estimated costs, duration or schedule proliferate newspa-
pers around the world. A well known case of a never ending project is the FAA case, de-
scribed in more detail in Chapter 2. The project concerns the modernization of the US Air
Traffic Control systems. After more than two decades of schedule delays and changing
and growing requirements, this project was still on the US Government Accountability
Office’s list of high-risk programs, where it has been listed since 1995 [32, 2, 35, 31].
What tools or metrics should be used for monitoring the requirements volatility of such
projects? Another infamous example is the Denver Airport’s automated baggage handling
system supposed to reduce flight delays. The system was delivered partly, two years later
and with a huge cost overrun, and even misplacing a considerable percentage of the lug-
gage that entered the handling system [71]. What silver bullet can tame these werewolves
of teeming cost, duration and functionality overruns?
1.5 Exploring Quantifiable IT Yields
The research project EQUITY studies connections between production yields and infor-
mation technology, so that production with software will be enabled in a calculated man-
ner. Decisions whether or not to invest in more or different software projects need to be
deprived of gut feeling and nourished with reason based on sound information. EQUITY
aims to trace what the actual contribution is of IT to the creation and destruction of value.
In this quest for quantification the Bermuda Triangle of project management plays an im-
portant role: costs, duration and functionality. What environment variables are important
factors in the over- and underrunning of estimates of these IT KPIs? If a project manager
focuses on one of these three KPIs, the control over the other two is easily lost. For in-
stance, if the costs are tried to be kept low, not all expected functionality is delivered as
the project runs out of funding too soon. Or, the project takes more time than planned if
the developers who are assigned to the project are not experienced enough, because of a
cost cutting effort.
1.6 Research question
This thesis is the product of research in this field of quantifiable IT KPIs. The focus
in this thesis is on the quantification of IT risks: how to avoid unacceptable risks, keep
projects on track and discover irregularities as early as possible. More detailed questions
are as follows. At what point is a project unbalanced by creeping requirements in such a
way that it tumbles into the tar pit of unmanageable projects? What are the risk drivers
that influence the disparity between the expected and actual project costs? How can risky
projects be identified as early in the project life cycle as possible? To answer these impor-
tant everyday questions of IT portfolio and project managers the necessary mathematical
hurdles are jumped. To obtain usable real-world answers to these questions, real-world
data is used as input. Project information from different organizations in different indus-
tries is used in the analyses. The real-world data shows what IT risks are to be expected
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and helps in future decision making. Feedback from the organizations is used in both
analyses for better understanding and explaining the results that were obtained during the
research. The research presented here resulted in both new mathematical methods for
modeling IT risks as well as obtaining improved industry benchmarks. As they are based
on real-world data, these results are valuable for companies keen on improving their IT
portfolio management practice.
1.7 Zen and the art of changing specifications
If the farmer from the first paragraph stores the profits from selling crops in a savings
account with a reasonable 5% interest per year, how many years does he have to wait for
his money to double? If the farmer buys 2% additional land every six months, after how
many months are the granaries too small to fit the harvests and the lands too large to plow
and the farmer loses control?
The second chapter of this thesis shows how to quantify the rate of increase or decrease
of the specifications of an IT system during its construction period. We refer to this
phenomenon as requirements volatility. The requirements of IT projects often change
during the execution. Sometimes because the clients have new desires, sometimes through
changing legislation, but also because of restricted budgets. To illustrate how to quantify
the requirements volatility and its effects, real-world data from different industries were
used.
In an organization operating in the financial services industry a low-risk IT subportfo-
lio of 84 IT projects is identified comprising together 16,500 function points, each project
varying in size and duration. For these projects the volatility of the requirements was
quantified by using the available function point countings and the duration between the
countings.
The compound monthly volatility rate, which is analogue to the compound interest
model in banking, is used as the requirements volatility metric. This metric was coined
by Jones in 1996 [60], we improved the metric by incorporating project duration. The
volatility figures that were found were aggregated into a requirements volatility bench-
mark.
Currently known industrial averages only consider the growth rate, not the period
during which the growth rate enlarges a project’s requirements. In Chapter 2 it is explained
that the maximum tolerable requirements volatility rates depend on both size and duration.
For instance, a monthly growth rate of 5% is commonly considered a critical failure factor,
but in the low-risk portfolio more than 21% of the successful projects has a volatility
larger than 5%. A mathematical model is proposed taking into account size and duration
thus providing a maximum healthy volatility rate that is more in line with the reality of
low-risk IT portfolios. Based on the model, a tolerance factor is proposed expressing the
maximal volatility tolerance for a project or portfolio. Two volatility ratios are derived
from this model, the pi-ratio and the ρ-ratio. These ratios express how close the volatility
of a project has approached the zone of critical failure rates. For the low-risk portfolio
under consideration the empirically found tolerance is acceptable, and values exceeding
this tolerance level are useful to trigger IT decision makers.
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In a second case the volatility data of a governmental IT portfolio were juxtaposed to
the financial services industry benchmark, immediately exposing a problematic project,
which was corroborated by its actual failure. If function points are less common, e.g. in
the embedded industry, daily source code size measures are used and it is illustrated how
to govern the volatility of a software product line of a hardware manufacturer. This third
case is discussed in detail as well.
With the three real-world portfolios it is shown that the results serve the purpose of
an early warning system for projects that are bound to fail due to excessive volatility.
Moreover, essential requirements volatility metrics were developed that belong on an IT
governance dashboard and such a volatility dashboard is also presented.
1.8 Behind the scenes of estimation errors
Another earlier mentioned question of the farmer is which fertilizer would best aid the
growing process of seeded crops. To answer that question the farmer would need data
on different land areas where different fertilizers have been used and the amount of full
grown plants. Other factors that could have influenced the growing process need to be
included in the analysis like hours of sun, millimeters of rain, etc. The results of the
analysis are used in the next year for influencing the growth of the crops.
In chapter 3 a statistical method is proposed for quantifying the impact of factors that
influence the quality of cost estimation for IT-enabled business projects. We call these
factors risk drivers if they can be influenced by project management before or in the
early stage of a project. The explained method can effortlessly be transposed for usage
with other important IT key performance indicators, such as schedule misestimation or
functionality underdelivery.
Logistic regression is used as a modeling technique for estimating the quantitative
impact of risk factors. This was done so, because logistic regression has been applied suc-
cessfully in the field of, among others, medical science, e.g. perinatal epidemiology, for
answering questions that show a striking resemblance to the questions regarding project-
risk management. In our study a data set of a large organization in the financial services
industry is used for assessing the applicability of logistic modeling in quantifying IT esti-
mation risks. This research has shown that it is possible to properly quantify IT estimation
risks, even with the help of crude data. With a real-world example it is illustrated how to
scrutinize the quality and plausibility of the available data.
We also explain how to deal with risk factors that cannot be influenced by project
management, but have an influence on the outcome of the estimation process. The detec-
tion of influential risk factors using logistic regression is demonstrated with a real-world
data set. After a discussion of the interpretation of the found models it is showed that the
findings are helpful in decision making on measures to be taken for reducing the chance
of misestimation and thus mitigate IT risks for individual projects.
The analyses reveal that projects must not be overstaffed and the ratio of external
developers must be kept small for obtaining better cost estimates. The research also shows
that business units that report on financial information tend to be risk mitigating, because
they have more cost underruns as opposed to business units without reporting that are
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risk seeking, the latter displaying more cost overruns. Moreover, a maturity mismatch is
discovered, an increase from the IT maturity level CMM 1 to CMM 2 does not influence,
although expected, the cost misestimations. This missing improvement in estimating is
explained by the fact that the maturity of the business is not increased alongside with the
IT department resulting in a maturity mismatch not affecting the quality of cost estimates.
The research findings are also valuable for increasing the efficiency of the auditing
process. The found cost misestimation models are used for classifying the projects in
risky projects and non-risky projects before the start of auditing.
1.9 Origin of the chapters
Parts of this Ph.D. thesis have been published previously. In this section the different
origins are listed.
Chapter 2 on requirements volatility effects has been published in Elsevier’s journal
Science of Computer Programming. It was included in the third issue of volume 72 [74].
Chapter 3 has been accepted and will appear in Elsevier’s Science of Computer Pro-
gramming [73] as well.
A part of the summary in Dutch has been published in the Jaarboek ICT en Samenlev-
ing: Omzien naar de toekomst [38].
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Quantifying Requirements Volatility Effects
The creation of software requirements is reminiscent
of hiking in a fog that is gradually lifting.
–T. Capers Jones [64]
2.1 Introduction
Software is ubiquitous [74], it has penetrated our society into all its capillaries. Since
our society is continuously evolving and changing its demands, the foundations on which
it stands have to adapt to the inevitable and often abrupt changes. Therefore, software
evolves, and not only after it has been delivered, but also during the development phase.
An illustrative example of evolving software is internet banking. Where most banking
systems were developed in COBOL in the sixties and seventies of the 20th century when
the World Wide Web did not even exist, the need for Internet banking arose with the
increasing popularity of Internet in the nineties of the same century. In an era when
object-oriented languages gained popularity, these new on-line banking services, mostly
written in object-oriented languages, had to be connected to the existing and aging, but
above all omnipresent [7], procedural COBOL systems. Over a time span of 40 years the
banking systems had evolved, COBOL systems were maintained and updated, and linked
to new systems, thus adapting to the needs of clients.
Requirements To impose boundaries on a project and to create consensus about its
scope, the stakeholders’ wishes and desires are translated into requirements. Require-
ments engineering is not something new and many books have been written on this sub-
ject, some well-known being: [28, 40, 55, 72, 98, 99, 107, 127, 130]. Weinberg succinctly
states the rationale for requirements [127]:
Requirements are made for a common purpose: to change vague desires into
explicit and unambiguous statements of what the customers want.
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But, before the ink of the requirements document is dry and the design phase has com-
menced, the first meetings generate questions and new insights that immediately influence
the decisions just taken and the agreed upon requirements. To continue Weinberg:
These statements are then used to compare what was built and what was
desired—the fundamental measurement of any feedback controlled process.
During a feedback controlled software development process the requirements that were
initially frozen are stretched until a desired and satisfying scope is reached. Oftentimes,
budget, schedule and requirements are not in alignment. We want it all, we want it yes-
terday and we want if for free. As a consequence, requirements are pressed together to fit
into a certain project budget or parts of the requirements are hewed away from the initial
scope. Requirements volatility is a fact of life, and therefore important to manage. Ideally
this requirements stretching, squeezing and hewing is kept within certain bounds. But
what bounds are acceptable? Some requirements volatility will be necessary and healthy,
but burgeoning requirements or the opposite, requirements suffering from severe scrap can
cause a project to get out of sight and off track. Continuously changing requirements can
drive project management crazy, make clients angry, developers irritated, budget holders
disappointed and everybody distressed. Then again, we encountered projects for which
a high volatility of the requirements had a positive influence on productivity. However,
these are exceptions when volatility is supported by a development process and tools.
Creep angst Weinberg [127] illustrates the explosive growth of myriads of requirements
with the project that is afraid to finish, an initially six month project turned out to be drag-
ging on for two years. The end-date was continuously postponed, keeping the project
from finishing. One of the main problems stated in Weinberg’s example was that manage-
ment failed to keep requirements volatility under control. Jones [60] confirms Weinberg
with his statement:
One of the most chronic problems in software development is the fact that
application requirements are almost never stable and fixed.
Jones further emphasizes the problem with:
Although creeping requirements are troublesome, they are often a technical
necessity.
So, requirements volatility is a fact of life, but how to control the volatility? Although
Weinberg states that volatility is always a problem leading to projects that do not finish,
we found that creep can be healthy when it positively influences productivity or when
there is a business case to stretch the requirements. When stakeholders decide to change
the requirements after they were agreed upon, and there is a business case to do so [91],
all project stakeholders need to be aware of this, so everybody knows what has to be
delivered at the end of the project and how much the client is going to be paying for the
resulting product. A natural question that arises is how much volatility is healthy and
how much volatility is going to create more havoc than solve problems. In this chapter we
propose how requirements volatility can be described and quantified with simple statistical
methods and how projects with unhealthy volatility can be identified.
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Plans and planes To illustrate that even with the best intentions it is very hard to keep
requirements volatility under control, we recall a famous real-world case of a project
that is at the time of writing still afraid to finish. It concerns the Advanced Automation
System (AAS), an initially quoted $4.3 billion, 1.5 million lines of code, 10-year project
announced in 1981 by the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) [19, 31, 42]. The
project concerns modernization of the Air Traffic Control system to:
meet projected increases in traffic volumes, enhance the systems margin of
safety, and increase the efficiency of the Air Traffic Control system.
In 1981 the FAA announced their plans for this program. After nine years of requirements
engineering and design competition, the contract was awarded in 1988 and signed two
years later in 1990, almost ten years after the announcement. Two years after commence-
ment, the project schedule was extended by 19 months due to, among others, unresolved
differences in system specifications caused by changes to the requirements. In 1994 after
an additional 14-month schedule delay the project was declared out of control by FAA
management. At the time of writing this chapter, after more than two decades of schedule
delays and changing and growing requirements, this project is still on the US Government
Accountability Office’s list of high-risk programs, where it has been listed since 1995.
What tools or metrics can be used to monitor the requirements volatility of such projects?
Software is a knowledge product, therefore, during the development process either
progressive understanding of the product is gained or new technology comes available
that needs to be incorporated into the product. Because of the volatile nature of the envi-
ronment that software needs to abide by, initial requirements are not necessarily the right
ones and need to be adapted and bent in the right direction during the process. How-
ever, requirements arriving in later project phases seem more difficult to implement than
requirements added in earlier stages of the process. We consider requirements volatility
healthy if it delivers an end-product based on changed requirements due to progressive
understanding of the product and when the end-product based on the changed require-
ments better suits the customer’s needs than an end-product based on the initial, partly or
completely, incorrect requirements. The requirements volatility must be within healthy
bounds to enable the project to deliver a product at all. Moreover, the volatility must be
supported by a sound business case. In all other cases, we are facing intolerable volatility,
i.e. when we have either too much volatility or it lacks a sound business case, or both,
which is usually the standard. With the metrics proposed in this chapter, it is possible to
monitor the volatility and create a requirements volatility dashboard as an early-warning
system to monitor for projects that are out of control.
Requirements reality We recall Jones who already wrote in 1996 [60] that in reality
requirements change. Requirements change is problematic, so executives are tempted to
consider an IT enabled business investment ideal when there are no more changes once
the requirements phase is finished. After signing off the requirements, the implementation
of the project should be without further change or delay. However, according to Kotonya
and Sommerville [72, pp.113–114]:
It is often the case that more than 50% of a system’s requirements will be
modified before it is put into production
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and that
a recent European survey of 4000 companies found that the management of
customer requirements was one of the principal problem areas in software
development and production.
Leffingwell states in a summarizing article [77] that between 41% [104] and 56% [114] of
all defects can be traced back to errors made during the requirements phase. Robert Glass
traced in a small empirical study [41] the origin of 5.5% of the persistent defects to in-
adequate requirements. Frederick Brooks proclaims in his seminal book on management
of computer programming projects ‘The Mythical Man-Month’ that the only constancy
is change itself [17]. So, a zero-change policy looks good on management charts, but
does not necessarily help in achieving the best possible results. The challenge is to allow
for healthy volatility and to prune excessive requirements growth or scrap. Some require-
ments volatility will certainly lead to a much better end result, whereas high volatility
often indicates serious problems. When requirements errors are unveiled, it is sometimes
necessary to scrap or grow more rapidly, in order to regain a sound project. In this chapter
we will see examples of both healthy and unhealthy volatility.
Function Points Not all requirements are equivalent in difficulty. That is why function
points are useful when requirements volatility is discussed. Sizing IT projects in function
points is a widely used synthetic measure to express the amount of functionality that will
be or has been built. Function points are independent of programming languages, and
therefore very suitable for cost estimation, comparisons, benchmarking [1, 3, 4, 30, 39]
and also for comparing requirements change. Each function point is comparable with an-
other function point counted with the same method. Function points analysis is a certified
functional sizing method of IT projects [39]. Function points can be used consistently and
with an acceptable degree of accuracy [66, 67, 118]; the intermethod and interrater reli-
ability is sufficiently high to compare function point totals that resulted from more than
one counting method or from different counters.
There are different techniques known for conducting function point countings [58, 84].
The International Function Point Users Group provides an ISO standard for function point
analysis [53]. It is known that function points can be counted at a rate of about one
hundred function points per hour depending on the quality of the requirements counted,
or, if divided by a standard rate of $100 per hour, only a dollar per function point. If the
quality of the requirements is low, this rate can decrease to 30 or 40 function points per
hour. Since lines of code are not directly comparable, for example one line of code can
be empty and another can contain a difficult boolean expression, we will convert lines of
code to function points later on to keep the size functionality discussion consistent. This
conversion to function points will make changes in lines of code comparable in terms of
function points.
Volatility in three environments We present three case studies on requirements volatil-
ity. In a large organization in the bancassurance1 sector we identified a low-risk IT sub-
portfolio for which we were able to quantify its requirements volatility. An IT portfolio
1Bancassurance: an, originally French, portmanteau of banking and assurance [131]
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is called low-risk when almost all projects are successful: within time, within budget and
delivering the desired functionality at the right quality levels which was the case in the
bancassurance portfolio. We start with a low-risk portfolio to know what requirements
volatility is acceptable. In our bancassurance portfolio the size of each individual IT
project was measured at least twice through function point countings; one counting after
initial requirements sign-off and the other at the end of the project. A few projects had
even three countings, an additional counting at the end of the design phase. The intermit-
tent function point countings of 84 different bancassurance projects were then combined
to analyze the characteristics of the requirements volatility at the IT portfolio level. All
these countings were used to calculate the so-called volatility rate, or compound monthly
requirements volatility rate to analyze the requirements volatility of projects from the en-
tire IT portfolio. The bancassurance portfolio that is used in this chapter is a real-world
and known to be low-risk portfolio. The results presented in this chapter can thus be used
as a yardstick to benchmark other portfolios. We juxtaposed governmental projects from
a known high-risk portfolio, our second case study, with our bancassurance benchmark.
The high-risk aspect is defined by large projects with high failure rates. This resulted in
the immediate identification of sure-fire failure projects that were unnoticed, proceeding
with an unhealthy growth of the requirements. Our third case study is a software prod-
uct line for embedded software of a hardware manufacturer. By applying backfiring on
daily source code volumes we calculated volatility rates and used these to create a volatil-
ity benchmark for embedded systems. With our proposed volatility metrics, we easily
identified large adaptations in this portfolio and were able to focus directly on potential
problems.
2.1.1 Overview
The remainder of this chapter is divided into the following sections.
Taxonomy We start with a taxonomy of requirements volatility in Section 2.2.
Basics and related work In Section 2.4 we explain the basics of the volatility rate
of requirements, r, how it can be measured, and we discuss earlier findings of industry
averages published by Jones and other related work.
Mathematical background The reader interested in the mathematical background of
our models and ratios is referred to Section 2.4.1. This section introduces the model to
calculate the maximal healthy requirements volatility for a project and a metric to cal-
culate a project’s tolerance p for volatility. This section presents also the p-proportional
volatility ratio pi to compare projects of different duration and the requirements volatility
ratio ρ to compare the volatility of projects of different duration and size.
Case studies The reader looking for case studies of requirements volatility can find
three extensive cases in sections 2.5, 2.6 and 2.9. The fifth section discusses volatility in
the bancassurance sector. Here, the analysis of the requirements volatility of a 23.5 million
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dollar costing real-world low-risk bancassurance portfolio representing 16,500 function
points in 84 IT projects originating from a large bancassurance portfolio is discussed.
Section 2.6 analyzes the volatility of high-risk government projects and compares these
projects with our bancassurance benchmark created in Section 2.5. Section 2.9 discusses
the volatility of a software product line.
In-depth studies More in-depth studies of requirements volatility can be found in Sec-
tion 2.7 and 2.8. The seventh section dives into volatility variations for in-house and out-
sourced projects of the bancassurance portfolio. It turned out that outsourced projects dis-
played similar requirements volatility characteristics as in-house projects. In Section 2.8
we perform a root-cause analysis on the bancassurance portfolio to clarify differences in
volatility.
Lines of code Section 2.9 presents instruments how to monitor the volatility of a soft-
ware product line when function point analyses are not available. We do this in a third
case study of a software product line by applying backfiring on daily size measurements
of the source code.
Dashboard Practitioners looking for tools that can be applied directly, are helped with
Section 2.10. This section introduces a requirements volatility dashboard to visually rep-
resent all volatility metrics in tables and graphs.
Conclusions Finally, we summarize and conclude in the last section.
2.2 Creep, Scrap and Churn
The lingo of requirements change has many variations, such as the previously mentioned
stretching, hewing and squeezing, or as Weinberg names it [127, 126], requirements leak:
projects that are in a state of perpetual pregnancy, never quite giving birth. All these
different forms of requirements volatility change the result of a project. We summarize
the most well-known terms in the following core glossary for requirements volatility, and
abide by these three different forms of requirements change in this chapter. Requirements
volatility is defined by any combination of the following three forms of requirements
change and is used as a general term for requirements change in this chapter.
Requirements Creep When the scope of a project increases, requirements are added,
because additional features surfaced or extra interfaces need to be build. This is called
requirements creep, also known as scope creep. Requirements creep can be caused by
loosely defined initial requirements, an incomplete analysis when some stakeholders were
overlooked or changing legislation during the project. For instance, in the earlier men-
tioned FAA case [19] additional systems needed to be interfaced with as soon as they
became available, whether these were additional satellite systems or on-line available
weather information systems, increasing the scope of the system. Even systems that were
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developed at the beginning of the project became legacy during the project, creating addi-
tional requirements to cope with the emerged legacy.
Requirements Scrap Requirements do not always increase, sometimes they decrease
when initially stated requirements were too broad and the stated goal could also be reached
with fewer requirements. Or sometimes unnecessary requirements can be left out during
the project. Due to shrinking budgets or running out of schedule it is also possible that
certain parts of the requirements are left out of the current project. Even though deferred
or scrapped requirements do not have the same impact on the requirements themselves,
they do have the same mathematical negative influence on the number of requirements for
the running project. The number of requirements decreases: it is decided to drop certain
parts of the requirements to finish the project on time and within budget and keep the
project manageable. The FAA announced requirements scrap in 1996. They requested a
reduced-functionality Initial Sector Suite System, a key component of the new system, the
centerpiece of FAA’s efforts, under a restructured and curtailed program. It was renamed
Display System Replacement, DSR, and downsizing was done with the intention to com-
plete deployment in May 2000 [19, 32]. All DSR installations were eventually completed
in 2000 [35].
Requirements Churn When the size of requirements during the project changes like
the bellows of an accordion during a polka, requirements churn is occurring: requirements
have been added and removed. For instance, when at the end of the project the size of the
project was not different from the size at the beginning, but the requirements have been
changed and not been stable throughout the project, this is called requirements churn.
Examples of requirements churn are, for example, when colors in an interface need to
be changed or buttons should be placed in a different position in an interface. Different
functionality is necessary, but it does not influence the size directly.
2.3 Modeling volatility as compound interest
Jones [60] introduces a measure to compare the change rates of requirements by calcu-
lating compound monthly requirements volatility rates. Jones does not use an average
percentage of change of the overall volume, because these numbers can be misleading,
and are making it very hard to compare the volatility of different projects or portfolios.
An average percentage of change of the overall volume lacks information, namely the
time in which the change occurred. The compound monthly requirements volatility rate
coined by Jones does express the time aspect. This volatility rate expresses the rate by
which the requirements have grown or decreased every month throughout the project.
The aspect of compoundness of requirement changes in this rate is illustrated by the fol-
lowing. Consider the requirements elicitation process, whenever new requirements come
in, maybe not all, but some requirements added in earlier stages have to be taken into
account. Moreover, every requirement that is added will trigger people to introduce other
requirements that they did not think of before. When requirements are added later during
a project, they will have also a larger impact on productivity than earlier requirements
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and lower the productivity, because more work is put into the same time frame, which is
known as time compression [93, 94, 119]. All these aspects are expressed by having a
compound monthly volatility rate and not an average linear monthly rate.
Calculating monthly requirements volatility rates, as defined by Jones, is a transpo-
sition from the financial world. The time value, or future value of money is in the field
of accounting well-known as compound interest or CAGR, short for compound annual
growth rate. By transposing from compound growth rate in finance we assume that re-
quirements are compound within a project as we explained above. We will refer back to
the financial origin throughout this chapter to help explain requirements volatility.
In finance annual growth rates are very common in interest calculations. A safe way
to earn money is by putting a certain amount of money in a savings account at a bank.
The amount of money grows when the account is accredited with the bank’s gratefulness
for leaving your money in their accounts, i.e. simple interest. If the earned interest is left
on the bank account for another interest period the total amount will create more interest
than was generated in the first period, i.e. compound interest, or simply money creating
more money. The mirrored version of this process would be an unattended debt. When
a loan is submitted by a bank, the amount of money that has to be returned to the bank
increases with the accumulating interest that the bank charges for having the loan. As
we will see shortly, this transposes effortlessly into IT. Therefore, we explain briefly the
basics of calculating compound interest.
Making money If one wants to know beforehand how much a certain amount of money
will be worth ten years from now, the future value of this amount that is deposited in a
bank account today can be calculated easily with the following well-known accounting
formula [101], with r being the periodical interest rate that is accredited every interval
and t denoting the number of intervals the StartAmount stays within the bank, which is
usually denoted in years.
FutureAmount = StartAmount · (1 + r)t (2.1)
By applying some standard algebraic manipulations the aforementioned Formula 2.1 can
be rewritten to the following equivalent Formula 2.2.
r = t
√
FutureAmount
StartAmount
− 1 (2.2)
Instead of calculating the future value of a certain amount as can be done with For-
mula 2.1, the required interest rate is now calculated. Formula 2.2 can be used to calculate
the required periodical interest rate from a start amount, a desired future amount and the
number of periods the start amount will stay in a bank account. For instance, if we start
with $1000 and we would like to have $1500 after ten years, we can calculate from For-
mula 2.2 that an annual interest rate of approximately 4.14% would be needed to achieve
our goal.
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2.3.1 Compound requirements
The CAGR originating from accounting transposes effortlessly into information technol-
ogy on the subject of requirements engineering, as introduced by Jones [60]. Where in
finance the compound annual growth rate is used to calculate the future value of money, in
requirements engineering the formula is used to calculate the compound monthly volatil-
ity rate r of requirements. Although the formula is common in finance, it is rarely used
in IT portfolio management. Therefore, not much related work is found in the literature.
Formula 2.3 shows the requirements equivalent of Formula 2.1 and in Formula 2.4 we
show the equivalent of Formula 2.2, to calculate the compound monthly volatility rate for
a project with a duration of t months and using a size estimate at the beginning and at the
end of the project.
SizeAtEnd = SizeAtStart ·
(
1 +
r
100
)t
(2.3)
r =
(
t
√
SizeAtEnd
SizeAtStart
− 1
)
· 100 (2.4)
Jones’s averages Few people provide data about the requirements volatility characteris-
tic, in fact we are only aware of Capers Jones who provides industrial averages in various
publications. We will discuss his and other related work in Section 2.3.4. Such histori-
cal information is useful and serves when no function point analyses are available in an
organization when agreements about requirements volatility are being made.
Volatility as a control factor Volatility is an important software control factor since its
value gives a strong indication for project success or failure. Just as a financial construc-
tion with interest above 30% is almost always suspicious, also IT projects that are highly
volatile are often in trouble. This cpahter provides intuition to what extent volatility is
healthy and when things are signaling further investigation, so that outright failure can be
prevented by bringing volatility under control before it is too late. With a little more data
than Jones provides it is already possible to obtain more insight into IT projects and to
improve their control. In this chapter we discuss three cases. One in which two function
point analyses per project were available for many projects in a low-risk portfolio, result-
ing in a bancassurance benchmark. In the second case a limited number of data points
were available for a high-risk governmental portfolio, and the third case describes a low-
risk portfolio in the systems industry, for which no function point analyses were available.
In the latter case we used the source code volume as a proxy to requirements volatility.
Having multiple project measures available, one can detect also requirements churn
when a project was first enlarged and later decreased. This is important, since when the
final and initial project size are equal, the project undergoing churn is not completely com-
parable with an equally sized project without churn. This can be compared to a company
with 100 employees when 10 employees are fired and replaced with 10 new employees.
The number of employees stays the same, but replacing the employees did cost time and
money. In addition to establishing elaborate post-mortem volatility benchmarks, we will
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also show how to assess ongoing projects with respect to volatility in Section 2.9.1. High
volatility then serves as an early-warning system requiring further qualitative and quan-
titative investigations. This low-cost assessment can prevent spending huge amounts of
money on software development that is almost certainly going to fail due to the alarming
value of requirements volatility. For IT projects that have more intermediate size esti-
mates it is possible to detect the derailing IT projects already in an early phase by using
our newly proposed metrics.
2.3.2 Determining requirements volatility
To calculate a compound monthly growth rate the size of the requirements has to be de-
termined at least at two different moments in time. With two time-stamped size estimates
an overall volatility multiplying factor can be calculated. We now take as a third variable,
the duration of the project expressed in months. By using Formula 2.4, the compound
monthly requirements volatility rate r, or short volatility rate, can be calculated on any
handheld scientific calculator or with a spreadsheet program. The resulting figure ex-
presses the monthly percentage of requirements change. A high requirements volatility
rate indicates highly volatile requirements, negative rates often indicate zealous require-
ments scrapping due to budget constraints or schedule overruns. With only two mea-
surements it is not possible to measure the earlier mentioned requirements churn, since
if we have a 1000 function point project and after one month the requirements have in-
creased with some 100 function points and another month later about 100 function points
of requirements are withdrawn, the project ends up having a size of 1000 function points.
When analyzing the measurements without creep or scrap knowledge of the project it-
self, it is impossible to measure churn, since from start to end there was no requirements
volatility with Formula 2.2. Later on in this chapter we will also show volatility analyses
of projects with intermediate countings and of a software product line for which we use
daily source code volumes and requirements churn will become visible.
Distribution over time Although we cannot assume in general that requirements volatil-
ity is equally distributed over time, our volatility measure is a reasonable approximation
for extensive analysis of requirements volatility. One of the reasons being that when re-
quirements change substantially during a project, this will impact cost, duration and other
important Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), making a recount reasonable. So, volatil-
ity is perhaps unequally distributed over start and end date, but equally distributed over
the intermediate, and shorter, time frames. This also applies if the volatility of the re-
quirements occurred at the beginning of the project or at the end of the project. Since,
as we stated earlier, adding requirements at the end of a project seems more costly and
appears to have more impact than adding requirements in the beginning of a project when
certain design decisions still have to be made [12, page 40], it is therefore important to
know at what moment in a project the requirements have been added. Jones [64] sug-
gests to set a sliding scale of costs in software development contracts as a way of dealing
with changing user requirements. With this scale, requirements added in later phases of
the software process are more expensive than requirements added in earlier phases. It is
therefore recommended to also have a look at absolute differences of several countings
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or requirements volatility over time during a project. But this would require more than
two function point countings and function point analyses cost time and money, so it is not
realistic to continuously demand these. It is also probable that requirements growth will
lead to deadline extension or time compression.
2.3.3 Sizing with function points and lines of code
In this study we analyze the volatility of finalized projects for which we calculate the
requirements volatility based on size estimates and final project duration. We do not con-
sider project durations that were only stated in project planning. Since we are using real
industry data from finished projects, we are able to create volatility benchmarks. Subse-
quently, we will use these benchmarks to analyze the volatility of ongoing projects when
early size estimates have been made, and we use our benchmarks to compare between var-
ious industries, in our case the volatility of a software product line by backfiring source
code sizes. Size estimates in all volatility calculations are expressed in function points.
For two portfolios function point analysis was used for size estimating. Intermediate
countings in the bancassurance portfolio were only performed when large volatility was
expected. Apart from this kind of analysis, one can also conduct daily size measurements.
We do this by translating the lines of code back to function points, a technique called back-
firing. In Section 2.9.1 we give an example of how we were able to closely monitor the
volatility of an IT portfolio comprised of a software product line for similar, but different,
embedded systems, each system containing millions of lines of code. The function points
under scrutiny in the bancassurance portfolio are a subset of a portfolio in which function
points were counted consistently. This result was inferred in another paper [118]. In brief,
boxplots and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were used in that paper to test the validity of the
function point counting data. Moreover, 10% of the function points were recounted by an
independent certified function point analyst. No significant deviations were detected. For
more information on this audit we refer the interested reader to [118].
DSDM A method to manage requirements is the MoSCoW principle from the DSDM
method [109, 108] short for Dynamic Systems Development Method. This method cat-
egorizes the requirements into must haves (M), should haves (S), could haves (C) and
want to have, but won’t have for this project (W). The capitals jointly form the acronym
MoSCoW. The projects in the analyzed bancassurance portfolio have utilized this method.
The usage of MoSCoW in the bancassurance portfolio contributes in keeping the high
volatility rates, that we encounter later on, healthy by creating small subprojects and only
doing the projects that are most important.
2.3.4 Related work
There are papers originating from different fields of science, among others agriculture,
biomedicine and astronomy, stating that requirements creep is inevitable and that exces-
sive requirements creep is a turbulence or even a failure factor for IT projects. In those
papers it is advocated that requirements creep should be avoided or managed [6, 123, 69,
81, 9, 37, 68, 124, 56, 129, 69, 76, 96, 112, 47, 46]. However, those papers fail to state
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how much requirements creep is actually occurring or how much creep is unhealthy and
excessive or even how requirements volatility should be monitored. Moreover, only a few
publications discuss quantifications of requirements volatility, most of them by counting
requirements and not the impact of requirements [26, 100, 46]. In a paper by Zowghi and
Nurmuliani [134] in which we do see some data, it is perception data. However, we are
not using perception, but actual project data. Their perceptive study finds a negative in-
fluence of perceived requirements volatility on project performance. However, we found
the opposite as well in our volatility data. Loconsole and Bo¨rstler [80, 79] quantify re-
quirements volatility through changes to use case models in a case study in the automotive
industry. In that research one project is studied in which only use cases were used to de-
scribe requirements, changes were measured as changes to the use case diagram. Their
paper is based on a single project comprising fourteen use cases. Our study quantifies the
volatility based on function points and lines of code in three different industries totaling
over 80 projects.
Other papers [57, 82, 113] stress the importance of measuring requirements volatil-
ity to investigate its presumed relation with defect density. These studies suggest that
changes to requirements can have a significant effect on defect density. In this chapter
we present metrics to measure requirements volatility. They are validated by real-life data
and identify excessive change in an early stage.
As we cited Jones earlier, requirements volatility is a technical necessity. Therefore,
methods are needed to deal with the apparent volatility. In this section we will review
what compound monthly requirements volatility rates have been found in previous re-
search. Since not a lot of industry data about requirements volatility rates are known, we
will summarize all the data in the field that we know of. Houston et al. [51] describe
a perceptive study on six software development risk factors that had 458 respondents.
The respondents perceived that for 60% of their projects, requirements creep was a prob-
lem. Requirements creep in this study was mentioned to be a problem when requirements
growth exceeded 10%, or caused more than 10% rework. However, we will see in this
chapter that you cannot uniformly state that 10% volatility is a problem. We will show
that 10% can be healthy, but also unhealthy depending on certain characteristics of the
project. In their stochastic model [51], requirements growth is modeled as a continuous
flow that increases linearly during the project until it reaches a maximum and then de-
creases linearly. The presented model does not mention the possibility of requirements
scrap, which we did encounter in the portfolios we analyzed in this chapter. Stark et
al. [111, 110] discuss the overall volatility of some 40 deliverables, but volatility is calcu-
lated as changes in the number of requirements, not taking effort into account. Over 60
percent of the deliverables encountered requirements volatility, with an average volatility
of 48%. A qualitative cause analysis model on change request data is discussed by Nur-
muliani et al. [86]. The model studies requirements documents, but they study only one
project, whereas we base ourselves on the function point analyses of many projects and
many data points of ongoing changes to existing systems. Since Nurmuliani et al. study
documents and not functionality or lines of code, the impact of change is not quantified.
An article by Anthes [6] mentions that the top reason for requirements creep, in 44%
of the cases, is a poor definition of initial requirements. A small analysis on the im-
pact of changes after requirements sign-off on the productivity of maintenance projects
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for military software was done by Henry and Henry [48]. This study reveals decreasing
productivity when having small requirement changes due to overhead in processing and
documenting changes.
In a paper by Sneed and Bro¨ssler [106] the growth statistics of a commercial software
package are presented. Although they do not present compound monthly growth rates, it
is easy to calculate the volatility rates with the five presented function point sizes and time
stamps. The volatility rates are an overall monthly rate of 1.47% over 4 years and for the
4 different intermediate years respectively 1.34%, 2.99%, 0.37% and 1.21%.
Capers Jones [60, 61, 64, 63] states industry averages of monthly requirements growth
rates for different types of software systems and projects. The latest averages in his work
are summarized in Table 2.1. Besides the averages of requirements change, Jones states
encountered maximum volatility rates in [62, Table 7.4, Table 8.5, Table 9.4, Table 10.3,
Table 11.4], summarized in the third column of Table 2.1 and in [62, Table 7.9, Table 8.10,
Table 9.9, Table 11.9] Jones states maximum requirements stability rates as project failure
factors. These failure factors are summarized in the last column of Table 2.1. In Table 2.1
MIS refers to Management Information Systems. The accompanying failure factor is the
event that the requirements creep is out of control.
Software Type avg r (%) max r (%) out of control
Contract or outsourced software 1.1% 3.4% > 5%
MIS Software 1.2% 5.1% > 5%
Systems software 2.0% 4.6% > 5%
Military software 2.0% 4.5% > 15%
Commercial software 2.5% 6% –
Civilian government software 2.5% – –
Web-based software 12% – –
Table 2.1: Jones’s industry averages, encountered maximum rates and failure rates in
various industries.
The figures in Table 2.1 were derived from function point countings and calculated on the
differences between the initial function point size at the completion of the requirements
phase and the function point size after completion of the software project. Jones states
in [64] also an average creep rate of 12% for agile projects. However, Table 2.1 offers
only failure rates independent of project duration. As we will argue shortly, size and dura-
tion can change a particular volatility rate from healthy to unhealthy. So, by incorporating
them in the quantification of requirements volatility, they help to understand what volatil-
ity is healthy and what volatility is not. In the next section we will show the impact of
project duration on requirements volatility.
2.4 Doing the math
To provide the reader with an intuition of growing requirements, we give an example in
which we use a volatility of 2% per month, which is the median of the second column
in Table 2.1 showing average volatility rates and recommended by Jones if you have
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no additional information on a project. The 2% is calculated afterwards on a 36-month
project with an initial size of 10000 function points. It turns out that twice the original
requirements end up—often undocumented—in the final system. Namely, the growth
factor for a 36-month project with a compound monthly growth rate of 2%, is 1.0236 ≈
2.04. For our 10000 function point project this results, when using Formula 2.3, in 10000 ·
2.04 = 20400 function points after three years. Obviously an unhealthy project, since we
have a project that doubles its requirements during development, which can hardly be
a healthy project. This was already mentioned by Jones in [60] in which he mentions
projects with overall changes of 100 and even 270 percent growth.
Table 2.2 illustrates the total requirements increase encountered afterwards for soft-
ware projects initially taking one, two or three years, with a growth rate of 2%. Obviously
the longer the initial project duration, the larger the chance that it fails due to surging
requirements.
Year Requirements increase
1 27 %
2 61 %
3 104 %
Table 2.2: Various total requirements increases for a volatility of 2% per month.
Projects having a larger compound monthly growth rate will reach the point of doubled
requirements sooner. See Table 2.3 for some typical examples. From Tables 2.2 and 2.3
we see that the point of requirements doubling occurs earlier in a project when a higher
growth rate is encountered, since this point depends on both the growth rate and the dura-
tion of the project. The point of doubling requirements can be calculated from the growth
function with the size at the end being 2 times the size at the start. This results in solving
the equation (1 + r/100)t = 2. The solution is presented in Function 2.5. The logarithm
used in these functions and in all formulas in the remainder of this article is the natural
logarithm; the logarithm with base e.
t =
log 2
log (1 + r/100)
(2.5)
A simplification of Function 2.5 is often referred to as the 72-rule [87, p. 181, Theorem
44], used in compound interest calculations in accounting to calculate the time when an
investment doubles its value. This simple approximation is presented in Function 2.6.
t =
72
r
≈ log2
log (1 + r/100)
(2.6)
The number 72 is used, since the value of log(2) is close to 0.72, 72 has many divisors,
and when r is small, the value of log(1+r/100) approximates r/100, since log(1) equals
0 and the derivative of log(x), being 1/x, equals 1 if x = 1.
In Table 2.3 some values of doubling requirements are shown as an example. The numbers
in Table 2.3 are from the exponential function bt in which the multiplier b = 1+ r100 with
r being the compound monthly volatility rate of a project and t the duration of the project
20
IT Risks in Measure and Number
volatility rate month when requirements have doubled
2 % 36
3 % 24
5 % 15
10 % 8
20 % 4
Table 2.3: Requirements doubling.
measured in months. Jones already showed maximum growth rates for certain project
types as we have seen in Table 2.1, but mentioning neither the project size nor duration.
In this paragraph we will explain how to calculate for a certain project duration an upper
bound for the requirements growth rate when healthy volatility becomes unhealthy.
With a 2% volatility we can already be in the danger zone, when requirements volatil-
ity reaches critical failure rates for longer projects, but for shorter projects this rate needs
not be any problem. Figure 2.1 shows the growth function for different volatility rates. In
this plot we show the rates 1%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 20%, and a theoretical 100 · (e − 1)% ≈
171.8%. The latter theoretical curve has exploding requirements from t = 0, because
it has a more than proportional growth from day zero. More than proportional growth
means adding more than initially was present every time frame. In financial terms this
means that one receives the initial amount and more as interest every year, which is the
interest period in our financial example. All projects in Figure 2.1 have a starting value of
a hypothetical single function point project. For a project with a different starting value
the growth curves in Figure 2.1 are exactly the same, the multiplier b simply needs to be
multiplied by the start value to obtain the future value. The horizontal dot-dash line repre-
sents the line for which the workload has doubled, and shows the corresponding doubling
moments from Table 2.3 with vertical dot-dash lines.
An interesting characteristic about the growth function bt of the requirements or work-
load of a project in Figure 2.1 is the point for which the derivative equals 1, or equally,
when the time-elasticity of volatility equals 1. Since, before this point every time incre-
ment adds a lesser increase in function points than the amount of function points present
at t = 0 and after this point every time unit increase adds more function points than were
initially present. We solve the equation of the derivative of this growth function f(t) = bt
equaling 1 to find this point. Recall that b = 1 + r100 . The derivative is the follow-
ing function for a certain multiplier b and a duration t between the initial and last size
estimate:
f ′(t) = log (b) · bt (2.7)
We need to solve the equation f ′(t) = 1 to find the point tˆ for which the function f(t) = bt
intersects a certain tangent. This intersecting tangent is of the form g(t) = t+ tˆ+ btˆ. In
Figure 2.2 we have redrawn Figure 2.1. The figure is zoomed out a little, but now with
the line connecting the points for which the derivative is 1. This point is the first period in
which the size of requirements added in this period is equal to the original size at t = 0.
Therefore, after this point the requirements increase explodes, creating more requirements
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Figure 2.1: Requirements growth.
every month than were counted at the beginning of the project. So, the line in Figure 2.2
shows the duration when proportional growth starts. Actual measurement of such rates
for a project is an indicator for apparent utter failure. This point is in our financial intro
the point when your bank account capital increases fast, since every month the absolute
amount of interest that you get from the bank is higher than the amount you initially put
in the bank account.
The solution of Equation 2.7 is Formula 2.8 for a certain multiplier b and is found as
follows:
log (b) · bt = 1 divide by log b=⇒
bt =
1
log b
logarithm of both sides if bt>0
=⇒
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Figure 2.2: Connecting the tangents of proportional growth.
log (bt) = log (
1
log (b)
)
rewrite left- and right-hand side
=⇒
t · log (b) = − log (log b) divide left- and right-hand side by log b=⇒
t =
− log (log (b))
log (b)
bt > 0 (2.8)
2.4.1 Lambert’sW function
The solution presented in Equation 2.8 can be used to calculate a maximum project dura-
tion in months for a given rate r. Recall that b = 1 + r100 . Figure 2.1 shows the tangent
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point for the functions 1.10t, 1.20t and et. For the other shown functions these tangents
are outside the bounds of the figure. Function 2.8 intersects the horizontal axis at the
point b = e, since for any value larger than e the function returns a negative value. The
function has a minimum at ee and is asymptotically going towards 0 for higher values.
So for any rate higher than e − 1 ≈ 1.72, the growth function has a tangent with a slope
higher than 1 immediately starting at t = 0.
The inverse function of Function 2.8 is Function 2.9 when solving for b and Func-
tion 2.10 when solving for r. Function 2.9 results in a multiplier factor b, with b = 1+ r100
and r being the compound monthly volatility rate. In Figure 2.4 we will draw Func-
tion 2.10. Function 2.10, resulting in a multiplier b for a project with duration t, can be
found solving equation 2.8 using Lambert’s W function [25, 33, 75]. Later on we will
show how we arrived at this solution.
b = e
W (t)
t bt > 0, b = 1 + (r/100) (2.9)
or, equivalently for rate r
r = (e
W (t)
t − 1) · 100 r, t > 0 (2.10)
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Figure 2.3: Lambert’sW function.
Lambert’s W , or Omega function, used in Equation 2.9, is the inverse of the function
f(x) = x · ex and is named after Johann Heinrich Lambert. The Omega function derives
its name from the constant Ω, that is defined by Equation 2.11, the value ofW (1).
Ω · eΩ = 1 =⇒ Ω ≈ 0.567143290409 (2.11)
The Lambert W function is multi-valued in the interval [− 1e , 0] as can be seen in Fig-
ure 2.3. Since we will use only positive values as input for the W function, the multi-
valued part will not be of any hindrance in our calculations. Most mathematical packages
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support the usage of the Lambert W function with standard functionality or with an ad-
ditional package. Or, it is also possible to calculate the inverse of the function x · ex for
necessary x-values and put these values in a table and then switch the x and y values.
In Section 2.10 we will show a table of Lambert W values to aid in quick calculations.
To give the reader a better understanding of the W function, the function is drawn in
Figure 2.3 for the interval [− 1e , 10].
Solving with Lambert This paragraph shows how the W function has been used in
solving Equation 2.7. Since every function of the form Y = X · eX can be rewritten
to X = W (Y ) [25], we will rewrite Equation 2.7 in that format in order to solve the
equation for b:
log (b) · bt = 1 e
log a=a=⇒
log (b) · elog (bt) = 1 a·log b=log b
a
=⇒
log (b) · et·log (b) = 1 multiply by t=⇒
t · log b · et·log b = t X=t·log b and Y=t and Y=X·e
X⇒X=W (Y )
=⇒
t · log b = W (t) divide by t=⇒
log b =
W (t)
t
eleft- and right-hand side=⇒
b = e
W (t)
t (2.12)
The limitation we have created by solving for variable b is bt > 0. But, we have only
positive durations, since t is time expressed in months and b expresses the multiplication
factor 1 + (r/100). A negative b has no physical meaning in our model, since that would
imply a project with a negative number of function points. Therefore, bt will always be
larger than zero in our model. With Equation 2.12 we now have a function to calculate
the maximum allowable volatility rate r, with b = 1 + (r/100) when we have a project
duration t available.
Example of volatility approaching the danger zone The resulting volatility function
in Equation 2.10 calculates the monthly volatility rate r for a certain duration twith which
the growth function (1+r)t will have a tangent of 1 at moment t. Function 2.10 can be il-
lustrated with the following example. Let’s consider two projects. The first is a two month
project initially estimated at a 100 function points and the second a 20 month project ini-
tially estimated at 1000 function points. Equation 2.10 dictates for the first project a maxi-
mummonthly requirements growth of 53% to barely avoid proportional growth and for the
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latter a maximum of 16.5% per month. These percentages are calculated with exact values
of the Lambert W function. In Section 2.10 we will present a table of the Lambert W
function for different values of t for quick reference and to ease calculations. So, for a
project with a short duration, larger volatility rates are acceptable than for longer projects.
This is also visible if we look at the absolute sizes of both projects when the volatility
rates have been equal. At the end of the projects we calculate the requirements volatility
for both projects. In this example both projects underwent a 15% monthly requirements
growth. For the first project this is very close to the dictated maximum, then again, it
resulted in a final size of 132 function points. The second project, on the other hand, ends
up with more than 16,000 function points, or in other words has grown by a factor 16,
definitively indicating that it is out of control. Clearly, healthy growth depends on project
duration. What is an acceptable rate for the first short project is totally unacceptable for
the other, longer project. Therefore, Jones’s industrial averages are inadequate as an early
warning system to detect unhealthy volatility.
2.4.2 Tolerance factor p
The point in the growth function for which the derivative function equals 1 was already
interesting to look at, since it indicates the start of more than proportional growth. In-
deed, no one argues that growth rates leading to 100% requirements increase are a strong
indicator of projects going astray. But what growth is still healthy? We can only know
by analyzing this in a low-risk portfolio. A higher coefficient of the tangent of the growth
function is possible, but a lower value of this tangent is more desirable when looking at
requirements that are out of control. Therefore, we will look at p-proportional growth in
this section. We calculated for the aforementioned Function 2.9 also the point for which
the derivative equals 0.5 or 2. To create a function similar to Equation 2.9 we will need to
solve a new equation, see Equation 2.13, in which p, replacing 1 in Equation 2.9 indicates
the slope of the tangent of the growth function, t the duration between size estimates and
b the multiplicative factor defined by b = 1 + (r/100).
p = p(b, t) = log b · bt (2.13)
We call p the tolerance factor of the requirements volatility of a project. If p is low
the tolerance for high requirements growth rates is low and a high p implies that high
requirements growth is acceptable. If p equals 1 the plot is equal to the previously shown
Figure 2.4. The actual value of the tolerance factor p for a specific completed project can
be calculated with Equation 2.13. If you calculate this tolerance factor for all projects pi
in a portfolio you can take the portfolio’s maximum tolerance factor p. When you have
found this specific tolerance factor p, you have found the maximum tolerance factor P of
a portfolio of projects, see Equation 2.14.
P = max(pi) (2.14)
The factor P depends on a portfolio of projects on the processes and tools that exist to cre-
ate software, thus representing a lower or higher tolerance for high volatility. And if you
know you have a low-risk portfolio, then calculating the portfolio’s maximum tolerance
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Figure 2.4: Equation 2.10: Maximum monthly requirements growth r for duration t and
p = 1.
factor P indicates what p-proportional growth is acceptable. Such volatility boundaries
used to be unavailable, but now we can calculate a measure for healthy and unhealthy
growth.
Solving Function 2.13 for b, t or r results in the Equations 2.15, 2.16 and 2.17 with b,
t and r defined as before. In fact, these equations are similar to the previous Equations 2.9
and 2.10 with tolerance factor p added to them. When p equals 1 we end up with the
previously described formulas.
tpi =
log p− log (log b)
log b
(2.15)
bpi = bpi(p, t) = e
W (p·t)
t bt > 0, b = 1 + (r/100) (2.16)
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rpi = rpi(p, t) = (e
W (p·t)
t − 1) · 100 r, t > 0 (2.17)
We decorate the solved variables that indicate p-proportional growth with the subscript pi
for usage in the following section. In Figure 2.5 a plot is shown of Equation 2.17 for
p = 0.25, 0.5, 1 and 2. The intercounting duration in Figure 2.5 is the duration between
two size estimates. Figure 2.5 shows that for lower values of p we get a lower tolerance
for high volatilities. For higher values of p the plot shows a higher tolerance for high
volatilities.
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Figure 2.5: Maximum growth factor rpi for intercounting duration t and different toler-
ance factors p.
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2.4.3 Requirements volatility metric: the pi-ratio
In order to judge projects on their volatility we need to be able to compare projects of dif-
ferent duration and size. We have just seen that comparing solely their rates is incorrect:
what is an acceptable rate for one project is problematic for another project. So we need
a measure to judge the requirements volatility of projects even if they have different dura-
tions and different sizes. In this paragraph we will start with a metric to compare projects
of different duration, but not yet take size into account. We do this by dividing a project’s
actual requirements volatility rate ract by its maximal healthy volatility rate calculated by
Equation 2.10, or, when a tolerance factor different from 1 is being used Equation 2.17.
The calculation of this volatility ratio is illustrated in Figure 2.6. We illustrated with the
slender arrow the p-proportional maximum volatility of 22.22% for p = 1. The thick
arrow shows the actual measured volatility for this project, which is 10%. The volatil-
ity ratio pi is then calculated by dividing these numbers, resulting in a so-called pi-ratio
of 0.45.
pi-ratio The p-proportional volatility ratio pi, presented in Equation 2.18, being a num-
ber larger than 0, now provides us with an indication of how close a project has approached
the maximal healthy p-proportional volatility curve, or, equivalently, how close the project
has approached the danger zone. The pi-ratio is calculated for a project with a duration t,
a tolerance factor p and an actual requirements volatility ract. If you calculate the pi-ratios
for at least two projects it is possible to compare their volatility. If you encounter a pi-ratio
larger than 1 with p equaling 1, then the project has experienced more than proportional
requirements growth. Later we will calculate the pi-ratio for various projects stemming
from different portfolios and encounter projects that have experienced more than propor-
tional requirements growth.
pip = pip(ract, t, p) =
ract
rpi
=
ract
(e
W (p·t)
t − 1) · 100
(2.18)
2.4.4 Requirements volatility metric: ρ-ratio
Although we have already created a model to compare projects of different duration, we
are now going to extend the model. Instead of taking only our just proposed tolerance fac-
tor p and duration into account, we will now introduce the size of a project as an additional
variable in the volatility ratio. The rationale of this metric extension is the following. If
we have a project of 100 function points realized within 12 months and it doubles in
requirements to 200 function points throughout the project, then this is not completely
comparable to a project of 1000 function points doubling to 2000 function points, also
realized within 12 months. Although the time span was equal for both projects, the latter
project is much more out of control because of the extremely large resulting size. In [61,
p. 202] Jones presented a benchmark for the relationship between duration d and size f
of IT projects, we test this existing benchmark on plausibility for the bancassurance port-
folio. In Equation 2.19 the relationship is presented in which the exponent of the formula
is based on a non-linear least-square estimation of the total project duration and the final
function point size for our bancassurance portfolio. The value of the exponent for the
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Figure 2.6: Calculating the p-proportional volatility ratio pi1.
bancassurance portfolio is 0.359, which is similar , but a little bit smaller than the values
presented by Jones in [61].
f0.359 = d (2.19)
The p-statistic of the least-square estimation is very small. The p-statistic equals 5.848095·
10−58, implying a rejection of the null-hypothesis. Therefore, the relationship presented
in Figure 2.7 is not a result of chance alone. In Figure 2.7 we have plotted the values for
f , d and the by non-linear regression obtained function f0.359 = d for our bancassurance
portfolio. As a side note we want to remark that the removal of the data point in the upper
right corner only slightly changes the regression line: the exponent in function in that case
becomes 0.358. As can be seen from Figure 2.7 not all variation in the data is explained
by the regression function. Therefore, we cannot omit size from our volatility metric and
will add it to the equation. Omitting size and thus falling back to the pi-ratio is in fact only
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possible if all the influence of the project size is explained by the project duration.
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Figure 2.7: Project size versus project duration combined with estimated function.
In Equation 2.20 we express the influence of size on the volatility in mathematical
terms, by incorporating the logarithm of the function point size f into the volatility calcu-
lation of a project. The other variables p and t are defined as before. By introducing size,
the volatility metric will give a higher weight to larger projects, becoming more sensitive
for higher requirements volatility occurring at larger projects. We opted for the logarithm
so the volatility metric will not become immediately allergic for project size, but gradually
more sensitive. The logarithm is a monotonic and slowly rising function, so its value will
be higher for larger project sizes. The root function, for instance, is also slowly rising, but
the logarithm expresses a project’s order of magnitude which we want to incorporate. The
logarithm function results in a discrimating effect between larger and smaller projects.
Not having a function that gradually rises, results in a metric that drops to zero unreal-
istically quickly, thus making it allergic and useless for project sizes already above 10
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function points. Of course we could have taken another choice instead of the logarithm,
but that does not change the relative comparisons between projects when taking their size
and duration into account.
rρ = (e
W( p·tlog f )
t − 1) · 100 (1 + r/100)t > 0, f > 1 (2.20)
We illustrate the maximum requirements volatility presented in Equation 2.20 with the
three-dimensional Figure 2.8. Figure 2.8 shows the safe zone for different sized projects
with different durations. The surface of the plot represents the point for which unhealthy
requirements growth starts for projects of size f and intercounting duration t.
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Figure 2.8: rρ for p = 1 and intercounting duration t and size f .
With this extended model we can introduce a new volatility metric, the requirements
volatility ratio ρ for a project based on the actual volatility rate ract, the size of the
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project f , the intercounting duration t and a tolerance factor p. This new ratio is defined
in Equation 2.21 and is used to calculate a duration and size invariant volatility metric.
ρp = ρp(ract, t, p, f) =
ract
rρ
=
ract(
e
W( p·tlog f )
t − 1
)
· 100
(2.21)
Minimum requirements volatility For completeness’ sake we state that the lower bound
in Figure 2.4 for requirements volatility is not 0%, i.e. no volatility, but the lower bound
is −100% for the duration t = 1. Complete requirements scrap has then taken place at
t = 1, no requirements are left. A project with a longer duration than 1 month cannot have
a compound monthly requirements volatility of −100%. This is, because as with Zeno’s
paradox, with a monthly requirements volatility higher than −100%, we are losing most
of the requirements every month with a negative volatility percentage, but never all re-
quirements. The moment that all requirements have been scrapped, the paradoxical point
in the race between Achilles and the Tortoise, is not expressible in a compound monthly
rate for a project with a duration longer than 1 month.
Summary From this section we conclude that a maximum requirements volatility rate
for a project is not a uniform fit for all project sizes and durations. So, the currently
published failure factors for requirements growth by Jones, see Table 2.1, do not predict
failure in practice. Therefore, we do not recommend their use. From the figures and
equations it is evident that projects with a shorter duration accept a higher requirements
volatility rate than projects with a longer duration. We have created the p-proportional pi-
ratio to compare the volatility of different projects. Furthermore, we proposed the volatil-
ity metric ρ taking the size of a project into account as well, since size and duration do
not completely correlate, therefore, the more complex ρ-ratio will be preferable over the
pi-ratio. The pi and ρ-ratio enable true volatility comparisons between projects and bench-
marks.
2.5 Case study: measuring requirements volatility
As was observed in [118] many important software KPIs display stochastic behavior. In
fact KPIs like cost, duration, size, etc. often have an asymmetric leptokurtic possibly het-
erogeneous probability density function (PDF). Leptokurtic means that the probability
density function has a positive kurtosis, i.e. the form of the statistical frequency curve
near the mean of the distribution is more peaked. Kurtosis is Greek for bulging or cur-
vature and lepto is Greek for slender or peaky. So, it means a more slender frequency
curve near the mean compared to the normal distribution. To discover stochastic nature it
is necessary to look at the characteristics of any indicator over a complete portfolio. Our
empirical research revealed that in accordance with other important software KPIs our
proposed volatility rates r, p, pi and ρ resemble the family of Generalized Pareto Distri-
butions (GPD). For the volatility r we will show this in detail, and the others are treated
analogously but not shown here. Of course, we cannot conclude this from a few projects,
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but we can from an entire portfolio of 84 projects. The conclusions in this chapter are a
result from considering the characteristics of the volatility of several portfolios of projects
instead of the averages presented in Table 2.1. All project data from different organiza-
tions that are the basis for this chapter are real-world cases. The 23.5 million dollar costing
IT portfolio consisting of 84 projects stems from a larger portfolio of IT projects in the
bancassurance sector. This larger portfolio has been subject to more research in which it
is identified as being low-risk [118]. The projects in the bancassurance portfolio represent
together some 16,500 function points, 64 of the projects were developed in-house and
20 projects were partly or completely outsourced. The 84 projects are subprojects from
larger projects. Projects in this bancassurance portfolio are split up to reduce risks and
improve control into smaller subprojects for which size estimates are made and are used
in our analysis. The subprojects with smaller sizes also allow for higher volatility rates
which we will see later, are higher than Jones’s failure factors, see Table 2.1. The ana-
lyzed portfolio concerns not only the development of new applications, but also changes
and significant enhancements to existing applications. The function point totals of the
considered projects in this portfolio have the characteristics represented in Table 2.4. We
can see that most projects are of a size between 67 and 227 function points, since the first
and third quartile represent respectively the 25% and 75% interval of the data set that con-
tains the function point totals. Figure 2.9 shows the empirical probability density function
of the project sizes in function points. The integral of the empirical density function over
any data set gives the probability that random data points in the data set will fall within
that certain interval. As can be seen from this figure, the curve is very slender, indicating a
portfolio with a lot of small sized projects and very few projects that have a size over 500
function points, with a maximum size of 2282 function points. The figure is in accordance
with earlier findings with projects of a similar portfolio presented in [118].
min. first quartile median mean third quartile max.
14.0 66.8 123.5 197.1 227.5 2282.0
Table 2.4: Function point countings characteristics.
For each project in this portfolio the function points were counted twice or thrice by
certified function point counters that counted consistently as we stated earlier, for details
see [118]. The first counting was done based on the requirements that were produced in
the initial phase of the project right before functional design started. After delivery of the
project the definitive requirements were measured in the second function point analysis.
The sum of function points of all first analyses is about 15,687 function points, this portfo-
lio grows to the total sum of 16,605 function points at the last counting, an overall growth
of about 6%. For some projects after the functional design an extra size estimate of the
requirements was done. In Section 2.5.4 we will further investigate these projects. For
all the projects the different function point countings were considered to gather a rigorous
basis for an analysis of the compound volatility rate. Because the requirements docu-
ments sometimes contained some temporary lacunae, the function point counters added
a certain percentage, based on experience, to a function point counting. These percent-
ages were needed to represent the requirements that were, although present requirements,
not completely elaborated and were incorporated in the analysis to obtain a more realistic
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Figure 2.9: Project size in function points.
volatility. The main characteristics of the thus calculated compound monthly growth rates
are presented in Table 2.5.
difference min. first quartile median mean third quartile max.
relative r -23.7 -3.6 0.0 0.9 3.7 31.5
absolute r 0.0 1.4 3.7 5.8 6.3 31.5
Table 2.5: Compound monthly volatility rate r characteristics for the bancassurance port-
folio.
From Table 2.5 it is apparent that the requirements volatility rate has a median of 0%
and an average of 0.903%. This average is close to Jones’s averages in Table 2.1. The last
row of Table 2.5 displays the absolute values of the requirements volatility rate, all neg-
ative volatility rates were made positive, as a measure to express change. Combining the
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64 in-house projects with Jones’s average of 1.2% requirements volatility and the 20 out-
sourced projects with Jones’s average of 1.1% requirements volatility, results in a bench-
marked volatility of this IT portfolio that amounts to (64 · 1.2 + 20 · 1.1)/84 = 1.176
according to Jones’s industrial averages. This volatility based on Jones’s averages is
only 0.27% percent point off of our own measured volatility average of 0.903%. This
small deviation is induced by using Jones’s benchmark for management information sys-
tems on a portfolio of bancasurrance specific management information systems. We infer
from the coincidence of Jones’s latest averages with the averages of our detailed informa-
tion that in itself it is an indication that it is useful to use Jones’s work in the absence of
the detailed data that we have. But, since the density is akin to generalized Pareto distri-
butions, it displays heavy tails. In that case, median and mean can differ strongly, so that
an average is not that useful and it is therefore strongly recommended to construct your
own benchmark based on your own projects with the metrics presented in this chapter or
use the benchmarks presented here as a surrogate, rather than an average of a presumably
strongly asymmetric data set.
Jones has measured maximums that are displayed in Table 2.1, but for 21% of the
projects we have measured higher volatilities than Jones, even though our bancassurance
portfolio is of low-risk. Fifty percent of the volatility rates in our bancassurance portfolio
are in the interval between -3.553% and 3.708% compound monthly volatility rate.
As we have seen, omitting project duration in volatility assessments, results in too
optimistic figures for long projects and too pessimistic figures for short projects, mak-
ing them not very useful for assessments of individual projects, whereas when using our
volatility models this is conveniently possible. Our proposed approach includes the du-
ration of a project and thus provides a more granular view of maximum volatility rates,
so it creates a better distinction between healthy and unhealthy projects. And thus this
method is a useful tool for IT governors, whether making volatility specifications in an
outsourcing contract situation or whether creating an IT dashboard to monitor volatility
and signal abnormalities.
Table 2.5 shows maximum and minimum volatility rates that are much larger than
zero percent volatility, the mythical no-change-no-delay policy. We will see later that
these were projects, with a relatively short duration; we recall that high volatility rates are
acceptable for short projects. For example, in our bancassurance portfolio, 21% of the
projects have an absolute monthly requirements volatility higher than 5%, the failure rate
stated by Jones. With a significant project size, such projects qualify directly for execu-
tive attention when applying Jones failure factors. But for projects with shorter duration
or smaller sizes this is not the boundary that should be used. Depending on the amount
of projects we can define boundaries among the projects using our volatility ratio pi, the
metric that takes into account also a project’s duration besides the experienced volatil-
ity r. With a boundary of −0.5 < pi < 0.5 we end up with 8% that needs attention
instead of 21% of the projects. This will be shown in Figure 2.14 that we will discuss
later on. These projects are candidates for immediate management attention since our
metric is highly correlated with projects out of control. Our tool is therefore a sieve that
gives IT executives a hint as to where to put their valuable time and effort. Management
attention that is directed to the capped portfolio of projects that require management at-
tention results in putting the identified derailing projects back on track before it is too late.
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The merit of our method is that we identify these projects early within large IT project
portfolios.
2.5.1 Volatility Density Function
Next, we will analyze the volatility indicator’s probability density function and its outliers
for the bancassurance portfolio. Figure 2.10 shows initial visual explorations. In the upper
left corner a Box-and-Whisker plot is drawn for all the volatility values. Boxplots were
originally introduced by John Tukey in 1977 [115] and are used to visually depict the
five-number summaries as illustrated in Table 2.5.
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Figure 2.10: Volatility characteristics.
Boxplots can help in identifying the skewness or the variance of an underlying proba-
bility function. The box in a boxplot represents the first and third quartile of the data set,
the so-called interquartile range, and the horizontal lines outside the box, the whiskers, are
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defined by the last observed data point that lies within 1.5 times the interquartile range.
The outliers in a data set are represented in a boxplot with dots.
In the upper-right corner a histogram of the bancassurance volatility rates is drawn
together with the probability density function. In this plot can be seen, as the boxplot
and [118] already hinted, that the probability is leptokurtic and heterogeneous with heavy
tails on both sides. To further illustrate this assumption we provide also Quantile–Quantile
plots, or short Q–Q plots in Figure 2.10. Q–Q plots are a graphical tool to diagnose the
distribution of samples. When the plot does not show a straight line, the underlying data is
not drawn from the same distribution as the distribution on the horizontal axis. The quan-
tiles of the left-hand side of our density plot, i.e. everything left of 0%, and the quantiles
of the right-hand side, everything right of 0%, have been plotted against the quantiles of
the exponential distribution in the lower two plots in Figure 2.10. We use the exponential
distribution as a reference here to confirm the heavy tail of the requirements volatility with
visual means. These quantiles appear to approach a straight line, thus indicating heavy
tails on both sides. These heavy tails can be interpreted by having occurrences with ex-
treme values, or in other words—these values are most likely not stray values, but actual
occurrences.
Care should be exercised if a probability function has several peaks, since this could
indicate that this is a natural characteristic of the data. To make a comparison with charity
donations, it is customary to find two peaks in the probability density functions of the
donations. The lower peak is induced by contributions from individuals and a different
peak at a higher value, for donations made by companies.
2.5.2 Kurtosis and Skewness
Despite the actual occurrences that are causing small peaks on the right-hand side of the
probability function it is still possible to calculate the actual kurtosis and the skewness of
the data. The kurtosis of sample data is defined as the fourth sample moment about the
mean divided by the square of the second moment about the mean, the sample variance.
See Formula 2.22 for the kurtosis formula for a data set with n values xi. In some def-
initions of the kurtosis formula there is a subtraction of three from the result. With this
subtraction the formula results in a kurtosis of zero for the normal distribution, which is
also called mesokurtic. Functions with a kurtosis higher than zero are called leptokurtic.
The skewness of a probability distribution is the degree to which a distribution departs
from symmetry about the mean. Sample skewness is defined by Formula 2.23 for a data
set containing n values xi; i.e. the third moment divided by the third power of the square
root of the second moment. A skewness of zero indicates a symmetric probability func-
tion. The results for the requirements volatility using Equation 2.22 and 2.23 are presented
in Table 2.6.
Kurtosis =
m4
m22
− 3 = n
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)4
(
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2)2
− 3 (2.22)
Skewness =
m3
m
3/2
2
=
√
n
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)3
(
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2)3/2
(2.23)
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Kurtosis 3.27
Skewness 1.09
Table 2.6: Kurtosis and skewness of requirements volatility for the bancassurance port-
folio.
Table 2.6 confirms with a kurtosis of 3.27 the slenderness of the requirements volatility
rate. And the skewness of 1.09 indicates that the requirements volatility is right-skewed,
the right tail of the distribution is heavier than the left tail.
2.5.3 Actual tolerance factors
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Figure 2.11: Various tolerance factors for the bancassurance portfolio.
For each project’s tolerance factor p a function as drawn in Figure 2.4 can be made. In
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Figure 2.11 we have drawn a picture with the same axes as Figure 2.4 for the bancassur-
ance portfolio. In Figure 2.11 the tolerance factors p of the highest tolerance factor 0.68
is shown with the accompanying function 2.17, this line displays the placement of equal
tolerance factors, 0.68, for larger and smaller projects. The same function is also dis-
played for the tree following high tolerance factors. The figure displays the spread of
actual tolerance factors for projects in this portfolio.
min. first quartile median mean third quartile max.
p -0.10 -0.028 0 0.040 0.046 0.68
Table 2.7: Tolerance factor p characteristics for the bancassurance portfolio.
In Table 2.7 the statistical summary of the tolerance factors p for the bancassurance port-
folio is shown. We remind the reader that a tolerance factor of 1 was equivalent with
starting to experience a more than proportional requirements growth. The tolerance met-
ric p can be used to calculate the tolerance of a portfolio. This is done by calculating the
tolerance factor p with Equation 2.13 for all projects and then taking the maximum, de-
noted P . Since our bancassurance portfolio is of low-risk, we conclude that the empirical
maximum tolerance factor of P = 0.68 that we encountered is an acceptable value for
healthy requirements volatility in the bancassurance sector and can serve as a benchmark
for other bancassurance portfolios. At the same time the tolerance factor can be used to
pinpoint the projects with a high tolerance for volatility. Projects with a high tolerance for
volatility can then be further investigated for the causes of this high tolerance.
In Figure 2.12 some general characteristics of our bancassurance portfolio are shown.
The upper-left plot shows a scatterplot of the function point totals versus the spent hours
for each project. The drawn regression line, h = f1.446 has a very small p-value, indicat-
ing a good fit for this data set. The upper-right plot shows the function point size against
the absolute value of the compound monthly requirements volatility. This figure shows
that high volatility rates occur only at small-sized projects, therefore the regression line
r = 1/0.003f with a p-value of 4.4 · 10−08 is also drawn. The lower two plots con-
firm this for the duration and the hours spent. The lower-left plot shows project duration
against the absolute value of the volatility rate and the lower-right plot shows the amount
of hours spent versus the absolute value of r. These bottom two pictures show that volatil-
ity rates are lower for projects that have longer durations, supporting that duration needs
to be incorporated in a volatility metric. We know that we are dealing with a low-risk
portfolio and we see high volatilities occurring at small projects. Indeed, further inquiries
within the organization revealed that high volatility was managed by using DSDM and
creating small projects thus isolating risks. So, their approach is a possible way to miti-
gate unhealthy requirements creep. The plots shown can aid in identifying projects that
need management attention. Especially if we are dealing with an unknown portfolio it is
possible to make a quick assessment to identify these projects by comparing them to our
bancassurance benchmark. We will do so in Section 2.6 in which we analyze the volatility
of a high-risk portfolio.
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Figure 2.12: Bancassurance portfolio characteristics.
2.5.4 Differences between counting twice or thrice
Some projects in the bancassurance portfolio had an additional function point counting
besides the counting at the end of the requirements phase and the counting after comple-
tion of the project. In all cases that the project manager requested an additional function
point analysis, it took place at the end of the design phase. In our analysis the first and
last counting were used to calculate the compound monthly requirements volatility rate.
Figure 2.13 juxtaposes different boxplots of the project portfolio to show the differ-
ences between twice and thrice counted projects. The first two boxplots in Figure 2.13
show the requirements volatility rate for these projects, revealing that the volatility rate
is slightly higher for thrice counted projects, but at the same time the extremely high and
low volatility rates are occurring at the twice counted projects. Previously we have seen
that projects with high or low volatility rates were the projects with a short duration which
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Figure 2.13: Differences between twice or thrice counted bancassurance projects.
is confirmed by the boxplots in the second plot in Figure 2.13. The left-hand side plot also
shows with the two boxplots that projects having a relatively high volatility are usually be-
ing counted a third time. Because project management was already aware of potentially
volatile requirements, they requested an additional function point analysis to have their
feelings of requirements volatility materialized in a function point analysis; they did not
want to wait for the final counting at the end of the project, to keep plan accuracy at the
highest possible levels. This results in a higher volatility rate for thrice counted projects,
since the volatility rate is based on the first and last counting. The interquartile range of
the function point size for twice counted projects is from 65 to 227 function points, the
interquartile range of the function point size for thrice counted projects is between 92 and
257 function points.
2.5.5 Inspecting the volatility ratios
Now we turn back to our volatility metric pi from Equation 2.18. We have calculated the
pi1-ratio from Equation 2.18 for all projects in the portfolio and placed these ratios among
a horizontal axis representing the intercounting duration of a project. This is demonstrated
in the first plot in Figure 2.14. The same exercise can be done for our ρ-ratio metric
presented in Equation 2.21 which also takes the project size into account. This results
in the second picture in Figure 2.14 showing ρ1. The resulting plots are similar but not
completely equal, although the different projects are scattered more or less equally in the
pictures. These plots display the spread of the pi and ρ-ratio for a low-risk portfolio and
are useful for benchmarking other projects. Volatility risks in this portfolio were managed
by having small projects, and each project adding value to the portfolio. Therefore, the
size of a project is less influential, since the size is almost always less than 200 function
points. In a high-risk portfolio there are larger variations between pi and ρ due to larger
sizes and thus creating more different scattering between the pi and ρ plots. In Table 2.8
42
IT Risks in Measure and Number
0 5 10 15
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
intercounting duration in months
pipi
−−
ra
tio
0 5 10 15
−
1
0
1
2
intercounting duration in months
ρρ
−−
ra
tio
Figure 2.14: Comparing volatility ratios pi1 and ρ1 for the bancassurance portfolio.
we have listed a statistical summary of the volatility ratios pi1 and ρ1.
ratio min. first quartile median mean third quartile max.
pi1 -0.64 -0.11 0 0.025 0.14 0.80
ρ1 -1.43 -0.29 0 0.083 0.33 2.34
Table 2.8: Volatility ratios pi1 and ρ1 for the bancassurance portfolio.
In Figure 2.14 the value of the tolerance factor p for both ratios is 1. The scattering of
pi and ρ in figures like Figure 2.14 will remain the same for different values of p, but the
numbers on the vertical axes will change if p is different. Projects that are located on the
upper edges of these drawings are projects with a high volatility, and should be further
inspected to find the cause of the high volatility. Especially projects that have a more than
proportional growth are in dire need of management attention. In Figure 2.14 we have
drawn a solid line for proportional growth in the pi-ratio plot and dashed lines that contain
95% of the projects in the ρ-ratio plot. By creating these boundaries the volatility outliers
are easily identified. Subsequently of making these plots, a root-cause analysis needs to
be performed on the requirements volatility of all projects that are outside these bound-
aries. By constricting these boundaries, more highly volatile projects will be included for
inspection. Creating figures of volatility ratios like Figure 2.14 is insightful to decide on
organization specific volatility boundaries that express tolerable project volatility. These
volatility metrics can thus be used to identify projects with unbalanced behavior regard-
ing the requirements volatility and therefore belong in an IT dashboard that is addressing
the requirements volatility. In Section 2.10 we will present such a requirements volatility
dashboard. Moreover, these volatility boundaries can be used in outsourcing contracts,
agreeing both parties on a maximum pi-ratio, invariant for project duration or, a maximum
ρ-ratio invariant for duration and size. Since we have created a strong indicator for dan-
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gerously high volatility, this metric certainly belongs in IT dashboards for IT governors.
In Section 2.10 we present a simplified method to calculate the volatility ratios pi and ρ
yourself as well as how to create a requirements volatility dashboard.
2.5.6 Cost per function point
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Figure 2.15: Cost per function point versus requirements volatility for the bancassurance
portfolio.
In Figure 2.15 a scatterplot is made of the compound monthly requirements volatility
rate against a cost index per function point. The costs are indexed for confidentiality. This
plot shows a large blob of projects around the zero percent requirements volatility rate;
the volatility rate of the projects has a standard deviation of 10.1 and 51 projects (80%)
have an absolute volatility rate smaller than 10.1. Besides the blob, it also shows that
some projects having a high positive volatility rate, tend to have a low cost per function
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point, which is non-intuitive. On the left side of Figure 2.15 the projects are displayed
for which requirements scrap occurred and these tend to have a higher cost per function
point. This indicates that when requirements are scrapped from a project the cost per
function point increases. Contrary to intuition, removing requirements turned out to be
associated with higher costs whereas you would expect lower costs due to designs that
do not need to be made, functionality that does not need to be made and tests that do not
need to be made nor need to be run. In the above intuitions we assume that requirements
are scrapped early. In practice this is almost never the case. After the requirements are
partly implemented, designed, tested, and so on, the stakeholders learn that not all initial
requirements were optimal. So scrap is accompanied with the waste of partly done work
not being expressed in the final function point analysis. This waste is costly, and will lead
to a non-optimal design even if some requirements are taken out.
2.6 Benchmarking government projects
In this section we will use the empirical probability density function constructed from
the bancassurance portfolio as a benchmark for projects from a government portfolio for
which in some cases intermittent function point analyses were conducted for audit pur-
poses. We know that the projects that are analyzed in this section come from a high-risk
government portfolio and that one of the government projects that we analyze failed. We
therefore perform this meaningful ex-post analysis on the requirements volatility of the
government portfolio, to illustrate that the failure of some of its projects that actually did
occur was predicted ex-ante by using our techniques. We predicted the failure while it
was still ongoing by computing the requirements volatility using our techniques.
The portfolio consists of six projects that are evenly sized. Among the projects is
a failing project with a size of about 1000 function points and a subproject consisting
of about 300 function points. Countings for most of the projects have taken place at
three points in time. From all resulting volatility rates r we created a probability den-
sity function. This function and our bancassurance benchmark are plotted in Figure 2.16.
Comparison of the probability density function with the bancassurance portfolio shows
three differences: a lower peak, a peak that is more to the right and a heavier tail for the
governmental project data. All these signs are indicating that the governmental IT portfo-
lio is presumably out of control, and that some projects are totally derailing. To confirm
the differences in the probability density function between the governmental and the ban-
cassurance portfolio, we calculated for the governmental portfolio and the bancassurance
portfolio the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic, to test whether both data sets stem from
the same continuous distribution. A distance D = 0.51 with a p-statistic of 0.00024 re-
sulted, implying that we can reject the hypothesis that these data sets come from the same
distribution. To give the reader insight into the growth of ongoing projects like our known
to have failed governmental project and its subprojects we plotted the size of the project
and the subproject over time in Figure 2.17. In this is figure also a dashed line visible for
a hypothetical project of the same size that experiences a volatility rate of 2% and a dotted
line to indicate 5% growth. In Figure 2.18 we have plotted the size variations of the other
five government projects that we analyzed. Since we did not have timestamps of the five
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Figure 2.16: Applying our bancassurance benchmark on governmental projects.
intermediate function point analyses, they were placed in the middle of the total project.
In Figure 2.18 we see that one of the projects is increasing very fast in a short period of
time, and some other projects are experiencing churn.
With our benchmarked volatility ratios at hand and data on duration and size we can
also position the governmental projects against our bancassurance portfolio in the plots
we presented in Figure 2.14. When we calculate the pi and ρ-ratios for the complete
government project, pi0.68 equals 0.34 and ρ0.68 equals 1.11. These are on the high side,
but not yet entering the danger zone. If we on the other hand look at the volatility ratios
for the subproject we see differences with the failing governmental project making the
comparison interesting. We obtain pi0.68 = 1.37 and ρ0.68 = 4.03 for the entire subproject
and pi0.68 = 1.76 and ρ0.68 = 6.98 for the first period of the subproject, points that
are well over the edge of Figure 2.14 indicating that this subproject was well into the
danger zone already after its intermediate size estimate. These governmental volatilities
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Figure 2.17: Requirements growth over time.
are plotted alongside our benchmark data in Figure 2.19 as solid dots. We remind the
reader that in this plot we plotted pi0.68 and ρ0.68, whereas in Figure 2.14 we plotted
pi1 and ρ1. This results in an equal scattering of the bancassurance projects, but with a
different scale on the vertical axis, and the project with the highest tolerance factor is now
positioned on the line pi = 1. The open circles in Figure 2.19 represent the bancassurance
benchmark data. In Figure 2.19 we can see the subproject positioned above the line of
healthy requirements growth in the bancassurance sector. The left solid dot is the pi-ratio
for the first part of the subproject, the right solid dot above the horizontal line is the pi-
ratio for the complete subproject. The maximum tolerance factor P for all governmental
projects is 1.71, which is the tolerance factor belonging to the first part of the failed
subproject.
As we can spot right away in Figure 2.19 the pi-ratio belonging to the intermediate
function point analysis of the subproject as well as the pi-ratio belonging to the last size
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Figure 2.18: Requirements growth over time.
measure of the subproject are lying above the line pi = 1, indicating that the subproject is
beyond control and needs to be stopped immediately. Indeed in this case the project was
eventually killed, and a complete overhaul was necessary since the already partly opera-
tional system was beyond its best-before date before it was even finished. Scatter plots
like Figure 2.19 can thus be used as a volatility litmus test for ongoing projects within an
IT portfolio, to signal for projects that are in the danger zone, or worse: beyond control. In
this governmental situation, consecutive function point analyses were misinterpreted both
by the auditors and management. Instead of being alarmed by the grandiose volatility,
they used the growth to, erroneously, extrapolate the function point countings to estimate
the function point total at planned project delivery. This illustrates that even when the
function point size measures of a project are available, uninitiated people can draw totally
false conclusions, and will walk with open eyes off the requirements volatility cliff.
The approach taken in the bancassurance portfolio helps to avoid these problems. In
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Figure 2.19: Volatility ratios pi0.68 and ρ0.68 for governmental projects versus the ban-
cassurance portfolio.
the bancassurance portfolio larger projects are split up in smaller subprojects to mitigate
risks. Jones [59] states that requirements creep is sometimes outside the control of the
entire software organization and that it can be anticipated, but seldom it can be reversed
once it occurs. The measures provided in this chapter serve as an early warning sign
for high volatility rates. And when high volatility rates are encountered for a project,
management needs to consider to split up the project in smaller more manageable projects
as is common practice in the low-risk bancassurance portfolio in order to mitigate risk.
2.7 Volatility variations for outsourcing
Many organizations outsource their IT function or parts of it. As Jones mentions in his
book [64], outsourcing of software development seems to decrease the compound monthly
requirements volatility rate. There are several reasons clarifying this. First, outsourced
projects are probably managed better on the client side. As the company that is giving
the requirements to sourcing partners it is impractical and costly to have too many meet-
ings about unclear requirements, so the company outsourcing its work will try to make
requirements documents as clear and complete as possible. Second, it is the company
receiving the development assignment that will try to complete the project as soon as pos-
sible to maximize their profit and thus clarify unclear requirements in the beginning of the
project. Third, the sourcing partner will not mind charging more hours than initially esti-
mated for the hours needed for clarifying the requirements. And fourth, there is a contract
in between, and to prevent litigation conflicts, there is a tendency to turn the project into
a success no matter what, which probably results in unpaid and unrecorded overtime.
Sometimes organizations tend to apply a zero-change policy at the start of an out-
sourcing deal with the idea of staying in control, also known as no-change-no-delay. But
requirements vary by their nature, so a zero-change policy does not always lead to an
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ideal end product. See Peters and Verhoef [91] for a discussion on business cases for
requirements creep with a positive return on investment.
The bancassurance organization in question was curious to know whether a zero-
change-no-delay policy would work out positively for their routine IT work. Business
management thought that this would once and for all solve their problems they histori-
cally had with their in-house development. The bancassurance portfolio contains enough
data to explore such questions. We submitted the bancassurance portfolio to an analysis
whether or not outsourcing had an effect on the compound monthly requirements volatility
rate. It turned out that outsourced projects display similar requirements volatility charac-
teristics as in-house developed projects. We will show in this section how we arrived at
this conclusion.
project type min. first quartile median mean third quartile max.
in-house 14 64.75 116.5 141.2 190.2 552
outsourced 55 111.2 223 376 374.2 2282
Table 2.9: Size variations for in-house and outsourced projects from the bancassurance
portfolio.
In Table 2.9 we show the size characteristics for the in-house versus outsourced projects.
We see in Table 2.9 that outsourced projects are usually larger than in-house projects. This
is to be expected, since when outsourcing work, larger portions of labor are more prone
to be candidates for sourcing and smaller projects are done in-house.
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Figure 2.20: Volatility variations for in-house versus outsourcing.
The first plot in Figure 2.20 shows three different probability functions for the ban-
cassurance portfolio. The dashed distribution represents the volatility rate for projects
that were outsourced. In the case of this portfolio the projects were nearsourced, i.e.
outsourced to a local company, as opposed to offshore outsourcing when projects are
outsourced to other countries. The dotted probability function represents the in-house
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volatility rate; the solid function is the probability function of the complete portfolio. As
appears from Figure 2.20, outsourcing seems to make a difference, but we will see shortly
that this is insignificant for our data set. In the second plot in Figure 2.20 the box-and-
whisker plots for the same three portfolio partitions are shown. Here we see that the
outliers with a high absolute volatility rate, |r| > 20%, are in-house developed projects.
Table 2.10 presents the kurtosis and skewness of the three data sets to further illustrate the
differences between the three. We remind the reader that the kurtosis and skewness of a
normal distribution are zero.
in-house outsourced combined
Kurtosis 2.17 0.67 3.27
Skewness 0.96 -0.73 1.09
Table 2.10: Kurtosis and Skewness of volatility of in-house versus outsourced projects.
Table 2.10 states that the form of the probability function is more slender than a normal
distribution, both for the in-house and outsourced projects and that the functions are right-
skewed. As we concluded before the outliers in Figure 2.20 are the smaller sized projects.
In this portfolio, the outsourced projects are larger in function point size than the in-house
developed projects.
2.7.1 In-house or outsourced?
As Table 2.9 states, the mean for in-house projects is 141 function points and for out-
sourced projects 360 function points. The plots in Figure 2.20 suggest that the projects
in the outsourced partition are showing a lower requirements volatility than the in-house
bancassurance projects, which concurs with Jones results summarized in Table 2.1 and
his findings on differences in average sizes of in-house and outsourced projects [62, Ta-
ble 7.7 and 8.5]. To validate this statement we have done a statistical test on the data,
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, to detect differences in the probability density function for
the two data sets. Despite the slight visual differences, there is no statistical proof of
our hypothesis that they are different. The resulting test statistic D, the maximum ver-
tical difference between cumulative distribution functions, equals 0.25 with a p-value of
0.2968. This result does not give us statistical proof to conclude that the two data sets,
in-house development and outsourced, are drawn from a different continuous distribution.
We can clarify this statistical insignificance since the outsourced labor for these projects
was not just thrown over a fence, but done on-site with the customer. External IT staff
adopted quickly to the in-house situation, more or less providing about the same require-
ments volatility as a regular on-site development. To further analyze our conclusion, we
partitioned the complete set of project data randomly many times and revealed that when
having more comparable data available, the difference in volatility between in-house and
outsourced projects can become significant; corroborating Jones’s results that there is a
difference. Resampling without replacement was performed by slicing the complete data
set in two separate sets of the same size as the in-house and outsourced data, a subset of
20 projects and a subset of 64 projects. This slicing, sampling without replacement, was
performed 10,000 times. For each partition the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was done on
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the two subsets, each time resulting in a value for the test statistic D. The probability
density function of all 10,000 D values is plotted in Figure 2.21 with the test statistic for
the in-house versus outsourced partition plotted as a vertical line. The percentage of ran-
domly created partitions that had a KS test statistic larger than the actual value is only 7%.
So, in 93% of the random slices that were created a smaller maximal distance between
the cumulative distribution function was found than in the actual slice of in-house and
outsourced. The division of the data set into in-house and outsourced projects creates a
relatively large distance between the subsets when concerning the distribution function.
This indicates that partitioning the projects in an in-house and outsourced subset creates
a larger difference than most random partitions. So, it is unlikely that the volatility differ-
ences induced by this division are purely coincidental. Even though the current difference
is not statistically significant, it does not appear to be purely random either. When more
similar distributed data is available it is important to look at this partition, because the cur-
rent large distance, although not statistically significant, can barely be induced by sheer
coincidence.
2.8 The boomerang
Comparing the different amount of staff hours for projects usually shows that larger
projects have a lower productivity than smaller projects, because of increasing fixed costs
like communication. We will investigate this in the bancassurance portfolio. In Fig-
ure 2.22 the number of hours spent on a project are compared to the productivity for that
project. Since there was no complete data on hours spent for outsourced projects this
analysis was performed only on in-house projects.
This results in highly elastic productivity for projects of a size smaller than 100 func-
tion points, which means that a small proportional difference in size can have a large
proportional difference in productivity for the range from 1 to 100 function points. Func-
tion 2.24 states for the bancassurance portfolio the statistically fitted productivity function
fppm , a simple statistical fit which is a variation of the benchmark in [117, p. 61, For-
mula 46]. Function 2.24 benchmarks for a certain size f , expressed in function points,
its productivity expressed in function points per staff month. Equation 2.24 is plotted in
Figure 2.22.
fppm =
677
f
(2.24)
This function, based on the project data, assumes a theoretical asymptote of zero function
points per staff month and a productivity smaller than 1 function point per staff month for
projects that are larger than 677.66 function points. This is not in accordance with real-
ity, however in this portfolio we can use this productivity relation for analysis purposes.
Next, we compare productivity with the absolute value of the compound monthly growth
rate. Surprisingly, some underlying effects tend to create clusters of projects along a
boomerang as can be seen in Figure 2.23. In the lower half of the figure a cluster of
projects can be seen that have a mutually increasing compound monthly growth rate, but
display the same productivity. In other words, these projects displayed mutually increas-
ing requirements creep, but were not able to manage the requirements change, resulting in
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Figure 2.21: Positioning in-house versus outsourced partitions among random partitions.
a low productivity. In the upper halve of the figure there is a cluster of projects that have
opposite characteristics. Whilst these projects do have a high compound monthly growth
rate, the projects also have a high productivity. These projects seem to flourish better with
higher requirements volatility. In the following paragraph we will discuss the causes of
the boomerang in Figure 2.23.
2.8.1 Size and volatility
To assure that the differences in volatility in Figures 2.23 and 2.25 did not stem from size
differences in the different projects Figure 2.24 has been made. In Figure 2.24 the size
in function points is added to the plot, in which larger sizes imply a circle with a larger
diameter. Figure 2.24 shows that both large and small projects appear in the different
partitions. An analysis with the internal project portfolio of the different projects plotted,
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Figure 2.22: Project hours versus productivity.
turned out to explain the boomerang shape.
In Figure 2.25 we present the boomerang picture again, but now for only three sub-
portfolios each containing 7 to 13 projects. This figure shows a factor that supposedly
has created the observed boomerang. The three partitions of the bancassurance portfo-
lio have the following characteristics. We call the cluster of projects with high volatility,
but low productivity, partition x. It turned out that these projects supported stock trad-
ing. Partition x contains very complex projects tightly interwoven with a large legacy
portfolio of existing IT assets mainly written in COBOL with several interfaces and the
portfolio evolved over many years making enhancement difficult, thus resulting in a low
productivity. This coincides with Jones’s type 5 enhancements [64]. Jones describes type
5 modifications as the classic form of maintenance of aging legacy applications with a low
productivity of 0.5 to 3 function points per staff month. The high requirements volatility
can be explained by the high cohesion between IT and business in this part of the ban-
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Figure 2.23: Requirements volatility and function points per staff month.
cassurance portfolio. Because of cohesion small changes to the requirements were often
made after requirements sign-off resulting in high volatility rates, which is not desirable
given the legacy portfolio.
The cluster of projects that display high requirements change, partition y, but also a
high productivity, are in a partition of the portfolio that deals with back-office systems.
In several project iterations new versions of the products were created. The projects suc-
ceeded in using mostly out-of-the box tools to generate the necessary forms, thus resulting
in high productivity. High volatility stemmed from different causes. First of all, the re-
quirements usually changed during project iterations that were executed in close contact
with the client. Secondly, the first function point counting took usually place in an earlier
stage of the development project in this part of the portfolio than in other parts. There-
fore, the requirements appear less stable when compared to projects from other parts of the
portfolio. The organization confirmed that the development method was geared towards
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Figure 2.24: Volatility variations versus the productivity of projects and size in function
points.
dealing with volatility. The last group, partition z, does not show a high requirements
change, less than 6%, but shows a moderate productivity. This group is a partition of the
portfolio concerning international payments. Requirements for international payments are
based on international standards and must therefore have clearly defined requirements,
which explains the low compound monthly volatility rate.
We partitioned Figure 2.23 in four quadrants, creating a diagram with four different
types of projects. In Table 2.11 we listed the values corresponding to the quadrant di-
vision. The matrix in Table 2.11 corresponds with the quadrants in Figure 2.23. The
high productivity–high volatility projects correspond to the upper-right quadrant, the low
productivity–low volatility to the lower-left quadrant and their opposites the high produc-
tivity–low volatility projects correspond to the upper-left quadrant and the low productiv-
ity–high volatility to the lower-right quadrant. With these quadrants and the diagram it
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Figure 2.25: Volatility and function points per staff month for different partitions of the
bancassurance portfolio.
low volatility high volatility
high productivity r < 15% fppm > 35 r > 15% fppm > 35
low productivity r < 15% fppm < 35 r > 15% fppm > 35
Table 2.11: Volatility quadrant division.
is possible to score projects and provide a list of potential projects that need additional
management attention.
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2.9 Monitoring the volatility of an ongoing portfolio
When the requirements volatility of an ongoing portfolio needs to be continuously moni-
tored, there is an alternative to intermittent function point analyses as size estimates. This
section describes how to assess the volatility of ongoing projects at low cost, but with
the drawback that, since we are monitoring production, outliers in the analysis are not
necessarily due to volatile requirements. Our low cost method does allow quickly pin-
pointing of production variabilities for root-cause analysis of requirements volatility or
other reasons.
Doing two function point measures for a project results in a cost of only two times the
function point size expressed in estimation dollars. However, when it is necessary to have
a constant grip on the volatility, monthly or weekly measurements become expensive. It
is then cheaper to revert to daily reports of lines of code that are checked in. By using
the total number of lines of code, LOC, from daily reports produced by configuration
management tools, it is possible to estimate the size of a project on a daily basis through
backfiring. Backfiring was introduced by Jones [65, 64, 62], and is simply a function
point conversion rate for the lines of code and the programming language involved. In
different programming languages it takes a different amount of lines of code to program
one function point. In [62, page 78] Jones lists function point conversion rates for various
programming languages.
2.9.1 Volatility of a software product line
In Figure 2.26 we show the size over a period of 206 days of a portfolio of correlated
systems that together form a software product line for embedded software of a hardware
manufacturer. Some of the subsystems were already deployed before the start date in
Figure 2.26. Within the shown period a few values were missing in the data files, but not
more than 9%, since it was not every day the report was created that listed the physical
magnitude of the portfolio in lines of code. With interpolation of the surrounding data the
few missing values were added. By applying backfiring we calculated the size in function
points of the software product line. This number is shown in Figure 2.26 for all days. A
line intersecting all points is also drawn in this figure in which we immediately notice the
size shocks at certain points in time. The substantial discontinuities signal large volatility
in very short time frames, and deserve direct attention to investigate whether something is
going astray. Fortunately, most of these size jumps turned out to be explainable. The leap
around day 58 occurred due to forking of a subsystem. From the forking at day 58 until
day 93 of the observed period two versions of the same subsystem had to be maintained,
to temporarily support two variants of an embedded system that is residing in the IT
portfolio. At day 93 the additional subsystem was removed, therefore the decrease in size.
Between day 141 and day 142 a part of the software product line that had been outsourced
and was finished, was checked in, radically increasing the size of the software product
line. So, the largest outliers were perfectly legitimate. This means that we can omit these
values from our analysis to dive into other volatility signals that become perhaps invisible
due to the large outliers now present in the picture.
From the daily backfired size estimates we can calculate the corresponding monthly
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Figure 2.26: Software product line code volume over time.
volatility rate with Formula 2.4. For the number of months twe use the value 1/30.5, since
we take 30.5 as the average number of days in a month and therefore 1/30.5 as the number
of months for 1 day. In Formula 2.4 we have to divide 1 by the intercounting duration,
1/30.5, and get 30.5 in the exponent of the size divisions. So, to monitor the volatility r
for a daily difference we use Formula 2.25 using the SizeAtDay on day n and day n+ 1.
r =
((
SizeAtDayn+1
SizeAtDayn
)30.5
− 1
)
· 100 (2.25)
Having a high amount of volatility data available on this product line, we can now apply
our previously shown analysis methods. Although we are not analyzing just the require-
ments volatility with these data, but the integral production volatility, this method is a very
cheap possibility to observe changes compared to doing function point analyses. Daily
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source code sizes are easily obtained from a source code version control system, and with
our formulas easily converted to compound monthly growth rates. Volatility outliers in
the thus obtained data should be inspected for root causes. We are in this manner creating
maximum volatility inspection results with minimal effort.
In Table 2.12 we show the characteristics of the daily measured volatility changes
expressed in monthly percentages. Of course the minimum and maximum are much lower
and higher for the data that contain the previously explained outliers, and we see a change
in the average that is 4.92% for the data containing the outliers and 1.69% for the cleansed
data. Jones’s average for system software, 2%, is again close to our empirically found
average.
r min. first quartile median mean third quartile max.
all -73.97% 0.04% 0.70% 4.92% 1.70% 571.70%
cleaned -29.57% 0.05% 0.69% 1.69% 1.63% 39.21%
Table 2.12: Software product line requirements volatility characteristics.
In this case, the averages should have been lower though, since the management’s target
was set to no growth at all, and preferably a code volume shrink. The shown data concerns
a so-called reactive product line [36], in which many instances of similar systems are
consolidated into a single system: a software product line. Of course, you need new code
for that, but the expectation is that other parts of the IT portfolio can shrink. Either by
code removal or by generic code that replaces multiple clones or near clones. Therefore,
management desired not only merging multiple instances into a single product line, but
also a decrease of the total code volume. With our metrics, it is possible to monitor the
conformance of the volatility of the reactive product line to the desired overall maximum
of zero percent volatility.
In these kind of portfolio assessments of the volatility it is also important to have
a look at the skewness of the density function of r. For example, our bancassurance
portfolio has a median of 0% requirements volatility, but its skewness is positive, 1.088.
So the chance on growth is larger than the chance on shrinkage. This is not a problem
since new functionality was added, which is in line with the overall growth of about 6%
in function points. The skewness of the density function of r of the cleaned data of the
software product line is 1.86, therefore the chances on code volume increase are higher
than the decrease that is desired by management.
Despite the conformance to Jones’s averages, the probability density function of this
data also has a GPD shape, and with GPD shapes the mean and median usually differ,
therefore, we recommend to create your own benchmark or use our systems benchmark
as a surrogate instead of Jones’s averages. The maximum tolerance factor P of cleaned
data is 0.33, which can serve as a benchmark for other systems software portfolios.
Volatility density To further investigate the volatility rate of the software product line,
we have first drawn a probability density plot of volatility data including the outliers. This
density plot can be found in Figure 2.27. In this density plot it is hard to distinguish the
numbers around zero percent. Therefore, we have also plotted a density plot for the data
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Figure 2.27: Probability density plot for the software product line.
without the outliers, since we stated the causes of these outliers earlier. This resulting
density plot is the solid line in Figure 2.28. For comparison we have also included our
bancassurance portfolio as a dashed line and the density plot of the governmental data as
a dotted line. Figure 2.28 results in an extended benchmark for the expected probability
density of the volatility for different professional environments:
• governmental environments with fixed political deadlines, continuously changing
requirements through continuously changing legislation;
• product line environments with small changes and occasional high outliers;
• the volatility of the bancassurance environment which has a wider range than the
software product line, but is centered around zero instead of the governmental en-
vironment that is centered around a 10% monthly requirements volatility.
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Figure 2.28: Requirements volatility rate density plots for various industries.
2.9.2 Volatility metrics
With the product line as an additional requirements volatility benchmark, we continue
with calculating the volatility ratios pi and ρ. In Figure 2.29 we present the p-proportional
volatility ratios pi, calculated with Formula 2.18. The data containing the outliers is on
the left-hand side, and the data without the outliers on the right-hand side. The slightly
larger solid dot in both plots on the right is the overall pi-ratio from beginning to end.
The overall volatility from begin to end is 2.16% per month and the overall volatility pi-
ratio is 0.087. In the plot on the left we can easily identify the leaps and plummets that
were shown also in Figure 2.26. However, we see also some ratios that were relatively
far away from the general mean. These are the observations that in an IT governance
situation need to be appointed for further investigation, since they are diverting from the
expected situation. To aid a portfolio manager we have plotted also the pi-ratios for the
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data without the outliers on the right-hand side of Figure 2.29. In the right-hand side plot
it is easier to identify the days diverting from the regular volatility rate. The same plots
for the requirements volatility ratio ρ can be found in Figure 2.30. These plots contain
the overall ρ-ratios from begin to end as solid dots. On the left-hand side of Figure 2.30
we plotted the ρ-ratios for the daily volatilities expressed in monthly rates for all data.
On the right-hand side of Figure 2.30 the ρ-ratios are plotted for data cleansed from the
outliers. Besides the ability to identify daily changes that differ from the normal situation,
these plots show also a tendency to smaller changes during the observed period. This
same tendency was also slightly visible in Figure 2.26, in which the slope of the line was
overall inclining.
Summary By applying backfiring on daily size measures of the physical lines of code
we monitored the volatility of a software product line. Backfiring of source code is more
cost efficient than function point size analysis. Obviously we obtain more data points
through the daily feed of data. With the introduction of the newly acquired volatility data
line we established a systems software volatility benchmark.
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Figure 2.29: The pi1-ratio for a systems software portfolio.
2.10 Requirements volatility dashboard
After introducing new volatility metrics and analyzing volatility data from different indus-
tries with these metrics and thus establishing volatility benchmarks, we will now propose a
requirements volatility dashboard for IT governance. The interested reader can find other
quantitative tools supporting IT governance in Verhoef’s article on IT governance [121].
Industry benchmarks are always helpful when little or no data is available in an organi-
zation, but when data starts to accumulate within an IT organization it is time to start to
develop its own metrics. Therefore this section helps the IT governor how to represent
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Figure 2.30: The ρ1-ratio for a systems software portfolio.
and organize the organization’s own data. It helps also as a comparative tool for a small
number of projects or to calculate the volatility of a single project.
A requirements volatility dashboard must contain four volatility metrics: requirements
volatility r, volatility tolerance p, the pi-ratio and the ρ-ratio. In Table 2.13 an example
volatility dashboard is shown with the volatility data from the previously shown govern-
mental project and its subproject. For the pi and ρ-ratios the tolerance factor p = 0.68 is
used, which is the maximum tolerance factor P shown in Figure 2.11 from the low-risk
bancassurance portfolio. Besides the four volatility metrics we have also shown in Ta-
ble 2.13 the maximum volatility rates rpi and rρ based on the tolerance factor P = 0.68
that are used in calculations of the pi and ρ-ratios.
project r (%) p rpi (%) pi0.68 rρ (%) ρ0.68
Project X 6.52 0.105 18.68 0.349 5.89 1.107
Project Y 25.63 1.433 18.68 1.372 6.36 4.030
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Table 2.13: Example of a requirements volatility dashboard.
Project X in Table 2.13 is the project in Figure 2.17 discussed in Section 2.6 and Project Y
is the subproject which we earlier identified as being out of control. Both projects X and Y
have an exact intercounting duration of 8.055 months which we will use in the following
calculations. We recall from Figure 2.17 that the subproject had an initial size of 131
function points and grew in 8 months to a size of 823 function points. Project X was
initially 1076 function points and surged to 1790 function points, to eventually collapse.
By using Formula 2.4, project X has a volatility rate r of ((1790/1076)(1/8.055) − 1) ·
100 = 6.52% and the subproject an r of ((823/131)(1/8.055) − 1) · 100 = 25.63%. With
the following table that shows values of the Lambert W function, close approximations
of the dashboard values of pi and ρ with p = 0.68 can easily be calculated.
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t 1 2 3 4 5 6
W (t) 0.567 0.852 1.050 1.202 1.327 1.432
t 7 8 9 10 12 14
W (t) 1.524 1.606 1.679 1.746 1.863 1.964
t 16 18 20 22 24 26
W (t) 2.053 2.133 2.205 2.271 2.332 2.388
Table 2.14: LambertW function quick reference for intercounting duration t in months.
The values in Table 2.14 can alternatively be calculated with the goal-seek function of a
spreadsheet program. The function must then be set to x · ex and the goal must be set
to the duration t. The variable x needs to be varied to find the goal value of t. The thus
obtained value of x is the neededW (t).
pi0.68 =
ract
(e
W (0.68·t)
t − 1) · 100
(2.26)
ρ0.68 =
ract(
e
W( 0.68·tlog f )
t − 1
)
· 100
(2.27)
The intercounting duration of project X and also Y was little over 8 months, so p·t = 0.68·
8.055 = 5.48 and we need to interpolate over the valuesW (5) andW (6) from Table 2.14:
0.48 · (W (6)−W (5))+W (5) = 1.377. By using the previous results, the p-proportional
danger zone for p = 0.68 is (e1.377/8.055−1)·100 = 18.64. The approximated pi0.68-ratio
for project X then results with Equation 2.26 in 6.52/18.64 = 0.35 and for project Y in
25.62/18.64 = 1.37.
For the ρ0.68-ratio we need to include the size of the projects as shown in Equa-
tion 2.27; the size estimate for project X before cancellation was 1790 function points
and for Y 823 function points. The input for the Lambert W function is then (0.68 ·
8.055)/ log(1790) = 0.731 and (0.68 · 8.055)/ log(823) = 0.816 for X and Y re-
spectively. With simple interpolation on Table 2.14 and W (0) = 0 we get as a result:
0.731 · (0.567 − 0) + 0 = 0.414 and 0.816 · (0.567 − 0) + 0 = 0.462 respectively. The
value of the denominator for the ρ0.68-ratio becomes (e0.414/8.055 − 1) · 100 = 5.27 for
project X and (e0.462/8.055 − 1) · 100 = 5.90 for project Y, resulting in an approximation
of the ρ0.68-ratio of 6.52/5.27 = 1.19 for project X and 25.62/5.90 = 4.34 for project
Y. These are close to the exact values from Table 2.13 that are 0.349 and 1.372 for the
pi-ratio and 1.107 and 4.030 for the ρ-ratio for X and Y respectively.
Suppose that the governors analyzing this dashboard accept a risk that is comparable
to the bancassurance industry, and therefore take the bancassurance tolerance factor of
0.68, then all projects with higher values must be colored red as displayed in Table 2.13
for project Y. On the other hand an amber color is assigned for values of p that are in the
interval between the third quantile, 0.046 for the bancassurance portfolio, and the maxi-
mum, 0.68, resulting in an amber color for the p value of project X. For the other metrics
in the dashboard similar coloring should be agreed upon as we have done in Table 2.13
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using the third quartiles and maximums of the bancassurance portfolio. Creating such a
dashboard for all projects in an IT organization gives a quick overview of the projects out
of control. The boundaries for the usage of the different colors red, amber and green are
industry specific and should be based on your own internal data or our benchmarks.
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Figure 2.31: Graphical representation of a volatility dashboard for r, p, pi0.68 and ρ0.68.
Every project in a volatility dashboard needs a link to a figure with four plots, each
plot containing data points with the internal or our bancassurance benchmark and the
value of the current project highlighted. Figure 2.31 shows an example of the dashboard
plots for project Y and restates our conclusions of Section 2.6. These dashboard plots
of requirements volatility combined with the dashboard in Table 2.13 are insightful to
compare a project with its peers on all four volatility levels and is a management tool for
monitoring requirements volatility.
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2.10.1 Data summary
In this paragraph we provide all statistical summaries of the volatility metrics r, p, pi and ρ
that we have found during the analyses of the three portfolios: bancassurance, government
and systems software. Table 2.15 combines all summaries, of which many were already
provided in earlier sections.
min. first quartile median mean third quartile max.
bancassurance
r (%) -23.66 -3.55 0.00 0.90 3.71 31.50
p -0.10 -0.028 0.00 0.040 0.046 0.68
pi1 -0.64 -0.11 0.00 0.025 0.14 0.80
ρ1 -1.43 -0.29 0.00 0.083 0.33 2.34
government
r (%) -9.14 3.82 8.48 14.73 18.74 65.46
p -0.044 0.056 0.15 0.39 0.31 1.71
pi0.68 -0.49 0.18 0.35 0.43 0.52 1.76
ρ0.68 -1.32 0.64 1.30 1.73 1.85 6.98
pi1 -0.41 0.15 0.30 0.34 0.44 1.38
ρ1 -1.03 0.49 1.02 1.26 1.27 5.05
systems software, cleaned data set
r (%) -29.6 0.05 0.69 1.69 1.63 39.2
p -0.35 0.00048 0.0069 0.014 0.016 0.33
pi1 -0.18 0.00029 0.004 0.01 0.001 0.24
ρ1 -3.0 0.005 0.07 0.17 0.17 4.0
Table 2.15: Statistical summary of the analyzed data.
2.11 Conclusions & findings
Volatile requirements have been a problem in software engineering for decades, but volatile
requirements are a fact of life and changes are often essential. In this chapter a number of
converging events come together, as one of the reviewers pointed out to us.
• Projects are getting larger and larger and, with the increase in size, there is the
associated increase of risk of failure.
• The nature of projects is changing. While once the largest projects were back-
office batch jobs, now the more difficult, and user-intense interactive projects are
eclipsing their back-office cousins in size and complexity. Worse, their close-to-
the-user nature leads to more requirements volatility than the back-office systems
do.
• The light on the horizon is the IT industry’s recent interest in project management
and project development reporting. Vendors and their customers are looking for
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ways to assess and report on project health. They are collecting information, some-
times daily, about how a project is progressing.
What the industry does not have is an accepted and useful way of interpreting the data
for project managers and senior IT management. This is where our results can be helpful.
This chapter proposes an interpretation needed to make project volatility data meaningful
and actionable. The combination of the heightened awareness by senior business man-
agement of the likelihood and cost of project failure, the desire by the IT community to
invest in project assessments, and the development of sophisticated performance and risk
metrics, provide a powerful project management weapon for the IT community. In this
chapter we proposed methods and metrics to help support these events.
We have developed project management methods to quickly pinpoint volatile projects
that are in the danger zone of unmanageability. Besides, we have also proposed metrics
to monitor the requirements volatility of IT projects. By using accurate size estimates,
function point analyses, executed at different moments in the project life cycle, we were
able to calculate the compound monthly requirements volatility r for different industries
among which a real-world bancassurance low-risk 23.5 million dollar costing portfolio
consisting of 84 projects representing together 16,500 function points. We have shown
the various characteristics of requirements volatility and analyzed it for various industries:
bancassurance, in-house and outsourced, systems software and civil government. We have
not found a significant difference in volatility between in-house and on-site outsourced
projects. Projects that were counted thrice showed a higher volatility than projects counted
twice, and we encountered projects with a high requirements scrap that tended to have a
higher cost per function points. Moreover, we saw that a high volatility combined with
a high productivity is possible when the development process and tools are completely
focused on both targets.
We have proposed a new mathematical model to identify the requirements volatility
danger zone of IT projects. With this model it is possible to calculate a project’s tolerance
for volatility based on size estimates at different moments in time and the duration be-
tween them. The various models are instrumental in comparing the volatility of projects
with different durations and size. It turned out that short projects are less sensitive to high
volatility than projects with long durations and large sizes. Therefore, the models allow
for early identification of healthy and unhealthy requirements growth. This is of essential
use in serving the industry’s need to monitor project progress. We have shown how to
calculate a project’s tolerance for requirements growth and named it the tolerance factor
p. The maximum encountered tolerance factor in a portfolio was named P . We intro-
duced the p-proportional requirements volatility ratio pi and its usage. A pip-ratio larger
than 1 indicates excessive growth, with p an industry or portfolio specific value. We found
P = 0.68 for the bancassurance portfolio and P = 0.33 for the systems software portfolio
as acceptable tolerance factors. The high-risk governmental portfolio containing the fail-
ing project had a maximum tolerance factor of P = 1.71. Because of the failing project
this is a factor when requirements creep is causing havoc. All ratios and tolerance factors
were summarized in Table 2.15.
We used the pi-ratio to assess the volatility of IT portfolios of projects of different
duration. With this metric we were able to pinpoint government projects that encountered
excessive requirements growth. An additional metric that we proposed was named the
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requirements volatility ratio ρ that also takes into account the size of a project besides
the duration and volatility. The ρ-ratio takes size into account since project duration and
size have no complete correspondence. The volatility metric ρ puts more emphasis on
high volatility occurring at larger projects than smaller projects experiencing the same
volatility. We have applied these metrics on portfolios stemming from various industries,
emphasizing the applicability of our methods on projects with a constant changing nature.
With our proposed metrics we were able to identify projects with unhealthy volatility.
In our analyses we established a number of benchmarks most notably a bancassurance,
governmental and a systems software benchmark. We proposed a requirements volatility
dashboard as a means to monitor the volatility of a portfolio of projects. All the different
analyses resulted in different benchmarks for different industries. These benchmarks can
be used to compare the requirements volatility of other IT portfolios. With the presented
methods and metrics we have created a new tool to quantify requirements volatility with
which it is possible to compare the volatility of projects of different duration and different
origin and to pinpoint projects that are getting larger and larger and are, or are getting, out
of control. Finally, the technical reality of software development is that we will continue to
have volatile requirements. We think that our method brings us a step closer to managing
that reality by being able to discriminate in a very early stage between manageable and
unmanageable requirements volatility.
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CHAPTER3
Quantifying IT Estimation Risks
But though labour be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities,
it is not that by which their value is commonly estimated.
–Adam Smith [105]
3.1 Introduction
It is common knowledge that investing in IT is often a risky undertaking. Frequently the
targets set at the start of a project are not met, budgets are stretched, IT key performance
indicators (KPIs) are grossly underestimated and business KPIs overestimated. IT has
an amazingly poor reputation for estimating the costs, effort and duration of IT projects.
We can think of cost and schedule overrun and not delivering the requirements agreed
upon. A considerable number of IT investments even fail completely. Investing in gen-
eral depends on, for example, the expected return. The more precisely you can project
the probability distribution of the return on investment (ROI), the better you can predict
whether an investment makes sense at all. The probability distribution of the expected
return is a representation of the returns of individual projects that are part of a portfolio.
Misestimating the Bermuda Triangle of project management [20], namely incorrectly es-
timating the costs, the schedule and the functionality to be delivered, results in a false
picture for the expected return, and therefore a false picture of its probability distribution.
Incorrect estimates lead to unexpected results and therefore incorrect estimates of
ROIs. Attempts to get an objective assessment of the problem of misestimation have
languished while researchers pursue other areas of project measurement. It is not a coin-
cidence that the risk of cost misestimation is an IT project risk or for short IT risk. We will
propose how to quantify IT risks in such a way that proper IT investment management can
emerge.
We deal with the risk management of IT-enabled business investment projects. We
speak of an IT-enabled business investment project if at least 25% of the project invest-
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ment is spent on IT activities. Our research shows that you can analyze investments in
IT-enabled projects through the assessment of the IT risks involved. But what are typical
IT risks, and how can you quantify them?
We studied other fields where similar questions were treated and solved. A field with
a striking resemblance to the IT world is that of perinatal epidemiology [16, 15, 52, 18].
Perinatal means around the birth; epidemiology refers, e.g., to mortality rates for diseases.
Perinatal epidemiology deals with, among other issues, mortality rates around the birth. In
perinatal epidemiology one searches for easily detectable indicators that will predict with
high accuracy the mortality chances for just born children. Historical information is used
in such predictions. It will not be a surprise that prematurely born children have a higher
mortality rate than other children. There are also differences between boys and girls in
this respect. Suppose the medical records of two just born children are shown to you,
and you have to predict the mortality chance. One seems to have a few small problems,
and the other is prematurely born. Without more precise quantifications, the first has a
higher chance of surviving. Let’s make this problem more complex. A boy, born after
26 weeks, and a girl, born after 25 weeks, are brought into the hospital. They are both
prematurely born, and girls are stronger than boys, but the boy is already a week older than
the girl. Now what? It is no longer possible to make a prediction without a precise model
that quantifies mortality rates based on indicators like gender and the gestational age in
weeks, i.e. the number of weeks dating from the first day of the mother’s last menstrual
period.
For IT projects similar, but less life-critical, situations exist: most IT projects suffer
from misallocated budgets due to the misestimation of the project costs, also called plan
inaccuracy [34]. But how does one rank projects by increasing risk, given their status?
This is not really possible without decent quantifications. We will show howmethods used
in perinatal epidemiology transpose to the world of IT to answer such questions. With the
quantification of risk, it becomes possible to quantify the expected return of a portfolio.
With an ordering of projects by increasing risk, IT investments in the need of management
attention will surface and audit attention is optimally allocated. More general, we state
that by quantifying the IT risks for an entire IT portfolio it becomes possible to quantify
the aggregate expected return of the IT portfolio, and thus it becomes known whether
investing in the IT portfolio makes sense. Moreover, it becomes possible to identify the
risk drivers and manage new projects based on the right values of the risk drivers with
a positive influence on the correct estimation of IT KPIs. We will make the first steps
towards achieving these goals by showing how to quantify and find the risk drivers of cost
misestimation. Knowing the risk driver misestimation, better estimates are possible in the
future, thus supporting investment decisions.
We will focus on quantifying IT risk solely. For quantifying IT value we refer to [119]
and to [91], for dealing with IT risks and outsourcing deals we refer to [120], and for
aggregating IT investment management to the IT portfolio level we refer to [117]. In an IT
governance context IT risks are also of predominant importance. For results concerning IT
risks in the light of quantifying IT governance effects we refer to [121], and for connecting
IT risk with quantifying IT productivity we refer to [118]. A deep analysis on the risks of
requirements volatility is published in [74].
We will deal with risks based on real-life data within a financial services organization.
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In particular we will propose a method for coming to grips with a very important risk
indicator for IT projects: misestimation of costs. An outcome within a selected boundary
around the estimated costs is considered a correct estimate. An actual situated outside
this boundary is considered a cost misestimation. This method can be effortlessly used
to manage schedule misestimation or solutions underdelivery, if for the latter project size
measures, e.g. function point countings, are available. The reason for considering these
IT risks is that the problems surrounding those indicators are already astonishing, and
getting a handle on those risks alone drastically improves the current situation of endemic
capital destruction, for many problems with IT projects are caused by the misestimation
of IT KPIs. For example: on an annual basis we invest about 290 billion dollars in aborted
IT projects: about 150 billion in the USA and 140 billion in Europe [27]. For comparison,
the annual cost of collapsing buildings in the USA is about 4.4 billion dollars. Collapsing
IT projects cost a factor of 34 more.
The reason we did not solely consider overruns, but misestimation in general, is be-
cause extensive cost underrun will result in unused money, but this money is put in a
reserve. Such unused resources could otherwise have been invested profitably, e.g. in
other projects.
The cost consequences of misestimations are substantial and change the picture of the
business case of the investment proposal dramatically as shown in an earlier paper [91].
The impact of time overrun and the overrun of estimated costs on the outcome of the Net
Present Value (NPV) calculation are quite substantial, depending on the business case.
We stress that project failure, costs, schedule and functionality misestimation risks are
not just a case of force majeure, but these risks can be influenced if the risk drivers are
known by project management. By taking appropriate measures to improve the estimation
process, the organization can decrease cost misestimation, duration misestimation, and
poor solution delivery and increase quality. However, whether this makes sense clearly
depends on the time and costs of taking such measures and the impact that these measures
will have. We propose the initial steps by explaining how to diagnose the presumable
causes of misestimating important IT KPIs.
In this paper we consider the quality of the estimation process and search for the
drivers of the risk of the misestimation of project costs. We will analyze the project data
using the logistic modeling technique. Logistic regression is a modeling technique which
has been applied successfully, as stated, in medical science to answer similar questions.
But logistic regression is also a common statistical tool in other sciences; for instance it is
often used in marketing to investigate consumer choice behavior. In marketing the binary
variable that is researched represents the buying or not of a certain product [5, 10].
In other computer science disciplines in which classification problems arise logis-
tic regression is also used—for example, in neural networks that are used in bankruptcy
prediction, or fraud detection of credit evaluation; for an overview see [88]. Other areas
mentioned in [88] for which logistic regression is used in neural networks are engineering,
manufacturing and marketing. In the area of software fault prediction logistic regression
is also used (see papers [103, 29]), to predict errors before testing. Article [70] uses lo-
gistic regression to identify explanatory variables of fault prone software modules over
subsequent releases.
Logistic regression allows us to quantify the effect of a particular risk factor on the
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likelihood that a particular unfavorable outcome, in this paper’s context misestimation
of IT costs, will occur. Comparable research is conducted in [122], in which schedule
estimation is analyzed with logistic regression. But in that paper, the risk drivers are
based on surveys; the data we use in this paper as potential risk drivers are not perception
data. In paper [122], logistic regression is not elaborately explained, but the risk drivers
resulting from their research are that project managers need to be involved in schedule
negotiations and adequate requirements information needs to be available at the time of
estimation and staff need not to be added late to meet aggressive schedules. The latter
two both imply a not unreasonable amount of requirements creep during development.
A method for quantifying requirements creep effects is presented in [74], illustrated with
examples from different industries. In [133] neural networks and logistic regression are
compared as early warning systems for predicting project escalation, but it also depends
on perception data from surveys. Besides understanding the requirements, also planning,
monitoring and controlling the project resulted as significant variables in [133]. Another
paper [92] also uses perception data to identify software development success factors by
using logistic regression, but also uses a rather small data set of 40 projects. Our research
does not use perception data, but real-world project information such as the estimated
budgets and the actual costs.
The reason for considering the particular risk of cost misestimation is not merely a
random choice, but inspired by many daily news headlines concerning IT projects. Of-
ten huge budget overruns are mentioned, demanding explanations from the responsible
manager or government. Almost as often the root causes of these overruns cannot be
pinpointed.
Therefore, risk models addressing these risks are useful and needed. Given our quan-
tifications, organizations can focus on the drivers of risk misestimation and move into a
position to trade-off whether or not costs are reasonable for mitigating or eliminating the
influence of risk drivers and thus increasing the expected yield [91].
3.1.1 Organization of the paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Risk drivers and their levels We start in Section 3.2 with a discussion of the risk
drivers that influence the likelihood of misestimation of project costs. From the literature
a large number of IT risk drivers are known. However, which risk drivers should be
considered in a specific case heavily depends on the data available within an organization.
We describe the process of selecting the risk drivers. Not all project variables need to be
considered as risk drivers—for instance, if causality between the binary outcome variable
and explanatory variable is lacking. In other organizations different data may have been
captured over time leading to the selection of other risk drivers, and also in that case our
approach of selecting the risk drivers is applicable. We also discuss the measure level of
the risk drivers. With respect to their measure level the risk drivers range from nominal,
categorical, ordinal and interval variables to ratios.
Real-life dataReaders who are interested in the structure of the data set of our real-life
case study are directed to Section 3.3. Of course, all the data have been made anonymous
for confidentiality. We show in detail how in general the plausibility and quality of the
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available data are assessed. The analysis on the reliability and completeness of the data
is an essential step in the modeling process, which should always be carried out. Subse-
quently, we show in Section 3.3 how we assessed the homogeneity of the data and we pay
attention to the test on dependencies between variables. We demonstrate how to select a
subset that combines different business units and project types, but still contains enough
data from all different types. This set will be used in our subsequent analysis.
Logistic regression explained In Section 3.4 we explain the basic ideas behind lo-
gistic regression to IT portfolio managers, who do not have any particular statistical and
mathematical background. We discuss the striking resemblance of answering questions in
the field of clinical research to IT investment decision making. Both phenomena are ex-
pressed categorically as dichotomous situations, e.g. yes or no; dead or alive; misestima-
tion or no misestimation. After that, we dive into a more thorough mathematical treatise
on logistic regression and show how the parameters of the logistic regression equation are
estimated by applying the maximum likelihood principle.
Risk model building In Section 3.5 we apply logistic regression to model IT mis-
estimation risks. This results in models based on different misestimation intervals. We
discuss the stability of the models as well as the interpretation of the risk drivers found in
the models. We discover that the ratio of external developers needs to be kept small and
overstaffing must be avoided to improve the quality of cost estimates. Moreover, the sta-
tistical analysis displays a maturity mismatch. In IT departments with CMM levels higher
than 1, the expected improvement in cost estimation is not realized because the business
department remains at a lower maturity level.
Validity of the model found In Section 3.6 we compare the goodness of fit of the
models found for the risk of misestimation and we discuss the predictive value of the
risk models that show the highest goodness of fit test scores. We also show by randomly
partitioning the data set in a simulation what the distribution of the lift factor of the mis-
estimation model is and compare it with the lift factor of the model we have found.
Digging into the data Section 3.7 shows the results if we analyze the causes of the risk
of overrun and the risk of underrun—combined into the risk of misestimation—separately.
In this section a new risk driver emerges which has opposite effects on underrun and
overrun and therefore did not show up previously.
Conclusions Finally, in Section 3.8, we conclude the paper.
3.2 Misestimation risk and its risk drivers
In this section we define the risk of cost misestimation and the concept of quantifiable IT
risk drivers.
3.2.1 Perception of risk
Many IT risk studies concentrate around the perception of risk factors. In the paper [102]
three Delphi surveys were deployed to identify a ranked list of project risk factors. These
surveys were conducted in three different countries: Hong Kong, Finland, and the United
States. The three panels, one for each country, consisted of experienced project managers.
The Delphi survey process in the aforementioned study consisted of three phases. In the
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first phase of brainstorming each panelist made a list of potential risk factors, with at
least six factors. The collected risk factors were compared with each other and combined
into an extensive list of risk factors (without exact doubles and similar risk factors). In
the next step, each panel, independently of the others, narrowed this list down to a more
manageable list. Each panelist chose the most important factors, at least ten, from a
random set of risk factors based on the previous extensive list. Each factor that was picked
by at least 50% of the participants was taken into account in the final phase. The initial
list of more than 150 items was now reduced into three smaller lists: Hong Kong ended
up with 15 items, Finland with 23, and the USA compiled 17 risk factors. In the last stage
each panelist ranked the remaining risk factors for their panel in order of importance,
which resulted in an overall project risk-ranking list per separate panel. In order to get
an international ranking, a composite ranking was made. All eleven risk factors that were
present in all three ranked lists were ordered by their average relative ranks.
While this gives a good idea of what risks factors are perceived by experienced project
managers, it rules out risk factors that they do not perceive. One risk factor that was left
out of the composite ranking was the lack of effective project management skills. We
expect that this is a typical consequence of perception research: they asked experienced
project managers. In two countries, this factor was mentioned: Finland gave it the highest
rank 1, and the USA ranked it 5. Due to the consensus step in the last phase of estab-
lishing the composite ranking, this important factor dropped out. With the methods that
we demonstrate in this paper all risk factors for which we have data are considered to
investigate whether they are significant or not. So, we prevent that important factors are
missing.
A number of success and risk factors are provided by various authors and consulting
companies—for instance, the top 10 success factors mentioned by Standish Group [43,
44, 45] or Capers Jones’ twelve characteristics of successful IT projects [59]. We summa-
rized these risk drivers elsewhere [120]. Other factors often mentioned are whether new
technologies are being used in a project, whether the project managers are experienced
and for instance how many management layers are present in a department. What these
success and risk factors share is that some of them are not easy to measure, especially not
in the dawn of an IT project. And some of them adhere to the perception of risk, rather
than the actual risk potential. Let us give a few examples. Jones formulates a success
factor effective communications. While we all agree that this will surely help in turning
any project into a success, it is difficult, but not impossible, to quantify it. When are
communications effective? You will only know when a project failed due to ineffective
communications. Moreover, such project data, when obtained, are subjective, since such
data are usually collected through surveys with project managers. But it is plausible that
even subjective data consisting of roughly quantified project information can lead to in-
teresting research results, and when available, should be considered for inclusion in risk
analyses. Proper care must be exercised if bold conclusions are drawn that are induced by
subjective factors.
Standish Group formulates as the most important project success factor: executive
support. Again, without doubt, it helps if important people make things happen that oth-
erwise take much more effort. But it is hard to quantify this support, and its effectiveness
is hardly predictable. In one company, a student carried out an analysis to figure out
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whether success and risk factors known in the literature did correlate with actual success
and failure. It turned out that none of the factors correlated with the actual situation. For
obvious reasons, the data for this case study are confidential, but the result gave us another
boost to dive deeper into the problems of how to design reliable models that do predict
IT risks. One of the problems of the thesis was that it was hard to quantify some of the
factors in an objective manner, leading to arbitrary results.
An obstacle with most risk factors that are mentioned in the literature is that they refer
to software development projects. The projects under study in this article are not pure IT
projects, but IT-enabled business projects. In an IT-enabled business project, the IT part
measured in terms of cost is at least 25%, so the IT component does play an important
role. Therefore, most of the IT risk factors are useful, but not all.
3.2.2 Problem definition
This paper proposes a method for finding the factors that determine the disparity between
a cost estimation, the financial investment in a project, and its actual. All projects that are
considered in this research have project costs that are determined by an estimate at the
start of a project and register actual costs at the end of a project. Before we continue, we
present some important definitions concerning misestimations.
Definition 1 A cost estimation e is defined as being misestimated if the actual project
costs belonging to that estimate fall outside the interval [e− y%, e+ x%], where y and x
are real numbers > 0 and y < 100. The percentages y and x are determined or chosen
by the decision maker.
Definition 2 An estimation method is any method that yields an estimate of the actual.
These estimates are anything from amounts that are just guessed, to amounts based on the
gut feeling of experienced managers or to amounts forecast from sophisticated models.
Definition 3 An estimation method is defined to be good, or acceptable, at level α if the
percentage of misestimates is lower than α%, where α is some number greater than zero
and less than 100. A common value of α is 5.
The above definitions do not require nor imply any knowledge of the estimation
method. All that matters is the discrepancy between the estimate, induced by the esti-
mation method, and the actual.
The percentages x and y will usually be chosen in such a way that the interval [e −
y%, e + x%] is not too large. When y > x, then the attitude of the decision maker is
characterized as risk avoiding. If x > y, the attitude of the decision maker is characterized
as risk seeking. In some cases x and y will be chosen equal. In that latter case the loss
of underestimating, and reserving money that could have been used in other projects, is
judged to be equal to the cost of overestimating and thus creating the need to reserve
additional money.
The simplest estimator of the probability of misestimation is obtained by counting
how many projects in the historical database displayed cost misestimation and dividing
the result by the total number of projects.
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3.2.3 IT risk factors
A very simple example of an exogenous factor in ice cream selling is the weather. It is
not possible to change the weather to increase sales, but most probably sales stay lower
during overcast and rainy weather than on a bright and sunny day. An example of an
exogenous factor which potentially influences the risk of making a misestimation of the
costs is the project category to which an investment proposal belongs. In our case study
there are four categories: transactional projects, informational projects, strategic projects
and infrastructure projects. Clearly, the decision maker cannot change the type of an
investment project. Nevertheless, the non-influential factors, like the weather for the ice
cream seller, need to be taken into account in decision making. It is important to know
for IT decision makers whether or not the risk of misestimating the costs is higher for a
certain investment category and how much higher that risk is.
If the quality of the estimation method is improved by changing the value of a risk
driver, the chance or probability of making a misestimate will decrease as a consequence.
Needless to say, the highest potentially attainable goal is to reduce the chance of misesti-
mation to zero. But this will never be accomplished as some amount of uncertainty will
always remain. However, if the quality of the estimation method improves, an excellent
job has been done. Although decision makers cannot change the value of an exogenous
factor it is very important for them to know the influence of such a factor.
The factors that influence the risk of making misestimates are called risk factors.
These factors are called risk factors as they influence, negatively or positively, the risk
of making a misestimation. We make a strict distinction between risk factors of which
the values can be changed by the decision maker, the risk drivers, and the risk factors of
which the values cannot be changed. The factors of the first category will be referred to
as endogenous factors, but they can also be found called controllable factors, influential
factors, or risk drivers. We will refer to the factors of the latter category, which can-
not be changed, as exogenous factors. These can also be named uncontrollable factors,
non-influential factors or extraneous factors.
There is an abundance of literature that provides us with checklists for addressing
and recognizing risks in IT. First and foremost there is the qualitative approach of McFar-
lan [83], who published in the 1980s his first version of a still used extensive questionnaire
for addressing risks in information systems. The problem with such questionnaires is that
they measure IT risk perception, not the actual risk itself. Of course, they do help to ad-
dress actual risks since a checklist forces you to think of aspects that would otherwise go
unnoticed until the risk materializes.
3.2.4 Quantifiable risk drivers
Our focus in this paper is on potential quantifiable risk drivers for which we have data
available. The following factors are examples of influential and quantifiable risk drivers
of IT-enabled business investments.
• Size of the pure IT part of the project, measured in some objective manner, like
using function points [3, 4, 39], lines of code, number of applications, etc.
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• Staffing essentials, like the number of FTEs working on the project, ideally broken
up into activities.
• Project constraints, like a fixed date or a fixed price contract, internal, external, etc.
• Is a formal development or project management methodology being used? Notice
that this is a dichotomous yes/no variable.
• The capability maturity level of the software development department or organiza-
tion, which is generally known as the CMM or CMMI level.
• Scope aspects of the project, e.g. the number of milestones in the project or the
number of changes in the user requirements, or the volatility of the scope expressed
as a percentage of change per month [74].
• The experience level of the project team, measured by the total years of experience
or by their historical percentage of successful projects.
• The experience level of the project manager, measured by the percentage of suc-
cessful projects or total years of experience. We can categorize this information in
two or three time slots. Think of zero to five years of experience, five to ten, or
more. Again, this is a discrete variable.
• The experience level of the user, e.g. the percentage of successful projects com-
pleted for a certain user.
Of course, the aforementioned risk drivers are hunches and we do not know whether
they are truly influencing the risk that we wish to get a grip on: the risk of IT cost mis-
estimation. And of course, the resulting risk drivers depend on the quality of the data
available within an organization. For instance, if there is no information on the experi-
ence levels of team members, we cannot examine this risk factor for whether or not it
has any influence. For instance, the shoe size of all IT employees is an easily retrievable
measure—but, as common sense suggests, not a potential explanatory variable.
In this study we investigate which potential risk drivers, for which data are available,
turn out to be real risk factors, given a certain organization and its data. Subsequently,
for new projects, it is possible to collect quantifiable data, and feed the data into the
established models, and a quantitative impression of the risks is obtained. If the resulting
calculated risks are unacceptably high, measures to mitigate the risks need to be taken. Of
course, when you address risks, money is involved, and ruling out every risk will lead to
exploding project costs. So given the residual risks that are left in the project, it becomes
possible to carry out a risk-adjusted appraisal of the value creation of the project. In
this paper we will not carry out such risk-adjusted calculations. For elaborate appraisal
examples for IT investments we refer the reader to [91, 119].
3.3 The available data
In many organizations there are almost no data available for analyzing any aspect regard-
ing information technology. For those organizations, our paper serves as an example of
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what is accomplishable if only data were routinely collected. At the same time, such or-
ganizations are also in dire need of tools and techniques for coming to grips with their IT
function. In such cases we advise basing the quantitative dimension for IT decision mak-
ing on models that take industrial averages into account. Those models—also for certain
important IT risks—are treated in papers directed towards organizations without proper
data collection [74, 91, 117, 116, 120, 119].
In this paper we treat the situation in which data are available. In such a situation
there is usually a structured process of data collection, analysis, and feedback. This pro-
cess is fully integrated within the organization and often there is a special corporate IT
department in which data are gathered, combined, scrutinized, analyzed and translated
into strategic information for executive decision makers. The organization from which we
obtained data is divided into reporting units from which individual and aggregate infor-
mation is collected.
But also in this case there are limitations and constraints. In our study we used data
from finished projects. Finished projects provide, next to their estimates, information
on actual performance with respect to actual costs, actual project duration and delivered
functionality. Using such historical data, plus a number of potential explanatory variables,
we analyzed which variables correlated with which IT risks, if at all.
Next to project specific data we also have access to data describing the context in
which the projects were carried out. In Table 3.1, we give an overview of the most promi-
nent generic information that is often easily available at the reporting unit level. This
information is also available in our data set that we will analyze later on.
Generic information Meaning
Reporting unit (RU) Logical business or regional part
Executive center Logical collection of RUs
Line of business Type of business for a RU
Total IT costs Total IT related costs per RU
Total IT staff (TIS) Total IT staff per RU
Internal IT staff Breakdown of TIS
External IT staff Breakdown of TIS
Management methodology Is a management methodology used in a RU?
IT maturity level Capability Maturity Model level of a RU
Table 3.1: Generic variables giving information on the environment in which projects are
carried out.
Let us explain Table 3.1. A reporting unit is some logical part of an organization,
either in terms of business, geographical dispersion, cross-cutting concern (e.g., security)
or otherwise. An executive center is a collection of such reporting units, e.g., the Ministry
of Homeland Security. Typical names for such collections are well-known. EMEA, an
acronym for Europe, Middle-East and Africa, is a typical reporting unit that is found in
many organizations. Regional or logical collections of reporting units are not necessarily
organized accordingly.
A line of business is also a well-known term, easy to identify, and characteristic for
a reporting unit. Think of MRI scanners, mobile phones, private banking, pension ad-
ministration, etc. as lines of business within organizations. Reporting units spend money,
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and contain staff members. This organization routinely collects a number of such aggre-
gates. Total IT costs is an aggregate that comprises the entire annual IT activities within
a reporting unit. Think of the IT budget of the FBI, or the IT budget of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development. Total IT staff is the pendant of total IT costs: it
aggregates all staff members of a reporting unit that carry out IT related activities. Fur-
thermore, some breakdowns for staff are shown: internal versus external, to mention an
obvious one. Finally two other kinds of variables reflecting quality of IT management
and IT craftmanship are listed: whether or not a project management tool is used and the
CMM level of the reporting unit. If no assessment has been done on the maturity of the
IT process, or it is not more than ad hoc, the CMM defaults to level 1.
Apart from these generic characteristics at the reporting unit level, there is also indi-
vidual project information. In Table 3.2 we summarize the most important project specific
variables.
Specific information Abbreviation Meaning
Reporting unit ru
Business owner of the project, to link generic
information to the project
Project category pc Type of investment project
Estimated Costs ec Estimated costs of the project
Actual Costs ac Actual costs of the project
Estimated Duration ed Expected duration of the project
Actual Duration ad Actual duration of the project
Estimated Project Power epp
Size of the project in terms of average invest-
ment per month
Actual Project Power app
Size of the project in terms of average invest-
ment per month
In-house/Outsourced io Either done largely in-house or outsourced
Functionality delivered fd Percentage of delivered functionality
Table 3.2: Project specific variables giving information on project performance within the
responsible reporting unit.
We elaborate on Table 3.2. We already encountered the reporting unit (RU) in Ta-
ble 3.1, but in this context it is the business owner under whose authority the project is
being carried out and it is denoted as ru . It is used to link the generic reporting unit in-
formation to a project. The project category pc refers to the type of project investment.
We distinguish four categories: transactional, informational, strategic, and infrastructure
projects. It is often easily determined whether a project fits within one of the above cate-
gories, a list that we adopted from [125]. We summarize these four types below.
• Transactional investments: Transactional investments provide the technology to
process the basic, repetitive transactions of the business, e.g., transaction process-
ing, accounting, account management etc. The main purpose of this type of IT
investment is to improve efficiency and to reduce costs.
• Informational investments: Informational technology provides the technology for
managing and controlling the organization. Systems in this category typically in-
clude systems for management and financial control, decision making, planning,
communication and accounting.
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• Strategic investments: Strategic investments will usually be designed to add real
value to the business by increasing competitive advantage, enabling the entry into
new markets, or otherwise increasing or enhancing revenue streams. Examples are
a system for supporting an Internet-enabled business initiative, cable TV-enabled
marketing channels, etc.
• Infrastructure investments: Investments in infrastructure are often of long duration
and costly, but may not, in themselves, generate any directly quantifiable financial
benefits, although the business applications that depend upon the infrastructure can
do so. Therefore, the investments in and maintenance of infrastructure are essen-
tial, and not always immediately profitable. This is an essential notion, already
mentioned by Adam Smith in 1776 [105, book V, chapter 1, article 1]. Examples
of infrastructure investments are the implementation of a new or upgraded systems
management product (e.g., Unicenter or Tivoli), the implementation of a new op-
erating system (e.g., Linux), or the roll-out of a new, private, network. Most such
investments are likely to be non-discretionary.
So, each project is categorized into one of these four categories. More mundane vari-
ables are the variable ec which is the expected cost, in millions of dollars, of the financial
investment for the project until completion and delivery. The actual financial investment
in a project is denoted by ac, also measured in millions of dollars to ease comparison with
the estimated costs. The next variable in Table 3.2 is the expected duration ed , in calendar
months, of the project until completion deployment. Such variables in combination with
the actual values provide a rich potential for developing predictive models for schedule
misestimation. The actual duration, in calendar months, of a project until completion and
delivery, is denoted by ad . The estimated and actual project powers, which are the sizes
of the project in terms of average investment per month, are denoted by respectively epp
and app. Furthermore, it is fairly easy to determine whether a project is done largely in-
house or is outsourced; this information is summarized in the variable io. The fd variable
represents the percentage of required functionality that is delivered within a project.
3.3.1 The research data
The aforementioned variables are classified into response variables and explanatory vari-
ables. Each response variable is a project risk, and the explanatory variables are ideally
influential, i.e. the risk drivers. As Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicated already, the risk drivers
are separated into generic aggregates at the reporting unit level and characteristics at the
individual project level.
In Table 3.3 we define the outcome of the project risk of cost misestimation. In the
following sections we will analyze the risk of misestimation of project costs. The analysis
of the other risks such as duration misestimation is analogous to the method we describe
in this paper.
The quality of the estimated costs, cm , is a crude dichotomous metric. In the case
where the estimation of the costs was significantly misestimated, then cm = 1. The
variable cm is set to 0 if this was not the case. So, cm = 1 indicates that costs were
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Project risk outcome Abbr. Definition Measure Level
cost estimation quality cm misestimated if the actual is outside
[ec − y%, ec + x%], good otherwise
nominal (0 or 1)
Table 3.3: Project-specific risk.
misestimated. On the other hand, cm = 0 means that the estimation was within the
predefined bounds.
We denote the risk of cost misestimation, which can have any value in the range [0, 1],
as the variable: pcm . As stated in Table 3.3, we define a project having a good estimate if
the actual costs have a value in the interval [e − y%, e + x%] for a certain x and y. For
example, let x = 2.5 and y = 5 and let us assume that 70% of the projects were mises-
timated. We now want to know which factors were influential on the performance of the
estimation process. Which factors can in the future positively influence the outcome of a
cost estimate? Does the accuracy of the estimate depend on having a mature organization?
Or on using certain project management tooling? The research presented here studies the
quality of estimates after the estimates have been produced by some estimating technique.
It does not consider the estimation method itself.
We are using an interval to indicate misestimation and since we do encounter under-
runs and overruns for our chosen interval, the method that will be used to find causes of
misestimation, i.e. the method of logistic regression, will be able to find useful results.
As in perinatal epidemiology, we will not research the amount of survived days, or in our
case the amount of overrun or underrun, but the research interest lies in the survival itself
or in our case misestimation. Because we use a bandwidth around the estimate, the model
treats actuals close or equal to an estimate in the same way.
Wewill focus on the risk of cost misestimation in this paper. Our goal is to explain how
to calculate such risks. Of course the method is applicable to the other two aforementioned
risks as well.
The measure level in Table 3.3 refers to the kinds of scales and levels of measurement
for each variable. As an intermezzo we explain this for the uninitiated. We already alluded
to the distinction between discrete and continuous variables. Discrete, or categorical,
variables are variables in which there are no intermediate values possible. Continuous
variables can theoretically take any value in between two points. The estimation quality
is a discrete variable: it is either zero or one. Nothing in between is possible in the world
that we defined.
The measure levels for a variable refer to either one of the four basic levels: nominal,
ordinal used for categorical variables and interval, or ratio, used for continuous variables.
We explain the four levels for completeness.
• A variable measured on a nominal scale is a variable that does not really have any
evaluative distinction. One value is really not any greater than another. A good ex-
ample of a nominal variable that we encountered earlier on in this paper is gender:
boy or girl. Information about nominal scales is usually coded with numbers. We
used the number zero for misestimation and one if this project outcome did not ma-
terialize for the project. Of course, this choice is arbitrary and one value is not larger
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or better than another choice. As illustrated we use these—arbitrary—encodings in
all kinds of formulas or programs to do calculations with nominal variables. The
main idea is that with nominal variables there is a qualitative difference between
values, not a quantitative one.
• A variable that is measured on an ordinal scale does have an evaluative connotation.
One value is also in reality greater or larger or better than the other. An example is
the earlier mentioned perception of risks. You can rate risks on a scale from 1 to
10, with 10 representing no risk, and 1 very high risk. With ordinal scales, we only
know that higher is better than lower, only we do not know by how much. Also the
scale is not constant, in the sense that the distance between 1 and 3 could vary from
the distance between 7 and 10. A well-known ordinal scale is the Likert scale [78],
often used as a five-point scale in questionnaires.
• A variable measured on an interval scale gives the same information as ordinal
scales do, but interval variables have in addition an equal distance between values.
The percentage of cost overrun is a good example: the difference between 10 and
20% cost overrun is the same as the difference between 60 and 70% cost overrun.
• Variables measured on a ratio scale have the same properties as ones on an interval
scale have, but in addition, there is an absolute zero point.
This concludes our little discussion of project measure levels.
For the project outcome duration misestimation (dm), we have a similar dichotomous
distribution: duration misestimation is present if the project experienced more than x%
overrun or less than y% time underrun, and not if this did not occur. For functionality fail-
ure we also have a dichotomous definition, but this is a little different than the others. We
consider a project to have failed in functionality delivery if less than 95%, the threshold,
of the functionality is delivered than was targeted for, or if the requirements creep was so
high that more than 110% is delivered. If this is the case we assign 1 to ff, and otherwise 0.
To ease comparison and calculations we recommend measuring functionality in function
points.
Furthermore, we have a continuous variable representing the amount of overrun, or
for that matter underrun. Note that the latter is possible if people estimate much too high
costs, which happens for instance for political reasons. Estimated project costs can also
contain biases, for instance if salami tactics are being used. For an extensive paper on
forecasting quality see [34]. This variable is measured on an interval scale and it is the
percentage of cost overrun. It is easily calculated by dividing the estimated costs by the
difference of the actual costs minus the estimate. The project risk schedule misestimation
is analogous to cost misestimation. It considers the overrun or underrun of the project
schedule. Functionality misestimation considers either solutions underdelivery, or in the
case of overrun, requirements creep if all functionality plus all added requirements have
been delivered.
Next, we discuss the non-influential classification factors that we used. Risk factors
are called classification factors if they cannot be influenced, as is the case with the weather
for the earlier mentioned ice cream seller. We summarized the classification factors in
Table 3.4. We already met the factor project category. We encode the four categories
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Classification factors Abbr. Definition Level
Project category pc Type of project investment category Nominal
Line of business lob
Type of business for which the project is carried
out Nominal
Executive center ec
The executive center in which the project is car-
ried out Nominal
Table 3.4: Classification factors for projects.
with the numbers 1, . . . , 4 as follows: transactional is 1, informational 2, strategic 3 and
infrastructure is assigned 4. Since 1 is not better or different than 3 this is a nominal scale.
The other two classification factors were already discussed before.
Reporting Unit specific risk
factors Abbr. Definition Level
IT maturity cmm>1
RU’s CMM level in which the project is
done Ordinal
Reporting Unit Size rs Size of RU in terms of total IT costs Ratio
Project management tool pmt Project management tool used or not Nominal
Reporting quality of financial
information rqf Reporting has been done or not Ordinal
Development department size dds
% of development and enhancement staff
in total IT staff Ratio
Internal development staff size ids Breakdown of DDS Ratio
Table 3.5: Generic risk factors at the reporting unit level.
This brings us at the other risk factors: the generic risk factors that are playing a role
at the reporting unit level, and the project specific risk factors. We start with the generic
ones in Table 3.5. We used the reporting unit’s maturity level: the CMM level, the size
of the reporting unit in terms of its total IT budget, and whether or not an overall project
management tool was used within a reporting unit. Instead of using the CMM levels
verbatim in the analyses, we transformed this variable. If a reporting unit has CMM level
1, the variable cmm>1 has the value 0; if the reporting unit has level 2 or 3, the variable
cmm>1 has the value 1. We do this because there are very few instances of level 3 in
our data set. Too few instances of a level can easily lead to uninterpretable or wrong
conclusions later on. Furthermore, we used a rating on the quality of the reporting unit
on financial information. Often this is known from internal or external audits done by
accountants, and it is complemented with other indicators, like reporting to the corporate
IT department about the financial state of the IT-enabled business investments themselves.
Furthermore, we used the size of a reporting unit in terms of total IT staff dealing with
functionality change: new and enhancements. We used a breakdown of that generic risk
driver and calculated the percentage of such IT staff who were internal.
The quality of the project management is an important risk driver according to the lit-
erature [43, 44, 45, 62]. In the aforementioned references an experienced project manager
was ranked high. Actual data for such risk drivers are usually not available or difficult
to measure. An indication based on running project data is available in a direct manner.
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In our field study, the reporting units needed to report on the expected financial perfor-
mance of running projects. Think of reporting a Net Present Value, an Internal Rate or
Return, Economic Value Added, Risk-adjusted Return on Capital, and other economic
measures. See [119, 91] for such analyses on IT-intensive investments. The presence of
these financial performance indicators implies the existence of a proper business case.
The rqf risk driver depicts whether a reporting unit has been reporting on financial
indicators or not. We distinguish two categories for the variable rqf . The levels of this
variable are no reports for units who have not reported on their expected financial returns
for any of their projects and reports available for those with a capability of reporting on
risk and return data. To give an indication, on the running project data, we encountered
about 27% of the reporting units that we assigned no reports to, so the majority did report
on at least a few projects. Normally, the largest projects obtain more management atten-
tion than the smaller ones. So, even if only a few projects have financial reports, it will
most probably add up to a large percentage of the total amount of IT investments. That is
why we chose to flip the variable to true as soon as there was some financial reporting.
From Table 3.2 we selected the variables for analyses that are shown in Table 3.6;
variables in Table 3.2 that refer to actuals, such as actual costs or delivered functionality
are left out, since they cannot influence the quality of an estimate, as the sold amount of
ice creams cannot influence the estimated amount of sold ice creams. In the next section
we will assess the quality of our data set.
Project specific risk factors Abbr. Definition Level
Estimated Costs ec
Size of the project in terms of total esti-
mated costs ratio
Estimated Duration ed
Size of the project in terms of total esti-
mated duration ratio
Project Power epp
Estimated size of the project in terms of av-
erage costs per month ratio
In-house or Outsourced io
Project either developed in-house or out-
sourced nominal
Project category pc
Transactional, infrastructure, strategic or in-
formational nominal
Table 3.6: Risk factors at the project level.
3.3.2 Data quality
The project database contained information on 221 finalized projects of a large organiza-
tion totaling to a financial investment of at least $435 million—for 33 projects cost figures
were missing. We narrowed the data set down to 165 projects with estimated costs of $370
million by taking the following criteria into consideration.
• Projects with missing data were not included in the research set.
• Double entries of projects were removed from the data set.
The remaining 165 projects have no missing data regarding potential project risk
drivers. In a few cases, we completed missing data regarding potential generic risk drivers
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by copying these data from other projects in the same reporting unit. For two reporting
units the CMM level was missing. An experienced IT auditor estimated their CMM lev-
els. The reasons for leaving projects out of the 165-projects data set were one or more
missing data fields. Almost always success criteria were missing. Missing data on the du-
ration of a project was ranked second as the reason for removing a project from the data
set. Furthermore, we noticed cost data missing, functionality data missing, or mistakes
like actual costs of zero dollar. We removed three double projects. These were three rela-
tively small projects, and they accounted for only 0.12% of the original estimated costs of
$435 million of the 165 projects. Notice that in a situation when you start up this kind of
IT portfolio management practice, you can save millions of dollars just by removing truly
redundant projects from the portfolio [11, 117]. In this case, no projects were done twice
for real, they were just reported on more than once.
Data correctness
The collected data are reasonable, correct and reliable. Namely, in this organization there
is a data intake procedure, where unlikely values are detected and currency issues are
checked and corrected. We can weed out these errors easily. Methods for detecting such
values are based on comparisons with industry benchmarks. Let us explain with an exam-
ple project that is estimated with $60 million project costs and whose estimated duration
is about 6 months. We use a formula from [117] that is as follows:
tcd(d) =
rw
1800
· d3.564. (3.1)
In Formula 3.1 w is the number of working days in a year, r is the daily burdened com-
pensation rate, and d is the duration of the project in calendar months. So, for a given
duration we can calculate with Formula 3.1 its total cost of development tcd(d) according
to industry benchmarks. In the above example, we just take d equal to 6 months, and for
the specific reporting unit we use the generic data for daily rates and working days per
annum to calculate the total cost of development. As an example, we take 200 working
days per year and a daily burdened rate of $1,000. This results in tcd(6) = 65, 930.83
dollar. What happened in the example project is that the local reporting system works in
thousands of dollars, and the project that was estimated to cost $60,000 was keyed in as
such. Adding an additional erroneous three zeros to the project in the reporting system
led to the unlikely high cost of $60 million. In the same way currency problems and staff
problems are detected, and other extreme outliers. Of course, there are many kinds of
projects and for other kinds of projects other benchmark formulas were necessary. For
an overview of a number of such benchmark formulas and how to create them, we refer
the interested reader to [117], in which about fifty formulas are found based on industry
benchmarks.
Data plausibility
To have a quick overview of the data we conducted the following visual inspection. In
Figure 3.1 we display a histogram, a box plot, a density plot, and a Q-Q plot of the
estimated costs in the data set.
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Figure 3.1: Visual insight into the empirical distribution of the estimated costs (indexed
for confidentiality).
A histogram displays the frequency of a variable in certain value classes, which gives
us a rough indication of the distribution. A box plot represents a graphical sketch of the
numerical statistics. The solid box depicts the data between the first and the third quartile,
the inter-quartile range, displaying 50% of the data, which is a rather small box in our
case. The line within the box represents the median, which cuts the data in half. The so-
called whiskers embody the boundaries of the box plot representing the bulk of the data;
data points outside these limits are often considered as outliers. A density plot depicts
a smooth estimate of the distribution or density. This estimate is based on subparts of
the values of variables. Our Q-Q plot, or Quantile-Quantile plot tests the data against
the log-normal distribution with unit rate. If this plot is more or less a straight line, then
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we have an indication that the probability density function belongs to the family of log-
normal distributions. In our experience, this is the normal pattern if data have not been
manipulated.
Let us discuss the four plots in this figure. First of all we plot a histogram. This
one shows that the majority of the estimated financial investments are in the partition
with the lowest investments. We immediately see that there are outliers, and they can
be pretty large. The next plot is the box-and-whiskers plot. Fifty per cent of the data
are cluttered around the median. The horizontal line segments outside the whiskers, the
horizontal square brackets, are the potential outliers. There are many potential outliers, all
high values. Furthermore, in the lower left plot of Figure 3.1 we estimated an empirical
probability distribution of the estimated durations in the data set. We notice that this
distribution has a spike around the third quartile, and a long tail to the right. The Q-Q plot
is roughly a straight line, giving us further visual evidence that the data has a log-normal
distribution. The above analysis has been carried out for other variables also: actual costs
and estimated and actual duration. These analyses showed the same result that these KPIs
have a log-normal distribution. IT KPIs often display long tails in their distribution and a
log-normal distribution has a long tail. So, the data are in line with characteristics that we
usually encounter.
Comparing the distributional behavior of the estimated durations with the estimated
costs, we expect somehow a correlation. As elaborately treated in [118], these correlations
are almost always not representing a one-to-one correspondence, since a lot of stochastic
effects are in place when constructing IT-enabled business projects. An exception to this
general rule is the case of the largest outliers. And also in this case, the single outlier above
60 months and the duration of the largest project are from the same project. Another inter-
esting observation is that there are somewhat fewer outliers of the estimated duration, and
they are more evenly scattered, than for the estimated investments. This is an indication
that the style of IT governance in this organization is more directed towards managing on
costs than on time. In an organization that manages uniformly on time, you would expect
to see clouds of data around certain time frames, like 12 months. Also these aspects are
useful in the analysis of distributional behavior of important KPIs of IT-intensive projects;
such patterns are elaborately discussed elsewhere [121].
Overperfect data detection
So far, we have shown that the data in our data set of 165 projects are plausible in the
sense that the KPIs display plausible characteristic distributional behavior. But we have
to take overperfect data [121] into account. Overperfect data are data that are too good to
be true. Suppose you plan for certain KPIs, say durations, or costs. Then it is important
to know how good the predictions are. You can do this by comparing estimated and
actual KPIs. Sometimes the similarities are so striking that the chances that the estimated
data are retrofitted to the actual data are very large. In order to spot such effects we
compare the estimated KPIs against their corresponding actuals. We do so by calculating
the correlation coefficient of the estimated and actual costs, r2, which has a value of
0.98. If the correlation was 1, than all actuals would have been equal to the estimates or
transformed by a constant value, a case of overperfection.
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In order to obtain more confidence about this, we overlaid their cumulative distribution
functions, which are the integrals of the probability density functions. We notice that the
two lines almost coincide. So, the hunch that the distributions are potentially similar
turned out to be valid. Now is this a case of overperfect data, or is this a case of very good
planning? From the data we cannot tell the difference. So additional qualitative insight
is needed here. In all cases where data show such similarities it is wise to dive into the
reasons. In this case it turned out that the estimated data cannot be retrofitted once the data
are reported to the corporate IT department and the data are checked for unlikely values.
Additionally, since the data collection is quite mature, the data producers gained a lot of
experience in estimating the costs correctly. Since the costs in the data set were rounded
off to thousands or millions of dollars this also led to actuals being equal to estimates.
Although this data set is very suitable for the analysis presented here, more exact, not
rounded off, numbers are always preferable for data analysis.
We learned from all these visual statistical plots that the KPIs under investigation are
reasonable and plausible. A method for measuring the quality of an estimation method,
and analyzing for political influences or other biases, is presented by Eveleens and Ver-
hoef [34]. The method uses the Estimating Quality Factor (EQF) and they present bench-
marks for the EQF. The median EQF of the estimated costs for our data set is 9.4. This is a
rather good result since in their paper a median EQF of 8.5 is considered good estimation
practice. Although the quality of the estimation practice in our case study is not bad at
all, there is still room for improvement. By defining a cost misestimation as actual project
costs falling outside the interval [−5%, 2.5%], a considerate amount of cost estimates are
classified as misestimates. Therefore, it still makes sense to search for the risk drivers of
the misestimations.
3.3.3 Pooling or splitting up?
Now that we are confident that the useful data are also plausible, we address another
question: can we pool all projects into one data set to analyze for the influence of risk
factors?
As a first check we created Figure 3.2 to inspect the distribution of the disparity be-
tween actual costs and estimated costs. This figure displays that cost overrun as well as
underrun occurred and that there are no multiple peaks in the distribution. Multiple peaks
are an indicator that the data set should be split up in two or more sets each containing
one peak. Each peak has its own causes and needs to be analyzed separately. Since this is
not the case we continue with the entire data set.
Our data set is a so-called pooled data set: the original data are collected from vari-
ous different samples; in this case from different reporting units. We must know whether
the pooled data set is homogeneous with respect to the phenomenon which we want to
explain: the variation in the risk of project cost misestimation. If the data set can be sub-
divided into subsets that are not comparable in kind of nature with respect to the explained
variable, the data set is called heterogeneous. Let us explain. In our case study the data
set can be subdivided in a number of ways. For example it can be subdivided along the
axis of the executive centers. We then obtain three subsets of 25, 29, and 111 projects
respectively. For each subset a specific influence on the risk of project cost misestimation
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of the disparity between actuals and estimates of investments.
can play a role which is specific to that subset which does not apply to the other sub-
sets. Let us label that factor culture. If this culture effect exists, the three subsets are not
homogeneous with respect to the phenomenon that we want to explain.
There are two ways to deal with this problem. First, we can pool the data of the
three subsets and include in our model a categorical variable which can take one of the
values 1, 2 or 3 and include interaction variables that allow for the combined influence
of this categorical variable and other variables. If a specific EC-culture influence exists,
the categorical variable and/or some interaction variables will show up in the logistic
regression equation with a significant coefficient. Second, we can estimate the logistic
regression equation for each of the three subsets separately. In that case we do not have
to include a categorical variable and interaction variables in the three models. The result
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will be three different logistic regression equations for the three subsets. However, in
both approaches the number of observations in each subset must be sufficiently large to
carry out meaningful statistical analyses. If different causes for project cost misestimation
exist across the executive centers, and if we want to search for these differences, we
need enough projects of each subcategory. If a subset contains not enough data points in
relation to the number of explanatory variables, it is statistically not possible to test on
heterogeneity. Or, in other words if a subset does not contain enough projects it is not
possible to determine whether there is a culture effect which must be taken into account
in explaining the variation in the risk of misestimating project costs.
Of course, we can also subdivide the data set along the axes of lines of business (LOB),
and project category (PC) to investigate the presence of LOB and PC effects. Potential
subsets based on these two classification factors are:
• Subsets by line of business: In our case there are three major lines of business, with
88, 60, and 17 projects.
• Subsets by project category: In our data set there exist four categories: 51 transac-
tional projects, 14 informational projects, 52 strategic projects and 48 infrastructure
projects.
In Figure 3.3 we depict simple bar plots of the three classification factors that are present
in our sample set. In the figure we include the amounts of misestimated projects for each
category.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of misestimation among potential risk factors.
We notice that the bar plots display similar distributional shapes for well estimated
and misestimated projects. Only slight differences for the categories with small sets of
data are displayed, which differences are very likely to be induced by the small size of
these data sets. But the estimation process can have differences between executive centers
and also in project category or line of business.
However, we are interested in the possible combined EC/LOB/PC effects on the risk
of project cost misestimation. If we subdivide the data set along the axes of the ECs,
LOBs and PCs we obtain 3 · 3 · 4 = 36 subsets. Each subset differs from the other subsets
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by the influence of a specific EC/LOB/PC combination, that holds for that subset and
does not apply to the other subsets. In Table 3.7 we present the number of projects and
the percentage of misestimation per subset.
It is questionable whether all subsets do contain enough data to estimate the logistic
regression equation for that influence of that subset. Table 3.7 shows that certain lines of
business do not occur in certain executive centers and that the three executive centers and
the three line of business show differences in the misestimation percentage. Therefore, it
will be hard to determine statistically whether or not the specific EC/LOB/PC combination
has an influence on the risk of project cost misestimation. We will not dive into the sample
size issue, but restrict our attention to the largest subset which contains enough projects
of the different subcategories that are left. This results in the subset defined by executive
center C and line of business 2, shaded in Table 3.7.
Project Category 1 2 3 4
estimate % mis n % mis n % mis n % mis n
EC LoB
A 1 100% 2 - 0 100% 1 0% 23 100% 2 100% 6 89% 9 67% 3
B 2 75% 4 - 0 100% 1 - 03 50% 8 0% 1 57% 7 38% 8
C
1 100% 1 50% 2 80% 5 25% 4
2 62% 29 75% 4 73% 22 75% 28
3 40% 5 0% 1 57% 7 67% 3
Table 3.7: Three-way table of the exogenous variables and the percentage of misestima-
tion for each class.
We see similar misestimation percentages in all four project categories and these cate-
gories contain sufficient projects, except for project category 2. The projects in this execu-
tive center and line of business still have a substantial amount of data points: 79 projects.
Therefore, we will continue our search for the influential factors of misestimation with
the data set of projects in executive center C, line of business 2 and project categories 1,
2 and 4. This is a data set that contains enough data points in each project category class
for searching for influences of the potential risk factor under consideration.
Note, that there are more classification variables than ec, lob, and pc among our risk
factors. We refer to the variables io: project either developed in-house or outsourced,
pmt : project management tool used or not, rqf : reporting on financial information or
not, and cmm>1: CMM level higher than 1 or not in the project’s reporting unit. These
variables are dichotomous variables that can just take two values: 1 or 0. Since we have
enough projects in our subset of 79 projects of each type, we do not have to split up the
data set further. The logistic regression technique includes dummy variables in our logistic
regression model that allow for the potential influence of io, pmt , rqf , and cmm>1. If
some dichotomous variable has an influence the variable and/or some of its interaction
variables will show up in the logistic regression equation with a coefficient that differs
from zero in a statistically significant way.
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As stated, a way to further split up the data is to leave out all the outsourced projects
(io). Outsourced projects must be left out if the risk of misestimation depends on the char-
acteristics of the company to which the system development is outsourced, as opposed to
a dependency on the company that outsources the labor. In the case of dependency on the
company to which the development is outsourced, we need information about the CMM
level of that company, their project management tools, and so on. For our data set, this
is not the case since the estimates were made in-house and not by the outsourcing party.
Therefore, estimates are dependent on the maturity level and the project management tools
of the company itself. Later, we will reconsider this issue of pooling in-house and out-
sourced projects. As stated, if a difference in misestimation for in-house and outsourced
projects exists, the variable io will show up in the logistic regression equation as a risk
driver.
3.3.4 Dependencies between variables
Next, we investigate whether the variables in our remaining data set of 79 projects display
mutual dependent behavior. This is important, because when having strongly dependent
variables, one of them could show up in the analysis, and the other not. In that case we
have to check which of the two is the explanatory variable. We distinguish three kinds of
dependencies, because our set consists of continuous and categorical variables.
• Dependencies between pairs of continuous variables.
• Dependencies between pairs of continuous and categorical variables.
• Dependencies between pairs of categorical variables.
ec ed epp rs dds ids
ec 0.75 0.72 0.55 0.26 -0.2
ed 0.31 0.49 0.18 -0.29
epp 0.57 0.3 -0.19
rs 0.42 -0.2
dds -0.07
ids
Table 3.8: Correlation matrix between continuous risk drivers.
We start to inspect the interdependencies of the continuous risk drivers. To that end
we calculated the correlations between continuous variables. A perfect correlation is dis-
played by the number 1, a perfect negative correlation is displayed by -1, and no cor-
relation by 0. Numbers in between indicate low or high correlation depending on the
displayed number. The lower left half of Table 3.8 is left empty for readability, but can of
course be filled with a mirrored copy of the upper right half of the table. We spot immedi-
ately that not all risk drivers are independent. We discuss the dependencies. The estimated
investment, ec, correlates with the estimated duration, ed , this is displayed by the value
0.75 in Table 3.8. This is what you hope to be the case, because projects with long du-
rations usually have higher costs than short projects, where the latter display lower costs.
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The ratio of development and enhancement staff to the total IT staff, dds , does not corre-
late with the ratio of internal development staff ids , as is displayed by the value -0.07. If
in the logistic regression analysis two risk drivers emerge that are strongly dependent, we
need to consider whether one of the two variables can be left out.
We now consider tests of independence for pairs of categorical variables, for which
we use contingency tables. A contingency table represents the combined counts of the
levels of two categorical variables. With the well-known statistical χ2-test we then infer
whether two variables are dependent.
We illustrate the use of this χ2-test with an example. We investigated the potential de-
pendency between the dichotomous variable indicating a higher maturity level than level
1, cmm>1, and whether the reporting unit uses a project management tool. Table 3.9 de-
picts the observed amount of projects for each combination of the maturity level cmm>1
and the variable pmt indicating whether a project management tool is in use.
cmm>1 pmtnot used pmtused total
1 26 27 53
> 1 6 20 26
total 32 47 79
Table 3.9: Contingency table with actual number of IT-enabled business investments
grouped on maturity level and whether or not a project management tool is in use.
To establish whether the two factors are independent, we calculate the expected amounts
of projects in each category based on Table 3.9. There are in total 79 projects of which 53
projects reside in a reporting unit with CMM level 1, so the chance of having CMM level
1 is 53/79 = 0.67. Since there are in total 32 projects that are in a reporting unit without
a project management tool in use, the frequency of pmtnot used projects with CMM level
1 should be 32 · 0.67 = 21.5. In this manner, the expected cell counts are estimated as
the products of the observed marginal totals divided by the table total. In this way we can
fill another contingency table based on the basis of the assumption that both variables are
independent. Table 3.10 contains all the expected amounts.
cmm>1 pmtnot used pmtused total
1 21.5 31.5 53
> 1 10.5 15.5 26
total 32 47 79
Table 3.10: Contingency table with the expected number of IT-enabled business invest-
ments grouped by maturity level and whether or not the reporting unit that creates the
estimates uses a project management tool.
The Cochran conditions [22, 23] are used as a rule of thumb for whether the χ2-test
can be used to test the dependency of two variables. These conditions state that 80% of
the expected values in tables calculated like Table 3.10 need to be higher than 5 and all
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values need to be higher than 0. For Table 3.10 we use these Cochran conditions to check
whether a χ2-test should be used at all: none of the cells has an expected amount of zero,
and more than 80% of the cells have a value higher than 5. Therefore, it makes sense
to carry out a χ2-test. The test gives a χ2-statistic of 3.9 and a p-value of 0.049. This
calculated p-value is small, so at a 5% confidence interval we can reject the hypothesis
that the maturity level is independent of whether a project resides in a reporting unit in
which a project management tool is in use. We thus have to assume that the two variables
are dependent on each other, a conclusion that makes sense, since, whenever the maturity
level of a reporting unit increases, the usage of a project management tool will be required.
It will not always be the case that the Cochran conditions are satisfied for a contin-
gency table with expected values. In that case, the Fisher’s Exact Test is used to determine
whether there are nonrandom associations between two categorical variables. Fisher’s Ex-
act Test calculates a p-value of 0.035 in the case of cmm>1 and pmt , leading to the same
conclusion as before.
In this section we have analyzed the available data. We have assessed the quality and
homogeneity of the data and dependencies between variables. Before we start with our
search for risk drivers for misestimation, we explain the basics of logistic regression in
the next section.
3.4 Logistic Regression
In this section we dive into the technicalities of IT risk quantification through logistic
regression modeling. First, it is worthwhile to give some background on the mathematical
methods underlying such analyses.
3.4.1 Introduction
Logistic regression is a specialized form of regression that is designed to predict and ex-
plain a binary categorical variable rather than a metric dependent measure–for instance,
what factors or combinations of factors are useful in predicting heart failure, or are signif-
icant in explaining buying, or not buying, behavior. Similar in form to regular regression,
it can and must be used when the basic assumptions for normal regression, particularly
normality of the independent variables, are not met. Usually regression analysis relies on
strictly meeting the assumptions of multivariate normality and equal variance-covariance
matrices across groups. Logistic regression does not need these strict assumptions.
The binary nature of the dependent variable means that the error term has a binomial
distribution instead of a normal distribution, and it thus invalidates all testing based on
the assumption of normality. The variance of the dichotomous variable is not constant,
creating instances of heteroscedasticity as well. Neither of these can be remedied through
ordinary transformations of the dependent or independent variables. Logistic regression
was developed to specifically deal with this issue. To that end it makes use of the so called
logit transformation, which will be explained further in this section, a special case of what
Kendall Atkinson [8] calls “the family of folded power transformations”, in which the
natural logarithm is used to create “normality by proxy”.
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Now, compare the quest for IT risk drivers with perinatal epidemiology: one wants to
predict neonatal mortality of a child within the first four weeks for live born infants with
a birth weight less than 1500 grams, given the gender of the child and the gestational age
of the child. In perinatal epidemiology, the dichotomous variable neonatal mortality is
the outcome variable of interest, and infant gender and gestational age are the predictors
of this outcome. It is relatively easy to know the gestational age or pregnancy time in
weeks, and it is trivial to detect the dichotomous gender variable. Usually, some kind of
regression analysis based on continuous variables would be used to fit their interrelations,
if any. But if the dependent variable, neonatal mortality, can only have two values, this
is no longer obvious. One therefore does not model the mean of the outcome variable
itself, but the probability that the outcome variable has one of two possible values. This
modeling technique is known as logistic regression. In logistic regression you directly
estimate the probability of an event occurring. So, one wants to predict the probability
of neonatal mortality of children, given their gender and the gestational age. Now, notice
that the gender variable has a binary value: boy or girl, and the gestational age variable
at birth has a limited range of different values in neonatal mortality: 24 weeks, . . . , 29
weeks. Now we want to turn this discrete input into continuous output, such as a 27.6%
chance of mortality for a child with certain indicators.
Because we are just interested in probabilities between zero and one, we have to do a
smart transformation to fit these discrete numbers to a value between zero and one. For
that, we use the so-called logit transformation, which is crucial for the form of regression
that we need for later quantifying IT risks of estimating.
Estimating uses restating probabilities as odds to calculate the logit values. Instead
of using ordinary least squares, logistic regression uses the maximum likelihood method
by comparing an estimated null model as baseline for a model fit with a proposed model
containing the independent variables that are the potential risk drivers.
First, we define the logit transformation and then we will explain its properties.
logit(p) = log (odds) = log
(
p
1− p
)
(3.2)
Let p be the probability function of the phenomenon that we are searching for, so it is a
function ranging between zero and one. The range of the odds of function p is the ratio of
the probability of p to that of its alternative 1 − p, which is p/(1 − p) in a formula. The
odds of p ranges between zero and infinity. Now, if we take the logarithm of a function
ranging between zero and infinity, we end up with a function that ranges between minus
infinity and plus infinity. We do so by taking the logarithm of the odds of p, and hence
the above expression, Formula 3.2. So the logit transforms a range between zero and one
into the real numbers. The idea behind this transformation is that if we find some trend
with a range we can use the inverse of the logit to bring that range back to the range
of the probability function that we are searching for. The trick is thus not to model the
probability of a phenomenon itself which potentially predicts values that are theoretically
impossible, but to model the logit of the phenomenon, and when a relation is found by
statistical means, to convert back to probabilities using the inverse of the logit.
The most well-known modeling technique that is based on this roughly sketched idea
is called logistic regression analysis. We will apply logistic regression to the data of our
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case study and use that to model certain IT risks, exactly like how you would model the
mortality of prematurely born children.
3.4.2 The logistic regression model
After having explained the general idea behind logistic regression, we will now explain
the necessary mathematics so that we can apply logistic regression modeling in our field
study. We explain for the uninitiated how to directly estimate the probability of an event
occurring using a logistic modeling technique and how the parameters of the resulting
logistic regression equation can be estimated.
Let yi denote the outcome of the event cost misestimation or no cost misestimation,
which equals cmi, for project i with the following possible values for the actual costs ac
and estimate costs ec:
yi = cmi =
{
1 if ac < (ec − 5%) or ac > (ec + 2.5%)
0 if (ec − 5%) ≤ ac ≤ (ec + 2.5%) (3.3)
In our research we used the above boundary values for misestimation, but you are free to
choose them otherwise. Let pi denote the probability of cost misestimation of project i.
Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn denote the risk factors on which the outcome of yi depends. Let
βj denote the impact of risk factor Xj on pi. So βj is the weight that can be given
to factor Xj , even if its effect is confounded by the presence of other risk factors that
influence the outcome of yi. From each project of our sample we know whether or not cost
misestimation occurred and we know the corresponding observations on the risk factors.
So we have a sequence of observations at our disposal:
(y1, x11, x12, . . . , x1n),
(y2, x21, x22, . . . , x2n),
· · · ,
(ym, xm1, xm2, . . . , xmn)
Here xik denotes the i-th observation of the explanatory variable Xk. A well-known
method for predicting a dependent variable from a set of independent variables is multiple-
regression analysis. As stated before, multiple linear regression is not suited for modeling
binary data. Let us consider the following equation for multiple linear regression
pi = β0 + β1 · xi1 + . . .+ βn · xin + ui. (3.4)
In Equation 3.4 the disturbance term is denoted by ui. It is assumed that all the ui are vari-
ables with zero expectation and have equal variance for all i. The explanatory variables
are allowed to be all kinds of variables—ordinal, categorical, continuous variables—but
the dependent variable needs to be a continuous variable. The coefficients β0, β1, . . . , βn
and the parameters of the distribution of ui are unknown, and the problem is to obtain esti-
mates of these unknowns. In linear regression the parameters β0, β1, . . . , βn of the model
are estimated using the method of least squares. Doing so in this case, the difficulty is
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clearly that not all possible values of pi predicted from the model can be interpreted as
probabilities as they are not constrained to fall in the interval between 0 and 1. So, the
linear model can predict values which are theoretically impossible: below 0 or above 1.
Moreover, the assumptions necessary for testing hypotheses in regression analysis are vi-
olated as it is unreasonable to assume the distribution of the errors to be normal if the
dependent variable can only have two values. Also, other well-known multivariate statis-
tical techniques such as linear discriminant analysis to predict the membership of a group
are also not to be considered, as the assumptions necessary for applying the method are
not fulfilled, i.e. multivariate normality of the explanatory variables and equal variance-
covariance matrices in the two groups.
Of course, it is also possible to try to create a linear regression model which does not
model the chance of project cost misestimation, but the amount of misestimated costs.
Such practice is also possible in the perinatal epidemiology case. Modeling the survived
number of days of prematurely born infants with a light birth weight, instead of the chance
of not surviving, creates a linear regression model as opposed to the common logistic
model. But the logistic model, indicating survival of the first 28 days, is of greater interest
than the exact number of days that an infant has survived. For reasons similar to those
that are apparent in epidemiology, we choose in the underlying case of IT risk also logistic
modeling: we are mostly interested in the presence or absence of cost misestimation, and
the factors that influence that outcome rather than the actual amount of misestimation.
Since it is inconvenient to model the probability directly, we apply the logistic re-
gression model. In logistic regression we do not assume that pi depends on the set of
explanatory variables through a linear combination of these variables, but assume that the
logistic transformation of pi, which we denote by logit(pi), depends on a linear combi-
nation of the explanatory variables, i.e. the risk drivers. This dependency is shown in
Equation 3.5.
logit(pi) = log
(
pi
1− pi
)
= β0 + β1 · xi1 + β2 · xi2 + . . .+ βn · xin (3.5)
The logarithms used in this paper are always logarithms with base e, the natural logarithm.
Clearly, applying a logarithm to a number is the same as measuring a number on a different
scale. Remember that xik denotes the i-th observation for the explanatory variable Xk
with respect to project i.
In matrix notation the logit becomes
logit(pi) = log
(
pi
1− pi
)
= Xiβ. (3.6)
In Equation 3.6 Xi denotes the vector of the observations of the explanatory variables
with respect to project i: Xi = (1, xi1 . . . , xin) and β is the vector of the coefficients to
be estimated: β = (β0, β1, . . . , βn). The choice of the logit transformation of pi has two
advantages. First of all, as stated before, it maps the range [0, 1] onto the range (−∞,∞).
Second, pi/(1− pi) can be interpreted as the odds of investment misestimation of project
i, which makes a direct interpretation of the regression coefficients possible. A logistic
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coefficient can be interpreted as the change in the logarithmic value of the odds associated
with a one-unit change in the explanatory variable. When we solve pi from Formula 3.6
we obtain the logistic regression model:
pi =
eXiβ
1 + eXiβ
. (3.7)
To obtain estimates of β0, β1, . . . , βn we use the maximum likelihood method. According
to this method we determine the values of pi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, which make the observed
outcomes y1, y2, . . . , yn most likely. The yi are a sequence of zeros and ones. Or, in
other words, those estimates βi are selected that make the observed results pi as likely as
possible.
We assume that the risk of cost misestimation of project i is independent of the risk of
cost misestimation of project j for all i 6= j. In that case the likelihood function has the
form presented in Equation 3.8.
L(β) =
n∏
i=1
pyii (1− pi)1−yi . (3.8)
If we substitute pi in the right-hand side of Formula 3.8 with the pi from Formula 3.7 and
take logarithms of both sides of Formula 3.8 we obtain the following function of β:
log(L(β)) =
n∑
i=1
[yiXiβ − log(1 + eXiβ)]. (3.9)
Formula 3.9 shows the general likelihood function. If we multiply the log-likelihood func-
tion by −2 we obtain the so-called deviance of the model by definition. The deviance is
just a scaled log-likelihood, and both terms are often used in logistic model evaluation.
To find the value of β that maximizes Formula 3.9, denoted by βˆ, we set the derivative of
log(L(β)) with respect to β equal to 0 and solve βˆ0, βˆ1, . . . , βˆn from the resulting system
of normal equations. Because the normal equations are nonlinear in the unknowns to be
solved, an iterative procedure is applied to obtain the estimates. The estimates can be ob-
tained by the Newton-Raphson procedure if all regularity conditions are fulfilled that are
needed to obtain the usual asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood estimators.
We do not go into those mathematical details, and refer the interested reader to the litera-
ture on this subject [128, 18, 85, 97]. We assume the regularity conditions to be fulfilled in
our case. We have used the logistic regression procedure of the statistical package R [95]
to carry out the necessary computations.
The logistic regression procedure of R yields not only βˆ0, βˆ1, . . . , βˆn, but also the
standard errors for the estimated parameters. If the sample size is sufficiently large, each
regression coefficient is normally distributed by approximation. The standard error can
subsequently be used to statistically test whether the estimated regression coefficient is
significantly different from 0. If the coefficient does not appear significantly different
from 0, using some chosen significance level (e.g. α = 5%), then the corresponding
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explanatory variable—the risk driver—does not have an influence on the outcome of Y in
a statistical sense.
The logistic regression procedure has several methods available for model selection.
By model selection we mean that the procedure determines which explanatory variables
from the list of available variables, IT risk factors in our case, are meaningful for in-
cluding into the logistic regression equation. Coefficients are meaningful if they differ
significantly from zero, given some chosen significance level (e.g. 5%). Moreover, it
should not be possible to increase the likelihood function significantly by entering one
of the non-selected explanatory variables into the regression equation. Basically, there
are two approaches for model selection. Both methods are based on the idea of stepwise
modeling. One can start with a model that only contains a constant, and at each step
the explanatory variable with the highest contribution to the increase of the likelihood
function is entered into the model. This method is called the forward stepwise selection
method. The backward elimination method starts with entering all explanatory variables
on the list into the model. Then, in a number of steps, variables are evaluated for entry or
removal. To select variables for removal the likelihood ratio statistic is used.
The deviance of a logistic regression model is defined as −2 times the log-likelihood
of that model and has a χ2 distribution with N − k degrees of freedom, where N equals
the number of data points and k the number of parameters in the model [49]. The null hy-
pothesis of the deviance statistic is that the fitted model is not significantly different from
a perfect model. A saturated, or perfect, model is a model that explains all variability,
or in other words, it contains a binary variable for every data point in the data set. The
difference in deviance between two models fitted on the same data set and similar param-
eters has a χ2 distribution with k degrees of freedom, with k the difference in number
of variables between the two models. Testing for a significant difference in deviance is
called the likelihood ratio test and is used to test for inclusion or exclusion of parameters
in a model.
For more information on logistic regression we refer the reader to any textbook on the
subject, e.g., [49]. A particularly readable introduction to logistic regression with easily
understood examples is [16, 15]. In the next section we will apply logistic regression to
our homogeneous data set.
3.5 Modeling cost misestimation risks through logistic re-
gression
In this section we show how to find a regression formula for the risk of cost misestimation
of an IT-enabled investment project using the logistic modeling technique. Formulas for
the risk of schedule misestimates, functionality underdelivery and overall project failure
are obtained in a similar way, but not considered in this paper. This article demonstrates
the usage of logistic regression in the analysis of IT risks of misestimation with real-world
project data with a focus on the risk of cost misestimation.
As in perinatal epidemiology we will model a binary variable indicating whether or
not cost misestimation occurred. First, we consider the simplest case, in which there are
no risk drivers considered that influence the probability of cost estimation. Following that,
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we consider the case in which there is one risk driver allowed in the model. And finally,
we allow all risk drivers to be considered as variables in the model.
3.5.1 The case of no risk drivers
If there are no risk drivers that influence the outcome of yi, then the probability of cost
misestimation is equal for all 79 projects that we selected for analysis. In that case For-
mula 3.5 boils down to a very simple expression for all projects:
logit(pi) = log
(
pi
1− pi
)
= β0 for all i. (3.10)
Of course we still have to estimate β0. We do this using the maximum likelihood method.
According to this method we determine the value of all pi that make the observed results
y1, y2, . . . , yn, a sequence of ones and zeros, most likely. If we want to maximize the log-
likelihood expression, Function 3.9, for β0, the following equation represents the model
with no risk drivers:
log(L(β0)) =
n∑
i=1
(yiβ0 − log(1 + eβ0)) (3.11)
The latter formula equals:
log(L(β0)) = β0 ·
n∑
i=1
yi − n · log(1 + eβ0) (3.12)
To find βˆ0 that maximizes Equation 3.12 we take the derivative of Equation 3.12, set it
equal to zero, and solve the result for β0.
∂ logL
∂β0
=
n∑
i=1
yi − n · 1
1 + eβˆ0
· eβˆ0 = 0 (3.13)
n · e
βˆ0
1 + eβˆ0
=
n∑
i=1
yi (3.14)
eβˆ0
1 + eβˆ0
= pˆi =
∑n
i=1 yi
n
= y¯ = 0.6962 (3.15)
In Equation 3.15, y¯ stands for the mean of yi for all i. In that equation we obtain pˆi
directly. Now we can calculate βˆ0 by using Equation 3.7.
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⇒ βˆ0 = 0.8293. (3.16)
So, the simplest estimator of the probability of failure is the number of displayed cost
misestimations divided by the total number of projects. In our case study we defined
misestimation as more than 5% underrun or more than 2.5% overrun. For our subset of 79
projects we obtain y¯ = 55/79 = 69.62% misestimation, which is a very simple constant
model for cost misestimation risk: given a new project, the chance of cost misestimation
is 69.62%.
By substituting p = 55/79 in Formula 3.16 we obtain βˆ0 = 0.8293 as the estimator
of β0 when using the logistic regression model. This is the intercept of a model where the
misestimation risk is associated with a constant model, also called the null model. Indeed,
if we fit a model using logistic regression with a statistical package we find an intercept
of 0.8293, and a log-likelihood of −48.51 and a deviance of 97.02. The deviance of the
null model is used as a yardstick to judge whether or not other models that are found later
on are an improvement. We recall that when we have found βˆ we have to transform the
model using the inverse of the logitfunction to find the chance of misestimation. But in
this simple case of no risk drivers, we already know that value: 69.62%. With Formula 3.7
we find that the model for cost misestimation risk equals to
e0.8293
1 + e0.8293
= 55/79 = 0.6962. (3.17)
In Figure 3.4, we depicted both the model from Equation 3.17 and the distribution of the
presence and absence of cost misestimation. Indeed, as we can see, the model is just a
constant over all the projects. The right-hand side plot is a bar plot showing the frequency
of the cost misestimation risk data.
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Figure 3.4: Plots of the null model and the cost misestimation risk data.
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3.5.2 The case of one risk driver
With the null model we illustrated the basics of applying logistic regression. Let’s con-
tinue with making the model a little more complex. Suppose we want to know whether
conducting a project in-house or outsourcing influences the misestimation risk. To that
end we model the misestimation risk for the 79 projects with one categorical variable:
whether a project was done in-house or outsourced. This leads to the following logistic
regression model:
logit(pi) = log
(
pi
1− pi
)
= β0 + β1 · io1i. (3.18)
In Equation 3.18 io1i is a dummy variable that stands for the categorical variable repre-
senting in-house projects, io1i = −1, or outsourced projects, io1i = 1. This so-called
Helmert contrast will be explained later. The probability of misestimation now depends
on the variable io1i, whether a project was done in-house or outsourced, and therefore is
not equal for all projects. If there is just one explanatory variable, the vector β consists of
two elements: β0 and β1. Using the logistic regression procedure of the statistical package
R we obtain Formula 3.19.
logit(pi) = 0.746−0.235 · io1i io1i =
{ −1 if in-house
1 if outsourced (3.19)
Therefore, βˆ0 = 0.746 and βˆ1 = −0.235. The standard error of the coefficients is 0.260
for both variables.
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Figure 3.5: The in-house and outsourced aware model and the distribution of the misesti-
mation risk.
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In Figure 3.5 we depict the ensuing model with open circles for the different projects.
The left-hand plot contains the new model. As we can see, it is a model with a dichoto-
mous explanatory variable, as is logical given the two possible values for our single vari-
able io1. To compare the null model with the new model we also depicted the null model
with the straight line. The in-house versus outsourced model is a slight improvement over
the null model. Indeed, the deviance, −2 times the log-likelihood, is still large, albeit
slightly smaller than that of the null model: 96.21, instead of 97.02 for the null model.
The purpose of the last model is that if a new project comes in, we predict the cost mises-
timation risk a little bit more accurately given the extra information of whether the project
was done in-house or outsourced. This is only true if this is a significantly better model;
we will shortly see that this is not the case. Assuming it is better, then, if a project is going
to be outsourced, the risk of cost misestimation changes from
pcm(in-house) =
e0.746−(0.235·−1)
1 + e0.746−(0.235·−1)
= 0.727
to
pcm(outsourced) =
e0.746−(0.235·1)
1 + e0.746−(0.235·1)
= 0.625
Of course, these chances are equal to the proportions of the height of the black boxes in
the right-hand side plot of Figure 3.5 to the width of the gray boxes. The right-hand side
plot shows the distribution of the in-house and outsourced projects, in which the projects
with a misestimation displayed as the black bars.
Note that a statistical analysis indicated that the added value of the variable io is not
significant. The likelihood ratio test, that we showed in the end of Section 3.4, for the
new model comparing to the null model equals 97.02 − 96.21 = 0.81. The p-value for
this test can be calculated with the χ2 distribution with k degrees of freedom with k the
difference in number of variables. In this case k = 1, which is the difference between
a model with only an intercept and a model with an intercept and the variable io. This
results in a p-value of P (χ2(1) > 0.81) = 0.36, indicating that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the coefficient of the variable io equals zero. Therefore, we conclude that
the coefficient is most probably zero and an insignificant improvement of the model is
found, and we will continue our search for a model that is more significant than the null
model.
3.5.3 Creating a full model
Let us now consider the case in which all risk factors that potentially influence the out-
come of the event of cost misestimation are taken into account. In Table 3.11 we sum-
marize the factors that are propagated from the previous Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Because we
have eliminated two classification factors to create a homogeneous set, these factors are
no longer present in Table 3.11.
In Table 3.11 we give a summary of the risk drivers and factors that potentially influ-
ence the outcome of cost misestimation, cm , and that will be used in our further analysis.
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Project risk factor Abbr. Definition Level
Estimated Costs ec
Size of the project in terms of total esti-
mated costs ratio
Estimated Duration ed
Size of the project in terms of total esti-
mated duration ratio
Project Power epp
Estimated size of the project in terms of
average costs per month ratio
In-house or Outsourced io
Project either developed in-house or out-
sourced nominal
IT maturity cmm>1
Reporting unit’s CMM level in which the
project is done ordinal
Reporting Unit Size rs
Size of reporting unit in terms of total IT
costs ratio
Project management tool pmt Project management tool used or not nominal
Reporting quality on finan-
cial information rqf Good or not good quality of reporting ordinal
Development department
size dds
Percentage of development staff in total IT
staff ratio
Internal development staff
size ids Breakdown of dds ratio
Project category pc
Transactional, infrastructure, strategic or
informational nominal
Table 3.11: Generic risk factors at the project level.
Since there are many explanatory variables, and many possible ways to combine them,
it is a time-consuming effort to check all the possibilities. In fact, we have ten potential
risk drivers, one potential risk factor which cannot be influenced (pc) and all potential
interactions between each of the risk drivers and the risk factor, so a lot of possibilities
to check. This procedure is automated in the statistical package R [95] that we used in
this research. The idea is to start with the simplest model, i.e., the null model, and to end
up with the model that contains all variables and potential interactions between variables.
This occurs if two variables have, besides an individual influence also a combined influ-
ence on the misestimation probability. In the modeling process the step-by-step approach
first adds variables, and if necessary later also interaction variables. A variable is added
if the decrease in deviance of the model is statistically significant. In principle, statistical
packages automate the process described, of adding variables, by using the likelihood ra-
tio test based on the difference in deviance of different models. Peduzzi et al [90] state
that at least 10 projects are needed for each explanatory variable in the final model. Since
we are adding variables one at a time and have 79 projects, there is no problem for our
analysis. Only if we end up with a model with more than eight explanatory variables do
we have to reject the resulting model, and remove some of the variables before we start
the analysis. The command for the analysis for the statistical package R is the following:
step(nullmodel,
scope=c(lower = ˜1, upper = ˜.ˆ2 ),
direction = "both"
)
Let us explain the above code snippet, since it illustrates the idea of stepwise modeling.
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The function step() is a generic function that builds models in a stepwise fashion. The
first argument nullmodel is an object that represents a model of the appropriate class. It
does not need to be a good model, as long as it is a feasible model. So, our null model that
we depicted in Figure 3.4 suffices. The next argument is a scope defining the range of
models that needs to be examined in the stepwise search for the best model. The notation
lower =˜1 means that the crudest model is only having an intercept, which is the null
model. The notation upper =˜.ˆ2 means that the most sophisticated model includes
all variables, as well as potential interactions between variables in the model. We start
with the lower model and step to the upper models until the likelihood ratio test tells us
that adding variables is not going to improve the model. We can also start with a full model
and remove unnecessary variables. To tell the package to try both directions, forward and
backward stepwise modeling, we define the direction of the step() function to be
both. The statistical package will then try forward and backward searching and show the
best model. Separate forward and backward searches can also be done to check whether
the two best models coincide.
Recall that we can step from lower to upper model and vice versa. There is no guar-
antee that we will end up with the same model. So forward and backward modeling can
lead to different models. This is not too strange, since each model is characterized by its
deviance, or likelihood, on the one hand, and its complexity in terms of number of vari-
ables, on the other hand. Depending on the value of the test statistic, and its corresponding
p-value, we decide in a structured way which model is best. A start model that contains
variables that are already considered risk drivers can also be helpful in finding the optimal
logistic regression model. If one variable shows up in forward and another in backward
modeling, it is important to check whether one of the two variables causes the effect of
the other variable.
The influence of the different risk drivers is assessed by examining the coefficients of
the variables in the various regression equations. The reason for assessing the regression
equations is that we can detect both positive and negative influences of certain factors.
Such knowledge gives you more grip on the IT function and is an instrument in manage-
ment based on measured facts. In the following we will discuss different models.
3.5.4 Helmert treatment
It is not possible to estimate a coefficient for each level of a categorical variable, as the
model becomes overparameterized with binary variables for each possible level. There-
fore, categorical variables are replaced by sets of binary variables also called dummy
variables, as we have already seen in the model with one variable. A particular set of
dummy variables is called a set of contrasts. In statistical modeling tools it is possible to
use the so-called Helmert contrasts to determine the coefficients of the dummy variables
used; see Table 3.12.
The statistical package we use creates by default so-called treatment contrasts. In the
case of treatment contrasts (see Table 3.13), one level of each categorical variable is left
out and the dummy variable represents the difference between that level and the left-out
level. In the case of our categorical variables cmm>1, pmt and rqf we leave out the lowest
level, because we are interested in the change of risk when reaching a higher level. This
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CMM cmm>1 RQF rqf 1 IO io1
CMM 1 -1 no -1 in-house -1
CMM > 1 1 yes 1 outsourced 1
PMT pmt1 PC pc1 pc2
pmt not used -1 1 -1 -1
pmt used 1 3 1 -1
4 0 2
Table 3.12: Weights of linear combination of the dummy variables according to the
Helmert contrasts.
is indeed more in line with our intuition that all projects have at least CMM level 1.
CMM cmm>1 RQF rqf yes IO iooutsourced
CMM 1 0 no 0 in-house 0
CMM > 1 1 yes 1 outsourced 1
PMT pmtused PC pc2 pc3
pmt not used 0 1 0 0
pmt used 1 3 1 0
4 0 1
Table 3.13: Weights of linear combination of the dummy variables according to the treat-
ment contrasts.
Note that the dummy variable cmm>1 = 1 stands for CMM level 2 or 3, and that
for CMM level 1 the dummy variable has the value 0. This is more natural to interpret
and gives us more insight into the influence of going from CMM level 1 to a higher
level. We have a similar situation with the variable rqf representing a good financial
reporting capability and pmt representing the usage of a project management tool. For
the variable in-house versus outsourced it is not the case that one variable is necessarily
better than the other; that is why we use the Helmert treatment for that variable. The most
important difference between models with Helmert contrasts and treatment contrasts is
the significance of the intercept.
3.5.5 Search for a model without allowing interaction variables
We now present the model that we found using all data without any interaction variables
and applying treatment contrasts to cmm>1 and rqf in Equation 3.20. We used both
forward and backward searching.
logit(pcm)= 1.690 +4.261·dds −3.090·ids (3.20)
The deviance of this model is 84.488. If we test the difference from the null model, we will
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see that it is significant: 97.020− 84.488 = 12.53. Then, P (χ2(2) > 12.53) = 0.00019,
a significant improvement at the α = 0.001 level when comparing to the null model. To
apply Formula 3.20 for other projects, we need to know the values of the variables that are
present in the formula. They are dds , the percentage of IT staff devoted to development
and enhancement activities, and ids , the percentage of development and enhancement
staff who are internal. With such generic information we can already gain more insight
into the misestimation risk of the costs in a project.
As stated, if the sample is sufficiently large, each regression coefficient is normally
distributed by approximation. This implies that we can easily assess by inspection whether
the value zero falls into the 95% confidence interval of the estimated coefficient. The
95% interval is defined by the mean plus and minus 1.96 times the standard error of the
estimated coefficient. The 95% and the 90% confidence interval are shown in Table 3.14.
coefficient 95% confidence 90% confidence
Intercept 1.69 (−0.976, 4.356) (−0.547, 3.927)
dds 4.261 (0.475, 8.046) (1.084, 7.438)
ids −3.09 (−5.989,−0.191) (−5.523,−0.657)
Table 3.14: Confidence intervals of the coefficients of the misestimation risk model [-
2.5%,1.25%].
The outcome of a logistic regression equation can be turned into a probability by the
inverse logittransformation. Let pcm be the chance of cost misestimation risk cm. Then
Formula 3.21 shows how the cost misestimation risk is turned into a probability.
pcm =
elogit(cm)
1 + elogit(cm)
(3.21)
The outcome of the logistic regression Equation 3.21 is transformed into a risk probability
with Equation 3.22:
pcm =
e1.690+4.261·dds−3.090·ids
1 + e1.690+4.261·dds−3.090·ids
(3.22)
To provide more intuition for this equation, let us calculate the predicted maximum and
minimum values of pcm . Our data set contains a project with an ids of 0 a dds of 0.294.
Almost a third of the IT staff were developers, and they were all external. This project
yields, using the above formula, a risk of 95% for a disparity between the estimate and
its actual. Another project contains an ids of 1 and a dds of 0.143. 14.3% of the IT staff
were developers, and they were all internal. This project predicts a misestimation chance
of 31%. As we see, the coefficients of the regression equation are scaled to the values of
its corresponding variable. To have a more sophisticated way to assess the quality of the
regression coefficients we observe upper and lower bounds of the coefficients provided by
the confidence intervals. Each coefficient has a value within these boundaries with 95%
and 90% reliability; see Table 3.14.
The model that we have found contains a constant term and two explanatory variables,
risk drivers, of which the regression coefficients differed significantly from zero. The most
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important risk driver is the percentage of the internal development staff (ids) with a neg-
ative regression coefficient and the second one is the percentage of development staff in
the total IT staff (dds) with a positive regression coefficient. Increasing the percentage of
internal developers means increasing the specific knowledge within the development team
of the core business of the company and its specific culture and this will certainly help in
making better estimates. The estimates in this company were all made by internal project
managers. This conclusion was supported by the organization that supplied the data set.
The internal developers make better estimates as they are much more familiar with testing
environments, have better knowledge of the complexity of systems and the infrastructure,
and will better judge whether potentially additional requirements are necessary.
Also the regression coefficient of +4.261 of the risk driver dds can be interpreted
meaningfully. It tells us that efficiency is important for good judgment. An overstaffed
development project increases the amount of communication which is often not consid-
ered in the cost estimates. Conte et al. [24] discuss the relationship between the size of
a team and the productivity which was confirmed by the company that provided the data.
With a database of 187 projects they show that the average productivity per person drops
when the team size increases. They explain this effect in terms of an increased number
of communication paths, citing also the seminal work of Brooks [17]. Brooks states that
an increased team size leads to a greater need to coordinate the activities of the group,
thus increasing overhead at the expense of production work. As we see in our data set,
this effect also influences the quality of estimates. More recent publications on the topic
of complex dynamic systems [13, 14] further underline this notion of increased and more
complex communication in larger development teams.
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Figure 3.6: Box plots for ids and dds for the data set with 79 projects.
To give an idea of the common values of the variables ids and dds , Figure 3.6 shows
the box plots of these variables for the data set analyzed. Some projects have no internal
staff at all, but most projects have development staff for which three quarters are internals.
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The median value of dds is 0.36; the highest value of the ratio of development staff to the
total staff is 0.63.
In order to investigate potential interaction between variables we also carried out anal-
yses where interactions of variables are potential risk drivers, besides the risk drivers ids and dds.
This analysis produced the same result as Equation 3.20. Apparently, on the basis of our
available data, it appears that there is no interaction between the variables dds and ids.
3.5.6 Loosening the misestimation risk definition
At this point we have shown the regression equation that we found by applying logistic
regression to the available data. We have also shown how to interpret the explanatory
variables in the regression equation round. Now, we will consider the stability of the
regression equations. Therefore, the bandwidth that indicates budget misestimation is
widened. We change the interval from [−5%,+2.5%] to [−10%,+5%]; this results in 48
projects with a cost misestimation. The enlargement of the interval results in fewer cases
of misestimation and yields Equation 3.23 and the confidence intervals in Table 3.15.
logit(pcm)= 1.706 −1.914·ids (3.23)
coefficient 95% confidence 90% confidence
Intercept 1.706 (0.034, 3.378) (0.303, 3.109)
ids −1.914 (−4.111, 0.283) (−3.758,−0.07)
Table 3.15: Confidence intervals of the coefficients of the risk model for misestimation
outside [-10%,5%].
By changing the definition we found a new model that only incorporates ids as a signif-
icant variable with α = 0, 1 besides the intercept. We recall that ids is the percentage
of internal development and enhancement staff. The effect of increasing the internal staff
is the same, a lower risk of misestimation as in the previous model. Although this is a
simpler model, we will later see that the goodness of fit of this model is worse than for
the previous model containing both ids and dds based on the smaller interval of good
estimates.
If a variable definition of the outcome variable, like the misestimation interval, changes,
be sure to check that the variable that is being explained does not contain too few true or
false cases. For example, if only 2 out of 79 projects are considered to have been mis-
estimated, this will lead to improper conclusions, because the calculations in the logistic
regression process need more discriminating data for the outcome variable. A statistical
rule of thumb is that we need at least about 20 to 30 values of each possible outcome of
the binary variable which needs to be explained.
3.5.7 Overdispersion
In logistic regression, overdispersion indicates the presence of a larger variability in a data
set than is expected from the statistical model underlying logistic regression. Overdisper-
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sion is caused by small data sets or small subsets that are induced by different categorical
variables as we have seen before. To prevent overdispersion we removed the categories
with a small amount of projects. Also a definition that creates an outcome variable with
either very few zeros or very few ones will not lead to a proper analysis. Overdispersion
can be detected by dividing the deviance of the logistic model by the degrees of freedom
of the logistic model found; this ratio needs to be around 1. If this ratio is improper,
larger data sets are needed or a different definition of the variable explained that yields
a more discriminating set of trues and falses. Also, a scale factor can be introduced to
reduce the variability; this scale factor induces wider confidence intervals, but retains
the model found. In our case we have properly mitigated the risk of overdispersion as
we have shown in previous sections by taking a subset with enough data points for each
classification variable and a proper definition of the outcome variable misestimation.
3.5.8 CMM insignificant
In the misestimation formula that we found the influence of the CMM level turned out to
be insignificant. We suspect that the skills needed for estimation are independent of the
CMM level which is geared towards process maturity. Our data set contains a dichoto-
mous variable that yields 0 in the case of CMM level 1 and in the case of CMM level 2 or
3 the variable has the value 1. This turned out to be a statistically insignificant variable,
which was recognized by the company that supplied the data set, which we explain be-
low. In Section 3.7, we will see that also digging deeper in the data set does not reveal an
influence of the CMM level on the correct estimation of costs of an IT-intensive project.
At first sight, this outcome contradicts the definitions of the second level of the CMM
model. Level 2 of the CMMmodel [89], labeled Repeatable, dictates that: ”It is character-
istic of processes at this level that some processes are repeatable, possibly with consistent
results”. But it also states that ”there could still be a significant risk of exceeding cost
and time estimates”. So, correct estimation is desirable at level 2 and higher, but in the
underlying case, in which CMM audits were conducted for the various reporting units, the
higher CMM levels did not significantly improve the cost estimation practice. According
to the definition of CMM level 2 a probability of exceeding costs still exists. Apparently
this probability of cost misestimation is factual for a considerate amount of the projects
in our data set. The CMM audits were done by the organization itself and not by a cer-
tified third party. Therefore the qualifications of CMM level 2 are possibly optimistic.
But it is more likely that the absence of improved estimates is explained by the follow-
ing. If a higher CMM level is reached, the requirements process within the IT department
improves, but the business department falls behind. For instance, the business does not
correctly consider testing phase efforts, leading to incorrect estimates, despite the higher
CMM level. This is more widely known as a maturity mismatch [21]. A discrepancy in
maturity level between the business and IT or supplier and client nullifies the expected
benefits of the higher CMM level.
112
IT Risks in Measure and Number
3.5.9 Pooling in-house and outsourced
In this section we return to the issue of pooling the in-house and outsourced projects. The
data set that we have been analyzing did show significant variables, ids and dds , with an
acceptable goodness of fit. But it did not show an influence of the variable io, whether or
not a project is outsourced. This result justifies the pooling of the data.
The same holds for the categorical variables pmt , rqf and cmm>1. Since these vari-
ables did not show up in the logistic regression equation there was no specific influence
of one of the separate values of these variables.
3.6 Goodness of fit and predictive power
We have inferred several cost misestimation models, and now we will assess their good-
ness of fit and predictive power. Note that you cannot tacitly assume predictive value with
such models, since they are built for analytical purposes. We need to assess the goodness
of fit first.
3.6.1 Goodness of fit
In the following sections we start with the assessment of the goodness of fit of the models
found. We will inspect the graphical goodness of fit as well as the calculated goodness of
fit.
Graphical goodness of fit inspection
We will use the cost misestimation risk model with the interval [−5%, 2.5%] as an exam-
ple to illustrate two graphical quality plots. In the next figure we illustrate the calculated
probabilities of misestimation of the model.
Figure 3.7 depicts the risk probabilities of cost misestimation versus the actual mis-
estimations, measured after completion of the projects. To obtain more spread on the
vertical axis the disparity percentages are placed on a logarithmic scale. Therefore, the
projects that are close to the misestimation interval of [−2.5%, 5%] are more visible. The
vertical lines represent the interval that defines the boundaries of good estimates.
It is not possible to count exactly 79 dots in Figure 3.7, because some projects have
equal values for the predicted chance of misestimation and the actual misestimation and
therefore appear as one dot. Since the explanatory variables in our model are business
unit specific variables, Figure 3.7 displays vertical lines of projects with equal chances,
but different actuals.
We highlighted some projects in the figure, for instance project number 5. These
projects realized a large saving in the estimated investment. The model predicted high
chances, higher than 80%, of cost misestimation, which is a very good prediction of the
model. Upon inspection of the project data, it turned out that project 5 was a combined
project where software and business processes were reengineered. The high predicted
risk of cost misestimation is in line with the risks of large business/software reengineering
projects. The actual 40% cost savings of this project were due to proper risk mitigation
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Figure 3.7: Quality plots of individual risk probabilities of the cost misestimation risk
model [−5%, 2.5%].
efforts by the organization. Project 37 on the other hand displays an overrun of costs.
From the plot it seems that the larger the chance of cost misestimation, the more likely it
is that there will indeed be a misestimation. But when the probability is low it seems that
there is less predictive power. To make this more precise, we will plot the chance that a
cost misestimation occurs given a minimal predictive value from our model.
For instance, if the model calculates a chance of between 30% and 40% of misesti-
mation, what is the chance that an actual misestimation occurs? We measure the amount
of actual misestimations that indeed emerged and took the fraction of the total number of
projects where our model predicts between 30% and 40% chance of cost misestimation.
In this case, there are nine projects with that chance and four of them have an actual mis-
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Figure 3.8: The chance of actual misestimation given a prediction from the cost misesti-
mation model.
estimation. So, when we predict a chance of 30–40% of misestimation, there is a 44%
chance that there is going to be an actual misestimation. In Figure 3.8 we depict this
relation for all decimals. Indeed for higher predicted misestimation chances the chance
that an actual misestimation will occur increases. In the next section we calculate the
goodness of fit more formally.
Calculating goodness of fit metrics
With the deviance of our models we tested whether the misestimation models do not
perform significantly worse than a perfect, saturated model. If we perform this likelihood
ratio test [49] for the [−5%, 2.5%] null model, the p-value equals 0.07, and we need to
reject the hypothesis that the model performs as well as a perfect, saturated, model. The
p-value for this test for our [−5%, 2.5%] model, with ids and dds as risk drivers, is as
follows: 0.236. In this case, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for any common α level,
and conclude that we have a model that does not perform significantly worse than a perfect
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model. For the model with the [−10%, 5%] interval we do reject this null hypothesis for
the null model and the fitted model with ids as a risk driver.
As in linear regression, there exist goodness of fit metrics for logistic regression [50].
The test of the unweighted sum of squares has a p-value of 0.98 for the [−5%, 2.5%]
model, indicating a good fit. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit statistic Cˆ is calcu-
lated by ordering all projects by their predicted chance of misestimation and subsequently
partitioning the projects over k groups, usually k = 10 [49], for which nk indicates the
number of projects in group k. For each partition the number of actual misestimations,
ok, and the number of expected misestimations, ek, based on the chances in group k, are
calculated. The statistic Cˆ is then calculated as follows:
Cˆ =
10∑
k=1
(ok − ek)2
ek ·
(
1− eknk
) . (3.24)
The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test compares the observed and estimated ex-
pected frequencies for the k groups. The value of Cˆ for the [−5%, 2.5%] misestimation
model equals 10.11246, it has a χ2 distribution with eight, k− 2, degrees of freedom and
therefore a p-value of 0.257, indicating a well fitted model.
For the [−10%, 5%]model the Cˆ-statistic has a value of 6.83, with a p-value of 0.555;
in other words: both are well fitted models.
Banana lifting
A tabular way to evaluate a model’s goodness of fit for classification purposes consists of
simply classifying successes and errors of the model. We distinguish four kinds of suc-
cesses and errors: true positives and false positives, and true negatives and false negatives.
We can put this in a classification matrix, also called a confusion matrix [132, 54].
prediction
actual
misestimate correct estimate
misestimate true positive false positive
correct estimate false negative true negative
Table 3.16: A confusion matrix for a two-class case.
Table 3.16 illustrates the idea. True positives are projects that had an actual misesti-
mation and are also predicted to have a misestimation. False positives are projects that
have no significant disparity between the estimate and the actual, but are predicted to have
a misestimation. The other half of the table can be read in a similar way. Now we must
choose a probability for distinguishing a risky from a non-risky project. This probability
enables us to provide values for the confusion matrix. The crux is how to choose this
probability. An ideal graphical support technique for selecting this probability is the lift
chart, sometimes called a banana chart because of its visual appearance [132, 54]. The
lift chart shows how a response variable behaves when a prediction model is used. The
chart displays three lines, a baseline that represents a random choice of projects, a perfect
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prediction line and the lift curve itself induced by the model. The lift curve displays, one
hopes, an increase in response rate, which is called the lift. A lift chart indicates which
subset of the data contains the largest possible proportion of responses, in our case mises-
timations. The further the lift curve is away from the baseline, the better the performance
of the model. So, in fact the lift shows how much better the model is than a random pick.
To create a lift chart, instances in a data set are sorted in descending order of their prob-
ability of a misestimation. Plotting the sorted data creates a graphical depiction of the
various probabilities. A lift chart is thus ideal for giving an overview of the classification
power of a model.
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Figure 3.9: Lift chart for the cost misestimation model.
Figure 3.9 depicts a lift chart for our cost misestimation model for the data set of
79 projects. The horizontal axis represents the inspected projects, ranked by decreasing
predicted misestimation risk as predicted by our misestimation risk model. On the vertical
axis we ranked the projects with an observed misestimation. The solid staircase-shaped
curve represents the lift chart of our predictive model. This line is formed by sorting the
predicted risks from high to low and comparing them with the observed misestimation,
which is whether a project did suffer from a significant disparity between the estimate and
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its actual or not. Each time an actual misestimation is detected, the line is lifted.
The dashed line with an angle of 45◦ is the predictive power of a random prediction:
detecting 50% of the projects with misestimated costs is achieved by inspecting 50% of
the projects at random. The random model is just the one where all projects have a risk
probability of 50%. The dashed line segments above the prediction represent the perfect
prediction: every project is predicted correctly. This means that the 55 projects inspected
first are all the projects with a cost misestimation. This line turns horizontal after the 55
projects inspected. Our lift chart is enclosed within the region created by a random and a
perfect pick: it is better than random, but not as good as a perfect prediction. The ideal
place to be in the lift chart is near the upper left-hand corner: the speed for detecting
risks is optimal, since all actual risky projects are detected first due to the ordering by
misestimation chance. The lift chart of the cost misestimation model for the interval
[−5%, 2.5%] on the overall data set is reasonable. It is well above the line of random
predictions for half of the data set, but overall not much better than a random pick. This is
not strange, because the model is based on the same data set as it is predicting the chances
for. Later we will apply this method in simulation of random subsets of our data sets.
The leftmost labeled point in the lift chart indicates that inspecting 35% of the projects
ranked according to our model leads to a detection of 49% of the projects with an actual
misestimation. Our model thus started reasonably with a lift of 49% when inspecting 35%
of the projects, yielding a lift factor of 49/35 = 1.4. From that point on the lift factor
diminishes: the line moves away from the ideal prediction. The next labeled point in the
chart has a lift factor of only 1.13 (76% found by inspecting 67% of the projects). The
lift chart tells us that if the risks of misestimation are lower, the predictive power of the
model is also somewhat lower. The lift factor of a random prediction can be calculated as
follows: the last inspected project is the last misestimated project to be found. This equals
a lift factor of 100%100% = 1. If after an inspection of 50% of the projects only 25% of the
misestimates are found, the lift factor for this subset equals 25/50 = 0.5.
We noted that ratios like 49/35 were instructive for assessing the quality of our lift
chart. To make this more formal we introduce definitions taken from [132]. They are the
recall and the precision of a lift chart. The recall is the ratio of the true positives, the
predicted misestimates that are also actual misestimates in our case, divided by the sum
of the true positives and the false negatives. The precision is the ratio of the true positives
divided by the sum of true and false positives. We calculate the recall and precision for
a lift chart by inspecting the confusion matrix. Suppose that we inspected 25% of the
projects ordered with a decreasing cost misestimation risk; then Table 3.17 gives us the
correct amount of true and false positives and negatives.
The recall at 25 inspected projects is 24/(24 + 31) = 0.45, or 45%, with a corre-
sponding precision at 25 inspected projects of 24/(24 + 1) = 0.96. A summary measure
for recall and precision is the so-called three-point average precision or the eleven-point
average precision. This is the average precision at certain recall levels. For the three-point
summary this is the average precision at 20%, 50% and 80%, and for the eleven-point
average precision this is the average precision at 0%, 10%,. . . ,100%. The summary mea-
sures for this model are 84.75% and 75.10% respectively. So, the average precision of
our cost misestimation model for interval [−5%, 2.5%] is about 80%. We expected to
detect 55/79 = 0.70 or 70% of the projects with a cost misestimation, which implies
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predictions
actuals
misestimates good estimates totals
misestimates 24 1 25
good estimates 31 23 54
totals 55 24 79
Table 3.17: A confusion matrix when 25% of the projects are inspected according to our
cost misestimation risk model [−5%, 2.5%].
an average lift factor of about 1.14 (80/70) in the lift chart. This average lift factor can
be seen as an overall quality of lift charts. These are relative measures and are used to
compare between different models for the same risk. We have computed the average lift
factors on the basis of the earlier defined subsets in order to determine the most stable
classification model. We depict these lift factors for the cost misestimation risk model in
Table 3.18.
average lift factor
risk for misestimation outside [-5%,2.5%] 1.148
risk for misestimation outside [-10%,5%] 1.088
Table 3.18: Average lift factors of the misestimation risk.
From Table 3.18 we observe that our misestimation models have average lift factors
of 1.15 and 1.09. Our cost misestimation risk model performs in a stable manner with
respect to the classification performance of the data set on which the model was built.
The lift charts and metrics used so far indicate that our misestimation risk model classifies
the projects decently, but it does not help us in determining the ideal amount of projects to
control. To that end, we calculate the so-called F -measure that represents the information
retrieval quality of the model [132]. This measure is defined as follows:
F-measure =
2 · recall · precision
recall+ precision
We compute the F -measure for each possible inspection amount of projects with the
above formula. In Figure 3.10 we plot the number of projects inspected against their
corresponding F -measures. A high risk detection quality is expressed by high values of
the F -measure.
Figure 3.10 shows us that we need to inspect at least 40 projects to detect most actual
misestimated projects; after 30 the F -measure still rises but not as fast as before the first
40 projects inspected.
With the F -measure we were able to obtain an indication of the ideal control amount
of projects based on the risk model for cost misestimation. This indication is based on the-
oretical measures and past performance since the models were assessed with the historical
data on which the models were built.
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Figure 3.10: F -measure for each possible control amount of projects for the cost misesti-
mation risk model.
3.6.2 Predictive power of the cost misestimation risk models
Having a model does not imply that you can use it for anything you like. Suppose we
want to use the model to predict misestimation risks of individual projects; we have to
judge its predictive power first, which we will do in the following. In this section we
compare the predictive quality of the models found earlier on the basis of the estimation
intervals [−5%, 2.5%] and [−10%, 5%]. The predictive quality of a model is measured
by the so-called Mean Minus Log-Likelihood (MML), which calculates the deviation of
the predictions from the original response variable [52, 18]. If the original data set is used
to calculate the MML, it equals minus the log-likelihood divided by the size of the this
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data set, which explains its name: minus the average, or mean, of the log-likelihood. The
MML is presented in Formula 3.25.
MML = − 1
N
·
∑
i
[
Yi log pˆ(−i)(Xi) + (1− Yi) log(1− pˆ(−i)(Xi))
]
(3.25)
In Formula 3.25 p(−i)(Xi) stands for the predicted chance of misestimation for project
i based on a misestimation model created with all data except project i; hence the sub-
scripted minus i in brackets. The perfect prediction of a data set has an MML of zero.
The worst value is +∞. We consider a model as having an acceptable predictive power if
itsMML is between zero and 0.5.
MML
[−5%, 2.5%] 0.588
[−10%, 5%] 0.742
Table 3.19: Performance of overall models on the different subsets.
Zooming in on the models 3.19, we notice that the cost misestimation model with the
small interval is performing better than the model with the larger interval. The model
with the [−5%, 2.5%] interval has anMML that is almost acceptable. A larger data set is
needed to draw more definite conclusions on the predictive value of the model on the indi-
vidual project level. Given the available data set though, it is possible to better understand
the predictive value of the models. We investigate this in more detail in the following
sections.
Note that the calculation of the MML through Formula 3.25 is needed if no test set
is available and we resort to the original data. If a test set of projects is available those
projects are used to calculate a mean minus log-likelihood. In that case the logistic re-
gression model found on the basis of the research data set is used to predict the chance of
the misestimation of the project costs of the test set.
Simulation
Since the MML did not provide enough evidence of the predictive power for classifica-
tion purposes for our model, we run a simulation. In this simulation we create random
subdivisions of our 79-project data set. Note that the ideal way to assess the predictive
power of a model is to use it to predict the risk of cost misestimation for a larger number
of new projects and to evaluate the successes and errors. However, such a set is often
not available. In that case a simulation as described in this section is an alternative. With
a random subset with a size of 80% of the 79 projects we create a cost misestimation
model. With this model based on about 63 projects we calculate the average of the three-
and eleven-point lift factors of the remaining 20% of the data set, i.e. 16 projects. This
process is repeated 10,000 times. From the 10,000 lift factors we calculate the probability
density function, which is displayed in Figure 3.11. In this way we have simulated the
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situation in which the research data set for constructing the model consists of 63 projects
and the test set consists of 16 projects.
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Figure 3.11: Distribution of lift factors obtained from 10,000 simulations of random sub-
set division for which the 80% subset served to create a model and the 20% complement
to calculate the lift factor.
In Figure 3.11 we have plotted the lift factor of the original model as well as the
median lift factor of the randomly subdivided sets. Given a random subdivision of the
data set of 79 projects, a similar lift factor is to be expected. Since we had no separate
test set for testing the predictive power of our [−5%, 2.5%] model, we created random
partitions to check whether the lift factor of the [−5%, 2.5%] model is an exceptional lift
factor or not. As Figure 3.11 shows, the lift factor based on the entire research set is
almost equal to the median of the 10,000 simulations. Apparently, the earlier calculated
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lift factor of 1.15 already gave a good indication of the predictive power of the model.
At this point we are in a position to conclude that our models are useful for finding the
risk drivers of misestimation, because of the goodness of fit. The predictive power of the
model for individual projects is rather poor as theMML displays, but for the classification
of portfolios of projects it is useful as we have seen with the lift models.
3.7 Separating misestimation into overrun and underrun
In Section 3.5 we have seen that the explanatory variables for misestimation are dds , the
ratio of enhancement and development staff to the complete IT staff, and ids , the ratio of
internal development and enhancement staff. Now we will dig deeper into the data set and
study the influences on overrun and underrun separately, which we previously combined
into a misestimation that incorporates both overrun and underrun. In Figure 3.12 the
differences of the definition of the risk materialization are illustrated.
estimation interval
overrun
underrun
misestimated misestimatedwell estimated
ESTIMATE
ESTIMATE
ESTIMATE
underrun
overrun
no underrun
no overrun
Figure 3.12: Illustration of different risk materialization definitions.
The first part of Figure 3.12 illustrates the model of the misestimation already exam-
ined. In that case an actual value that is outside predefined boundaries of the estimate,
indicated by the thick line, counts as a misestimation. The second part of Figure 3.12
represents the underrun situation: an actual that is located on the thin line counts as an
underrun. Overrun is defined by an actual value that is located on the thin line of the third
part of Figure 3.12. In all three definitions the comparison of an actual with an estimate
results in a dichotomous variable fit to be used in logistic regression. The first case of
logistic regression, using an interval, was extensively explained in the previous sections.
As we have our data set up for logistic analyses in the previous sections, it is close to
effortless to analyze alternative scenarios.
First, we examine the alternative of underrun. Recall that underrun is defined as an
actual that turned out to be lower than the estimation. Using the same techniques as we
elaborately discussed in this paper, we obtain the following equation by applying logistic
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regression for the chance of underrun, denoted by pur:
logit(pur)= 2.148 +0.714·rqf yes −3.531·ids . (3.26)
The standard errors for the variables in Equation 3.26 are respectively 0.948, 0.502 and
1.301. The data set for the underrun model contains 38 misestimations. Second, we cal-
culate the logistic regression equation for the chance of overrun, denoted as por. Overrun
is present if an actual value is higher than the estimate. This model contains 20 misesti-
mations. The resulting equation from the logistic regression method is as follows.
logit(por)= −2.879 −1.202·rqf yes +6.111·dds . (3.27)
The standard errors for the variables in Equation 3.27 are respectively 0.868, 0.664 and
2.403. What strikes one about Equations 3.26 and 3.27 is that the variables ids and dds
each only appear in one equation. But they have the same effect on the misestimation if
an interval is considered, as was elaborately discussed in Section 3.5 with Equation 3.20.
Increasing the ratio of development staff increases the risk of overrun and the risk of mis-
estimation, when considering an interval. Increasing the ratio of internal staff decreases
the risk of underrun and the risk of misestimation if an interval is considered. Apparently
if the overrun and underrun effects are combined, the separate causes ids and dds remain
risk drivers in the resulting logistic regression equation.
Another striking point of Equations 3.26 and 3.27 is the appearance of the vari-
able rqf yes. This variable has the value 1 if financial reporting is practised and 0 if this
is not done. In the equation for underrun there is a higher chance of underrun if financial
reporting is present. In the equation of overrun on the other hand, its presence displays
a decrease in the chance on overrun. So, if financial reporting is practised, there is both
a decrease in the chance of overrun and an increase in the chance of underrun. Since no
other variables regarding for instance the costs or duration appear in these equations, the
two samples are of a similar nature as regards size. These equations support the notion
that the reporting variable is not visible in the equation for misestimation if an interval
around the estimate is inspected. Apparently, if financial reporting is conducted, projects
do not become compliant to target, but drop significantly below their estimate, and be-
come underruns below the boundaries of the inspected interval. Estimates for projects
with financial reporting tend to be too high, where their opposites tend to be too low. If
no financial reporting is conducted, financial estimates tend to be risk seeking, and if the
reporting is conducted, the estimates tend to be risk mitigating.
3.8 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that logistic regression is a powerful modeling technique
for investigating what risk factors influence the risk of a significant disparity between a
cost estimate and its actual, for short, misestimations. The definition of significant in
this context is defined by the bounds of an interval around the estimate. In this paper
we mainly researched an interval of [−5%,+2, 5%] around the estimate; an actual that
is situated outside this interval is considered to be misestimated. If the project costs or
schedule are incorrectly estimated, wrong decisions are made at the start of the project as
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regards allocation of money and staff capacity. Moreover, calculations of the Return on
Investment (ROI), the Net Present Value (NPV) and Pay Back Time (PBT) are based on
wrong figures and this may lead to the acceptance of unsound investment proposals. It
therefore makes sense to analyze your set of IT projects and investigate for risk drivers
that cause misestimations.
We have focused on the risk of falsely estimating the costs, being one of the most
critical KPIs of an investment project. The authors are comfortable that the method de-
veloped for cost misestimation is applicable for investigating the significant risk drivers
for project schedule misestimation and the risk of functionality underdelivery if the nec-
essary data are available. However, we have not carried out that exercise, as the focus of
the organization that provided the data is on cost management.
For our case study we found that the differences between the development environ-
ments of the reporting units explain the variety in the chances of project cost misesti-
mation. According to the logistic regression equation found, the risk of misestimation
varies within the range of 0.31 to 0.95 for the various reporting units. The chance of
misestimation is independent of project specific characteristics. It only depends on the
characteristics of the development environment. To be more precise, it varies with the
percentage of developers in the total IT staff, the metric dds , and the percentage of the
development staff who are internal, the metric ids . For management this information is
extremely useful. It tells management that the focus needs to be on dds and ids in order
to improve the estimation quality. Of course the coefficients of the regression equations
that we have found are specific to the data set that we have researched, but the risk drivers
found are more generally applicable.
Our most important learning experiences are listed below.
• It is very important to inspect the data carefully before applying the logistic model-
ing technique. It does not make any sense to use an entire data set of projects if the
set is not homogeneous. In that case a regression equation will be found that does
not apply to any of the homogeneous subsets of which the total data set consists.
In our case we detected one subset of 79 projects, out of a total set consisting of
165 projects, which satisfied the condition of being homogeneous with respect to
the research questions under consideration and consisting of sufficient data.
• The regression equation found must have a logical interpretation. In our case we
found a constant term and two risk drivers for which the regression coefficients dif-
fered significantly from zero. The most important risk driver was the percentage
of the internal development staff, ids , and turned out to have a negative regression
coefficient, and the second one was the percentage of development staff in the total
IT staff (dds) with a positive regression coefficient. The question is whether one
can put a meaningful interpretation on the risk drivers found and the signs of their
regression coefficients. In our case the answer is yes, and the statistical conclusions
were supported by the company providing the data set. Increasing the percentage
of internal developers means increasing the specific knowledge within the develop-
ment team of the core business of the company and its specific culture, complexity,
infrastructure and requirements process. Apparently this aids in making better es-
timates. Also the regression coefficient of +4.448 of the risk driver dds can be
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interpreted meaningfully. This tells us that efficiency is important for good judg-
ment. Projects that are overstaffed increase the amount of communication paths
which is often not considered in the cost estimates. This results in a misestima-
tion of the project costs. It is remarkable that the CMM level turned out not to be
significant in the regression equations as one of the risk drivers. A significant im-
provement of estimations is expected on the basis of the definitions of the capability
maturity model. The CMM audits were done by the company itself, and not by cer-
tified CMM auditors, making the level 2 qualifications probably optimistic. But the
absence of improved estimates in higher CMM levels is more likely induced by a
maturity mismatch. The higher CMM level improves requirements processes, but
the business is not aware of efforts needed for testing, leading to incorrect estimates.
The variable that indicates reporting on financial information turned out to have a
decreasing effect on the risk of estimate overrun, and also an increasing effect on
the risk of estimate underrun. When considering the more general notions of mis-
estimation, both underrun and overrun, the effects of financial reporting cancelled
each other out for the separate cases. The underlying systematics are probably best
described as follows. In reporting units without reporting, projects tend to be risk
seeking, and in reporting units with reporting, they are more risk avoiding.
• The model has been very useful for identifying the important and less important
risk drivers in the collected data as the goodness of fit showed. To our surprise only
two risk drivers turned out to have a significant influence on the estimation quality.
For management this is valuable and useful information. It tells management that
it must first of all focus on these two risk drivers to improve the estimation quality
and management can neglect the other potential risk factors for the time being, for
instance an effort to go from CMM level 1 to CMM level 2 to improve the estimation
practice.
• The predictive power of the model for individual projects is not acceptable as the
MML displays, but for the classification of portfolios of projects it is useful as we
have seen with the lift models. To reduce the cost of auditing, our models provide
nonrandom selections of projects that have the highest chance of misestimation
problems. This aids in focusing attention first on the most risky projects in terms of
the largest chance of misestimated project costs or project duration.
We stress that the coefficients of the formulas presented in this paper cannot be used
verbatim by other organizations and are specific to the organization providing the data.
However, the risk drivers found are in our opinion points of interest and attention in IT
governance in other organizations, especially those in the financial services industry. The
conclusions presented are useful as guidelines even in the absence of the data necessary
for constructing logistic regression models. Moreover, the methods explained in this paper
for identifying the drivers for IT risks are universally applicable for obtaining your own
IT risk models.
Capturing misestimation risks implies, among other things, that given a set of easily
retrieved indicators as regards an IT project and the environment in which it is carried out,
a prediction can be made as to how large the IT risks will be, so that proper measures can
be taken to mitigate them.
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IT risico’s in maat en getal
Uit analyses van de huidige kredietcrisis blijkt dat het nemen van risico’s, zonder te weten
hoe groot de kans is op aanzienlijke schade of verlies, kan leiden tot een globale crisis.
Banken die niet goed op de hoogte waren van de onzekere waarde van hun hypotheek-
portefeuilles moesten na het omvallen van de huizenmarkt in de Verenigde Staten grote
bedragen afschrijven op hun balans. Dit vergrootte de algehele onzekerheid op de finan-
cie¨le markten, leidend tot de huidige kredietcrisis.
Het nemen van risico’s is een logisch onderdeel van ondernemen. Bij een duurzaam
ondernemersbeleid worden doorgaans gecalculeerde risico’s genomen in plaats van luk-
rake beslissingen gebaseerd op onderbuikgevoelens. Er wordt nagegaan op welke manier
de productiefactoren zo optimaal mogelijk ingezet kunnen worden zodat risico’s op grote
schade vermeden kunnen worden, of kansen op verlies verkleind kunnen worden. In de
traditionele economie zijn arbeid, kapitaal en natuurlijke hulpbronnen de productiefac-
toren. Met behulp van historische data, zoals bijvoorbeeld gegevens over ziekteverzuim,
levensduur van een machine, aantal millimeters regen kan een werkgever met enige zeker-
heid de verwachte inzet door werknemers voorspellen, wanneer een machine vervangen
moet worden en hoeveel water bij het waterbedrijf ingekocht moet worden om een veld
met kroppen sla voldoende groot te laten worden.
Vandaag de dag is software een belangrijke productiefactor, maar historische gege-
vens of beschrijvende of voorspellende modellen ontbreken doorgaans. Met een grote
regelmaat worden grote IT projecten voorpaginanieuws als blijkt dat kosten ruimschoots
overschreden worden en de projecten zelf onbeheersbaar blijken doordat de specificaties
maar blijven wijzigen.
Het EQUITY project beoogt door middel van haar onderzoek meer rationele beslissin-
gen te bewerkstelligen daar waar IT een factor speelt en onderbuikgevoelens te vermijden.
Dit proefschrift doet verslag van onderzoek naar het kwantificeren van IT risico’s. Daarbij
ligt in hoofdstuk 2 de focus op de mate waarin instabiele projecteisen een project onbe-
heersbaar maken en in hoofdstuk 3 wordt geanalyseerd welke factoren de discrepantie
tussen verwachte en daadwerkelijke IT kosten verklaren.
In veel bedrijven en overheidsinstellingen zijn geen analyses mogelijk door het ont-
breken van gegevensverzamelingen over IT projecten. De gegevensverzamelingen die
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gebruikt zijn in dit proefschrift zijn allemaal uit de praktijk afkomstig van verschillende
overheden, en bedrijven uit diverse industriee¨n. Door gebruik te maken van deze prak-
tijkdata zijn de uit dit onderzoek resulterende modellen direct toepasbaar en resulterende
benchmarks beschikbaar, ook voor bedrijven die gegevensverzamelingen ontberen.
Instabiele eisen
Een belangrijke oorzaak voor mislukking en verspilling bij grote projecten is de indiening
van aanvullende functionaliteitseisen tijdens de projectuitvoering. Doorgaans worden bij
een IT-project aan het begin de eisen van het op te leveren product vastgesteld in het
programma van eisen. Deze eisen heten bevroren te zijn tot oplevering, totdat door voort-
schrijdend inzicht, wijziging in wetgeving of andere exogene factoren, het slot van de
kluis met vastgestelde eisen smelt en er toch achteraf wijzigingen nodig blijken. Dit is
een herkenbaar moment voor iedere ITer en zeker goed verdedigbaar: op een product
dat voldoet aan vervallen wetgeving, maar niet aan de nieuwe gewijzigde wetgeving zit
immers niemand te wachten. Maar hoe vaak, en hoeveel nieuwe eisen, ook wel require-
ments genoemd, en wijzigingen van deze requirements kun je toestaan voordat een project
ondergesneeuwd raakt door continue wijzigingen van het op te leveren product? Projec-
ten met een onbeheerste groei van specificaties leiden gemakkelijk tot het falen van een
project, doordat het onduidelijk is en blijft wat er uiteindelijk bij de eindstreep verwacht
wordt: de ontwikkeling van de software wordt onbeheersbaar.
Op welk moment moet er dan besloten worden geen nieuwe eisen of wijzigingen
van de eisen van het af te leveren product meer toe te staan? Het rente-op-rente model
biedt soelaas. Om te bepalen hoeveel groei tijdens een project nog gezond is grijpen
we naar een eenvoudig model uit de economie: samengestelde interest of rente-op-rente.
Als je 100 euro op een spaarrekening zet, keert de bank na een jaar 3 euro rente uit en
verhoogt daarmee het bedrag op je spaarrekening. Het jaar daarop krijg je 3% rente over
de 103 euro en keert de bank je 3 euro en 9 cent uit. 9 cent meer rente dan in het eerste
jaar. Een veelgebruikte rekenregel in de economie om te weten hoeveel jaar het duurt om
een spaarbedrag te laten verdubbelen bij een bepaald rentepercentage is de 72-regel. De
formule voor deze rekenregel is terug te vinden in geschriften uit de 15e eeuw [87] en
luidt als volgt:
t = 72/r (3.28)
Deel 72 door het jaarlijkse rentepercentage r en de formule geeft bij benadering het
aantal jaren dat je geld moet achterblijven bij de bank om het te verdubbelen bij een
gegeven rentepercentage r. De 100 euro is bij een rentepercentage van 3% dus na 24 jaar
verdubbeld.
Naar analogie van het samengestelde interestmodel introduceerde Capers Jones [60]
een model om de groei van de hoeveelheid werk uit te drukken in maandelijkse percen-
tages. Door bij oplevering van een project, of tussentijds, de omvang te meten en dit te
delen door de omvang aan het begin van een project, dat is nadat initieel het pakket van ei-
sen bevroren is, kan aan de hand van het aantal tussenliggende maanden berekend worden
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wat de groei per maand was. Hiermee kunnen de groeipercentages van projecten onder-
ling vergeleken worden. In aanvulling op de door Jones vermelde groeipercentages per
maand, laten we zien in hoofdstuk 2 hoe je kunt berekenen bij welke percentages je in de
gevarenzone terecht komt en er alleen nog maar extra werk bij komt en nauwelijks werk
wordt opgeleverd zonder uitzicht op afronding van het project. Als voorbeeld laten we in
Figuur 2.17 de groeipercentages zien van een overheidsproject dat uiteindelijk mislukt is.
Figuur 2.17 laat van e´e´n project en van een subproject de metingen zien op verschil-
lende momenten; aan het begin, na een paar maanden en na 8 maanden. De horizontale
as geeft het tijdsverloop van het project aan. De verticale as geeft de omvang van het
project in functiepunten weer. Een functiepunt is een veel gebruikte maat voor de omvang
van IT-projecten. Zoals men kan zien is het project in 8 maanden tijd gegroeid van ruim
1000 functiepunten naar bijna 1800 functiepunten. Dit betekent dat de projectomvang per
maand 6,5% is gegroeid, acht maanden lang. Als we alleen naar de eerste tweeenhalve
maand bekijken, groeide het project zelfs met 11,9% per maand. De voornaamste ver-
oorzaaker van deze groei was het getoonde subproject, dat in die periode van 8 maanden
groeide van 131 naar 823 functiepunten. Dit is maandelijks groei van maar liefst 25,6%
voor het subproject! In de eerste tweeenhalve maand groeide het subproject zelfs 65,5%
per maand.
Na de eerste tussentijdse meting had men eigenlijk de functionele eisen van het pro-
ject moeten fixeren. Echter de groei van requirements heeft uiteindelijk verder doorge-
woekerd, wat geleid heeft tot een onbeheersbaar en mislukkend project. Met de formules
uit hoofdstuk 2 kan voor iedere doorlooptijd van een project een gevarenzone berekend
worden. Deze gevarenzone ligt voor kortdurende projecten bij een hoger maandelijks
groeipercentage verder weg dan bij langdurende projecten. Een project dat 10 maanden
lang 10% groei per maand ondervindt, heeft daar namelijk meer last van dan een project
dat 2 maanden lang 10% groei per maand heeft. Door te kijken hoe dicht de waargenomen
maandelijkse groei bij die gevarenzone is gekomen, kunnen projecten van verschillende
duur beter met elkaar vergeleken worden. Ook wordt in de formules rekening gehouden
met de omvang van het project. Voor een project van grote omvang geldt dat ook bij een
relatief laag maandelijks groeipercentage de gevarenzone al snel wordt bereikt.
De initie¨le eisen van bijvoorbeeld het OV-chipkaart project zijn onderhevig aan veel
veranderingen. Helaas hebben wij niet de nodige informatie om vast te stellen of dit pro-
ject daadwerkelijk in de gevarenzone ligt, maar het staat buiten kijf dat de veranderende
requirements zorgen voor grote problemen. Door de technieken en benchmarks uit hoofd-
stuk 2 in de toekomst toe te passen bij tussentijdse audits kan beoordeeld worden of op
dezelfde voet met gelijkblijvende groei doorgewerkt kan worden, of dat er ingegrepen
moet worden. Dit kan gedaan worden door de groei te beteugelen of zelfs aan te sturen
op het laten inkrimpen van het project. Naast het hierboven beschreven gouvernementele
project wordt in hoofdstuk 2 in twee andere bedrijfssectoren de requirements volatiliteit
geanalyseerd. Ten eerste wordt de projectportfolio van een grote financie¨le instelling gea-
nalyseerd en ten tweede analyseren we de groei van specificaties van embedded software
van een software product line.
De technieken en data uit hoofdstuk 2 kunnen ook gebruikt worden om over afge-
ronde projecten inzicht te krijgen hoeveel groei nog toelaatbaar was en geabsorbeerd kon
worden binnen de organisatie. Indien de audits waren uitgevoerd bij de grootschalige
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overheidsprojecten waar we de afgelopen jaren kennis van hebben kunnen nemen, dan
hadden op basis van deze early warnings tijdig maatregelen genomen kunnen worden om
verspillingen te voorkomen.
Schatten van projectkosten
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt uit de doeken gedaan hoe met logistische regressie de bepalende
factoren voor misschattingen van projectkosten gevonden kunnen worden. De statistische
techniek logistische regressie wordt in andere vakgebieden veel toegepast. Zo wordt in de
geneeskunde deze methode gebruikt om na te gaan welke factoren van invloed zijn op de
sterfte van pasgeboren baby’s. In de logistische regressie is er e´e´n te verklaren variabele
met twee mogelijke waarden, 0 of 1, en een aantal potentieel verklarende variabelen met
een verschillende bereik. In de perinatale epidemiologie is de te verklaren variabele het
wel of niet overleven van de eerste vier weken na de geboorte. De mogelijk verklarende
variabelen in dat onderzoeksgebied zijn de leeftijd in weken sinds de laatste menstruatie
van de moeder, het geslacht van de baby en het gewicht van de baby. Met behulp van
een historische gegevensverzameling van de te verklaren en verklarende variabelen en
logistische regressie is het mogelijk de bepalende factoren te achterhalen.
In het beschreven onderzoek is gekeken welke factoren van invloed zijn op een mis-
schatting van de projectkosten. Een schatting van de kosten is daarbij gedefinieerd als
een misschatting indien de actuele kosten de geschatte kosten met meer dan 2,5% over-
schrijden of indien ze meer dan 5% lager uitvallen dan geschat. Kosten die uiteindelijk
hoger blijken dan geschat zijn problematisch voor de financiele situatie van een bedrijf,
maar indien de kosten lager uitvallen dan geschat dan zijn ten onrechte te veel financie¨le
middelen gealloceerd die voor andere projecten gebruikt hadden kunnen worden. Daarom
is het belangrijk te analyseren welke factoren bepalend zijn voor een misschatting.
Een gegevensverzameling van 79 projecten met een IT component van een grote fi-
nancie¨le instelling vormde de basis van het onderzoek. De factoren waarvan gegevens
beschikbaar waren om te bepalen of ze van invloed zijn op het ontstaan van misschat-
tingen waren onder andere de geschatte kosten, de geschatte doorlooptijd, het volwas-
senheidsniveau van de business unit op IT gebeid uitgedrukt in het Capability Maturity
Model (CMM) niveau, of er gerapporteerd wordt over financie¨le gegevens, het percentage
ontwikkelaars op de IT afdeling en het percentage interne ontwikkelaars. De laatste twee
factoren bleken bepalend voor een misschatting van de kosten. Bij een hoger percentage
interne ontwikkelaars neemt de kans op misschattingen af. De bedrijfsspecifieke kennis
neemt daardoor toe, de kennis over cultuur, complexiteit, infrastructuur en het require-
ments proces. Dit helpt blijkbaar in het maken van betere schattingen en daarmee minder
misschattingen.
Een lager percentage ontwikkelaars op een IT afdeling verlaagt de kans op misschat-
tingen. Dit duidt er op dat efficie¨ntie belangrijk is, overbezette afdelingen hebben meer
communicatielijnen. Deze extra communicatielijnen worden vergeten bij het schatten van
kosten en resulteren in misschattingen.
Opmerkelijk genoeg bleek het volwassenheidsniveau van een business unit, het CMM
niveau, niet van invloed op de kans op misschatting. Een verbetering van schattingen werd
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wel verwacht gezien de definitie van het CMM model. Een verklaring kan zijn dat de
CMM audits zijn uitgevoerd door het betreffende bedrijf zelf en niet door gecertificeerde
auditors. Daardoor zijn de CMM niveau’s mogelijk optimistisch ingeschat. Veel waar-
schijnlijker is echter dat de verbetering niet werd behaald wegens een zogeheten maturity
mismatch. Aan de IT kant worden bij een hoger CMM niveau onder andere verbeterin-
gen ingevoerd in het requirements management proces. Indien de business echter nalaat
de daardoor noodzakelijke verbeteringen door te voeren bij het testproces, dan wordt het
effect van de verbeteringen aan de IT-kant teniet gedaan. Deze maturity mismatch leidt
tot het ontbreken van een verbetering in het percentage misschattingen bij hogere CMM
niveau’s.
De variabele die aangaf of er gerapporteerd wordt over financie¨le informatie bleek in
eerste instantie geen invloed te hebben op misschattingen wanneer tegelijkertijd over- en
onderschattingen worden bestudeerd. Bij nadere inspectie bleek deze variabele wel een
effect te hebben indien alleen overschattingen of alleen onderschattingen werden geana-
lyseerd. In het geval van het ontbreken van financie¨le rapportages was er vaker sprake van
onderschattingen dan indien ze wel aanwezig waren. Als er wel financie¨le rapportages
waren, dan waren er juist meer overschattingen. Blijkbaar veranderen projecten bij het
invoeren van financie¨le rapportages van risicozoekende naar risicomijdende projecten.
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